The question of Pakistan’s participation in international nuclear commerce cannot be separated from the credibility of the criteria governing access to it. If nuclear security, safeguards and effective export controls are the standards against which applicants are judged, then those standards must apply equally. Pakistan’s position is straightforward: its nuclear credentials should be assessed on the basis of verifiable performance, not political considerations. A country that invests in strengthening its regulatory institutions, improves nuclear security and meets internationally recognised standards cannot reasonably be denied consideration simply because it does not fit an established political preference.

This is where the inconsistency in the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) approach becomes difficult to overlook. India was granted an exceptional waiver in 2008 despite remaining outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan, however, continues to face a different set of expectations, even though its civilian nuclear facilities operate under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The distinction raises an important question: is the NSG applying a consistent set of non-proliferation standards, or has access to international nuclear commerce increasingly become a question of political acceptability?

Pakistan’s position on the NPT and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) must also be understood in the context of regional strategic realities. Pakistan has consistently maintained that it cannot accept NPT membership as a non-nuclear-weapon state while India remains outside the treaty. Its position on FMCT follows the same logic. Pakistan favours an arrangement that addresses existing fissile material stocks rather than one that merely prohibits future production. A cutoff that leaves existing stockpile untouched would effectively preserve the existing asymmetry in India’s favour. These are not positions that can be dismissed as objections to non-proliferation. They reflect Pakistan’s concerns about strategic stability and its opposition to arms control arrangements that institutionalise an unequal regional balance. Expecting Pakistan to accept restrictions that do not address India's accumulated capabilities would hardly constitute a non-discriminatory approach.

The debate over nuclear security reveals another contradiction in the criticism directed at Pakistan. India has repeatedly questioned the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, with its defence minister calling for IAEA supervision of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in 2025. Yet, assertions about nuclear vulnerability must be tested against evidence. Following the May 2025 hostilities, the IAEA confirmed that Pakistan’s nuclear installations had suffered no damage and that no radiation had been released. The subsequent independent assessment of Pakistan’s civil nuclear security arrangements offers further evidence of institutional preparedness. These findings do not support the sweeping portrayal of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure as inherently vulnerable.

India's own position makes such criticism even more difficult to reconcile. Its civilian nuclear facilities came under IAEA safeguards through the 2008 arrangement, which also enabled its access to international nuclear commerce. Pakistan, meanwhile, continues to face restrictions despite placing its civilian nuclear facilities under international safeguards. If nuclear security is the principal concern, why should scrutiny be directed at Pakistan alone while India enjoys exceptional treatment? Nuclear safety cannot be invoked as a universal principle when convenient and applied selectively when political interests dictate otherwise. Pakistan's longstanding preference for universal and non-discriminatory nuclear security arrangements offers a more credible basis for addressing these concerns.

This is not to suggest that the latest IAEA assessment settles every question surrounding Pakistan's nuclear programme. Its significance lies elsewhere: it provides independent evidence of Pakistan's performance within the civilian nuclear security framework. That distinction matters because Pakistan's case should rest on what can be independently verified, rather than on claims that no existing mechanism is mandated to assess. The question is whether a country demonstrating verifiable progress should continue to face exclusion on grounds that are not applied consistently to others. If the NSG intends to preserve its credibility as a non-proliferation institution, it cannot allow political preferences to determine the application of its standards. Pakistan's case deserves consideration on the same objective terms extended to India. Anything less would expose the gap between the principles the NSG claims to uphold and the political realities governing its decisions.

*Komal Khan is Research Officer at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad.