In the fast-changing world of global geopolitics, some of the most thought-provoking predictions come from unexpected places. A lecture delivered in 2024 by Chinese Canadian scholar Jiang Xueqin, which was once a relatively obscure academic talk, has recently resurfaced across social media and geopolitical forums. In that lecture, Jiang made three striking predictions: that Donald Trump would return to the White House, that tensions between the United States and Iran could escalate into a military confrontation, and that such a conflict might ultimately end badly for the United States.

The renewed attention around the lecture is largely driven by the fact that the first two predictions now seem increasingly plausible. But it is the third claim, the suggestion that a war with Iran might not play out in Washington’s favor, that raises the most serious questions.

At first glance, that idea might seem counterintuitive. The USA possesses the world's strongest military force, with unmatched global presence, military power, and the largest number of allies. Iran does not have the conventional military power that the USA possesses. However, the nature of war in the twenty-first century is different. Military power and conventional strength alone cannot ensure victory.

If a war were to erupt between the United States and Iran, it would not be a conventional war between two countries, but a multidimensional conflict involving asymmetric warfare, proxy forces, cyber warfare, and the balance of power in the region. To understand why this war could become strategically costly for the United States, it is necessary to move beyond military comparisons and examine the deeper structural realities of military doctrine, geography, regional alliances, and the evolving nature of global power politics.

Theoretical Foundations: Asymmetric Warfare and Strategic Endurance

One of the most useful ways to analyze a potential U.S.–Iran conflict is through the concept of asymmetric warfare. In such conflicts, weaker actors compensate for their conventional military disadvantages by targeting the vulnerabilities of stronger opponents. Rather than trying to win decisive battles on the battlefield, they adopt strategies to prolong the conflict, raise the cost of intervention, and gradually erode their adversaries' political resolve.

Researchers such as Andrew Mack and Ivan Arreguín-Toft have shown that weaker states often succeed by avoiding direct confrontation with stronger powers. Instead, they rely on strategies like attrition, dispersing their forces, and sustaining long-term resistance. In these circumstances, victory is not defined by battlefield dominance but by something simpler: the ability to outlast the stronger opponent.

This is evident in the military doctrine of Iran, which has been developing a defense strategy since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Rather than trying to compete with America on military strength, Iran has been developing a military doctrine that ensures that the costs of war become politically and economically unsustainable for its adversaries.

Game theory offers another lens for understanding this strategy. Iran’s approach can be seen as a form of deterrence through punishment. The underlying message is clear: any attack on Iranian territory would trigger a chain of regional consequences—disruptions to energy markets, instability across the Middle East, and attacks on allied interests—dramatically raising the stakes beyond a conventional military confrontation.

Geography: Iran’s Quiet Strategic Advantage

One of Iran’s most underestimated strengths is its geography. The country covers more than 1.6 million square kilometers larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Its terrain includes mountain ranges, deserts, densely populated cities, and rugged coastlines.

For any outside military force, such terrain presents serious operational challenges. Historically, difficult geography tends to favor defenders rather than attackers. The Soviet Union’s experience in Afghanistan, as well as the United States’ campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, shows how terrain combined with local resistance can frustrate even technologically superior forces.

Iran has deliberately integrated these geographic advantages into its defense planning. Military installations including missile bases, command centers, and weapons depots—are widely dispersed and often located in hardened underground facilities. This makes large-scale bombing campaigns more difficult and reduces the effectiveness of rapid “shock and awe” strategies that characterized earlier U.S. interventions in the region.

Iran’s Layered Strategy of Asymmetric Deterrence

Over the past two decades, Iran has invested heavily in building a layered military structure designed to counter stronger adversaries.

At the center of this strategy is Iran’s ballistic missile program, widely regarded as one of the largest in the Middle East. These missiles give Iran the ability to strike military bases, key infrastructure, and maritime targets across the region. Advances in drone technology and precision-guided weapons have further strengthened its capacity for retaliatory strikes.

In the maritime domain, Iran has also developed unconventional naval capabilities focused on the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. Fast attack boats, anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and drone vessels form the backbone of this strategy. Even temporary disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz could send shockwaves through global energy markets.

Cyber warfare is another important element of Iran’s strategic toolkit. Iranian cyber units have demonstrated the ability to target financial systems, infrastructure networks, and industrial facilities. In a full-scale conflict, cyber operations could complement military actions by disrupting communications, logistics, and economic systems.

The Power of the Regional Proxy Network

Perhaps the most complex part of Iran’s strategic posture is its network of allied non-state actors across the Middle East. Often described as the “Axis of Resistance,” this network includes armed groups operating in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

These groups act as force multipliers, extending Iran’s strategic reach far beyond its own borders. In the event of a major confrontation with the United States, the United States could open multiple fronts across the region.

Such a situation would transform a bilateral conflict into a regional war spanning multiple theaters simultaneously. Rocket attacks, drone strikes, and irregular warfare carried out by these groups could stretch U.S. military resources and complicate strategic planning.

For Washington, that would mean managing not just a conflict with Iran but potentially simultaneous crises across several countries and political environments—an extremely complicated challenge.

Lessons from Modern Military History

Modern history offers many examples of technologically superior powers struggling against determined adversaries using asymmetric strategies.

The United States’ experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan highlight the limits of conventional military superiority when conflicts evolve into prolonged political struggles. In each of those cases, early battlefield successes did not translate into stable or decisive political outcomes.

These experiences have been studied carefully by Iranian strategists. Their strategy is based on the principles of patience and gradual erosion of the opponent's will to continue the fight. Rather than seeking a final battle, the aim is to extend the conflict over time until the opponent is unable to continue because the price is too high.

Long wars in democratic societies will eventually come under public scrutiny. The economic, political, and electoral consequences will eventually influence the strategy.

Economic Shockwaves and Energy Politics

Any conflict involving Iran would have consequences far beyond the battlefield. The Persian Gulf remains central to the global energy system, and Iran sits next to one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.

Disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz could cause dramatic spikes in global oil prices. Even limited interruptions in tanker traffic could destabilize international markets.

For energy-dependent economies in Asia and Europe, such disruptions could trigger inflation, economic stress, and political pressure on governments to push for rapid de-escalation.

Within the United States itself, the domestic economic effects of a prolonged conflict could also become politically significant.

The Multipolar World Factor

Another major difference between a hypothetical U.S.–Iran war and earlier Middle Eastern conflicts is the changing structure of the global order.

Today’s international system is increasingly shaped by competition among several major powers, including China and Russia. While neither country might directly enter a war between Washington and Tehran, both could influence the strategic environment indirectly through diplomacy, economic cooperation, or technological support.

Alternative financial systems, arms partnerships, and intelligence cooperation could help Iran withstand external pressure over time, gradually weakening the strategic advantages the United States has historically enjoyed in the region.

The Political Battlefield at Home

Wars are not fought only with weapons; they are also fought within the domestic political systems of the countries involved. In democratic societies, sustained military campaigns require public support and political consensus.

After two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, American society remains deeply cautious about large-scale military intervention in the Middle East. A prolonged and costly conflict with Iran could quickly become politically controversial.

Iranian leaders may believe that time itself could become a strategic asset. If the war drags on and becomes increasingly expensive, political pressures inside the United States could gradually reshape Washington’s strategic calculations.

The Danger of Escalation and Miscalculation

Even the most well-planned wars seldom go exactly as intended. The escalation process, miscommunication, or unexpected incidents can easily escalate even small-scale conflicts into full-blown crises in the region.

Possible escalations, such as energy infrastructure attacks, ships, or attacks on military installations, could easily get out of control. In such an environment, the possibility of strategic miscalculations is high.

A War That Could Redefine the Global Order

The mention of the possibility of a war between the US and Iran resulting in a negative outcome for the US should not be taken to imply that the US is likely to lose the war. Rather, it is a commentary on the complexities of modern war in a highly interconnected and multipolar world.

Even if Washington is successful on the battlefield, the final outcome will be influenced by a wide variety of factors.

Iran's geographic depth, asymmetric military capabilities, regional alliances, and patience might transform a conventional military confrontation into a prolonged geopolitical struggle with unpredictable outcomes.

The real message hidden in the renewed interest in Jiang Xueqin’s prophecy, however, is not about prophecy. It is about the nature of power in the twenty-first century. Modern wars, unlike their predecessors, do not end with the victors emerging triumphant. They rearrange the power structure in regions, upend the global economic order, and redefine the global political map.

In a world like this, even the most powerful nations must approach war not simply as a demonstration of strength, but as a decision with profound and unpredictable consequences.