Over the past several years, India's security agencies have carried out repeated raids, arrests, alleged encounters, and cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), almost always accompanied by claims of "Pakistan-sponsored" involvement, "Pakistani modules," or "cross-border handlers." What was once framed strictly as a national-security posture is, according to critics, increasingly functioning as a political and governance tool, one used to divert public attention away from domestic failures, unresolved grievances, and a growing chorus of political opposition.

The pattern is visible across multiple domains. Crises in education and governance, corruption scandals, minority concerns, and street protests are, in this reading, routinely securitized and rebranded as anti-state activity. Sections of the Indian media are said to reinforce this framing through sensationalist coverage built around recurring phrases such as "Pakistani module" and "cross-border handler" that circulate long before independent verification is possible.

A Contradiction at the Core

The central contradiction critics point to is straightforward: a large share of those arrested over alleged "Pakistan links" are not Pakistani nationals at all, but Indian citizens, including a significant number of local Indian Muslims. This has fueled accusations that the "Pakistan" label functions less as a precise security finding and more as a blanket designation applied to domestic dissent.

The numbers cited are substantial. From roughly 2000 through mid-August 2026, an estimated 1,960 arrests have reportedly been linked to alleged connections with the banned outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), with a further 493 to 496 tied to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), pushing the combined figure above 2,450. Year-by-year, LeT-related arrests are reported at 144 in 2022, 109 in 2023, 43 in 2024, 22 in 2025, and 17 through mid-August 2026. JeM-related arrests followed a similar declining trajectory: 60 in 2020, 35 in 2021, 43 in 2022, 21 in 2023, 29 in 2024, 21 in 2025, and 16 in partial 2026 figures. In 2025, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) reportedly categorized 67 of 276 arrested individuals under a broader "Jihadi" label. Critics stress, however, that an arrest is not proof of guilt. The meaningful benchmarks are independent judicial scrutiny, admissible forensic evidence, verified financial records, digital verification, a documented chain of custody, and, ultimately, final court judgments.

The August 2026 Crackdown

The largest recent operation surfaced in August 2026, when authorities announced roughly 253 detentions across 14 states, more than 200 arrests, and over 80 First Information Reports (FIRs) tied to an alleged network connected to Pakistani fugitive Shahzad (also referred to as Shehzad) Bhatti. State-wise breakdowns reportedly included Uttar Pradesh (62), Haryana (52), Delhi (51), Punjab (44), Rajasthan (15), Maharashtra (8), and Uttarakhand (5), with additional operations reported in Karnataka, Gujarat, Bihar, Telangana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, and Kerala.

Authorities announced recoveries including IEDs, grenades allegedly marked as originating from Pakistan Ordnance Factories, pistols, ammunition, and CCTV equipment. Yet questions remain, in the critics' framing, over whether specific, independently verifiable forensic evidence tied to each individual detainee has been publicly demonstrated with the same prominence given to the arrest announcements themselves.

Indian investigators have linked Shahzad Bhatti to several high-profile incidents: the October 2024 Baba Siddique case, the March 16, 2025 Jalandhar grenade attack, the November 2025 Gurdaspur and Sirsa attacks, and alleged 2026 plots spanning Ambala, Gurdaspur, Delhi-NCR, Hapur, Meerut, Greater Noida, and Gwalior. Additional names, including Sohail Ahmed (also referenced as Sohail Baloch), Abid Jatt, Ajmal Gujjar, Rana Hunain, and Hassan Gujjar, have appeared in official accounts as alleged handlers or facilitators.

Weakening Credibility

Critics argue the effectiveness of this security strategy is eroding as citizens increasingly question the credibility, evidentiary basis, and accountability underlying such allegations, particularly when mass arrests are publicized immediately, while clearly established Pakistani links or verifiable forensic evidence are not presented with comparable visibility. This, they argue, sharpens an uncomfortable question: if India's security and intelligence apparatus is as robust as officials claim, how does alleged Pakistani infiltration, handling, and clandestine module-building keep recurring across so many states?

The debate is not confined to India's borders. Kulbhushan Jadhav, a former Indian Navy officer arrested in Balochistan in March 2016, saw his case escalate to the International Court of Justice in 2019. In the United States, Vikash Yadav was charged in October 2024 in connection with an alleged murder-for-hire plot in New York, and his co-defendant, Nikhil Gupta, pleaded guilty in February 2026. In October 2024, Canada's Royal Canadian Mounted Police publicly detailed serious allegations involving Indian government agents, alleged homicides, violence, organized crime, clandestine intelligence gathering, and threats directed at members of the South Asian diaspora, particularly those associated with the Khalistan movement. In September 2025, Canada formally designated the Lawrence Bishnoi-linked Bishnoi Gang a terrorist entity, further intensifying debate over alleged India-linked transnational activity.

Taken together, these cases are cited as evidence of what critics call a double standard: India applies stringent security measures domestically over alleged "Pakistan" connections, even as serious allegations of Indian-linked cross-border interference, covert activity, and transnational repression have surfaced in Pakistan, the United States, and Canada.

The emerging counter-narrative, in this view, seeks to shift the conversation from "Pakistan is behind every Indian problem" to a different question: why is the Indian government unable, or unwilling, to address its own problems? Domestic discontent over governance, unresolved minority concerns, political opposition, and friction with Nepal, Bangladesh, and China are cited as challenges to the claim that Pakistan is the primary source of India's political and strategic difficulties. The "Pakistan" label, critics contend, risks becoming less a genuine security explanation and more a convenient political escape route from governance accountability, both at home and on the international stage.

The Real Test

Ultimately, the measure of credibility is not how many "Pakistani modules" are announced as dismantled, but how many of these allegations are actually proven before independent courts, using verifiable digital, financial, and forensic evidence, and how many cases involving Indian citizens arrested "in Pakistan's name" result in a genuine cross-border connection being established through judicial scrutiny rather than press briefings. As this debate continues, critics argue that India is losing credibility internationally due to what they characterize as unverified reporting and propaganda, even as Pakistan positions itself as a strategic partner to major global powers, including the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union.