REPORT  335 / ASIA 06 DECEMBER 2023   CRISIS GROUP

Nearly a million Rohingya remain stuck in Bangladesh, with little hope of going home soon, as violence rises in the camps and international agencies trim their assistance. Donors should scale the aid back up, while Dhaka should modify its approach to allow for long-term planning. 

What’s new? Turf wars among armed groups and dwindling aid have worsened dire conditions in refugee camps in Bangladesh, home to almost one million Rohingya since 2017. Dhaka and Naypyitaw are pushing for repatriation to Myanmar, but large-scale returns are unrealistic given insecurity and the absence of citizenship and other protections.

Why does it matter? Pressing for repatriation, Dhaka restricts refugees’ freedom of movement and ability to work in Bangladesh. Constraints on aid organisations also push up the cost of delivering humanitarian assistance. Refugees are taking drastic measures – from joining criminal gangs to attempting dangerous migration – simply to survive.

What should be done? Foreign governments can bring immediate relief to Rohingya refugees by upping their support for the humanitarian response. Meanwhile, given the likelihood of a protracted crisis, Dhaka should adjust its policies to increase aid efficiency and refugee self-reliance with support from donors. It should also overhaul the policing of camps.

Executive Summary

Six years after most of them fled Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the almost one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are no closer to returning home. While the 2021 coup in Myanmar has further dimmed prospects for large-scale repatriation, security and economic conditions are deteriorating in the overcrowded refugee camps. Local authorities have failed to keep the Rohingya safe from armed groups and criminal gangs fighting for control of the camps. International aid is declining, due to competing priorities and financial constraints, but the Bangladeshi government makes matters worse by restricting the refugees’ ability to earn an income. Donors should urgently increase humanitarian assistance closer to its previous level and work with the government to alter its policies so that more refugees have opportunities to support themselves. Bangladesh should also reform the way camps are policed, in part to allow greater civilian Rohingya leadership.

Over the past twelve months, turf wars among rival armed groups have bedevilled the sprawling refugee camps located in Bangladesh’s southern Cox’s Bazar district. Fighting between the once-dominant Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and groups such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) has left scores of refugees dead, while the number of abductions – in which armed groups or criminal gangs hold refugees for ransom – has increased nearly fourfold in 2023. While violence earlier occurred only at night, militants wielding knives and locally made guns now roam the camps during the day, threatening residents and killing rivals. Bangladesh’s Armed Police Battalion, which has been responsible for camp security since July 2020, not only lacks the resources to protect refugees, but also appears to be complicit in their troubles: its members are accused of extorting, kidnapping and even torturing Rohingya, who have almost no recourse.

Meanwhile, international support for the Rohingya humanitarian response is dwindling. In 2022, the UN’s humanitarian appeal was only 63 per cent funded, and pledges have dropped even more sharply in 2023 to date. As a result, humanitarian organisations have had to scale back vital services; most significantly, the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) has been forced to cut food rations twice, reducing them from $12 to $8 per person per month, or a meagre 27 cents per day. The cuts are devastating because most refugees are heavily dependent on aid; government restrictions designed to prevent Rohingya from integrating into Bangladesh mean that finding legal employment is exceedingly difficult. Rising food prices in the aftermath of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine have further exacerbated the problem. There are already indications that the aid cuts are having a range of deleterious effects, from rising malnutrition rates among children to more cases of intimate partner violence.

In early 2023, following two failed attempts at repatriation in 2018 and 2019, Naypyitaw and Dhaka pushed ahead with a pilot project that would see more than 1,000 refugees return in a first phase. Both sides – along with China, which is playing a mediating role – are keen to make progress, albeit for different reasons: Myanmar’s military regime believes that returns will help its defence at the International Court of Justice against allegations of genocide in 2017, while Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government hopes that they will play in its favour in the general election scheduled for January 2024. The repatriation attempt is unlikely to succeed, however. Refugees are sceptical of Naypyitaw’s assurances of their safety and wary of its refusal to grant them automatic citizenship. They have good reason to be cautious: conditions in Myanmar have got worse since the 2021 coup, and in November fresh fighting broke out in Rakhine State between the military and Arakan Army, one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups, making safe, dignified and voluntary return all but impossible.

The Bangladeshi government’s restrictions have deepened refugees’ reliance on assistance and added to the cost of the humanitarian response.

These three issues – rising insecurity, declining aid and stalled repatriation – are closely intertwined, creating a crisis that threatens to spiral out of control. The Bangladeshi government’s restrictions have deepened refugees’ reliance on assistance and added to the cost of the humanitarian response. Dhaka’s policy is also at odds with a reality in which tens of thousands of refugees are already working informally in cities surrounding the camps, where they are regularly subjected to exploitation due to their illegal status and forced to pay bribes to security officials.

Growing poverty and hopelessness in the camps – fuelled by the lack of near-term prospects of return to Myanmar – have compelled many Rohingya to make difficult decisions, ranging from young men joining armed groups or criminal gangs for pay to families resorting to early marriage of adolescent girls in order to reduce the number of mouths to feed. Thousands of desperate refugees have also undertaken risky journeys in the hope of reaching Malaysia, while an unknown number have quietly returned to Rakhine State despite the dangers or disappeared into other regions in Bangladesh despite rules that normally forbid them to leave the camps.

Bangladesh, in partnership with international actors, needs to break this vicious cycle. It should lay the foundations for a sustainable response that acknowledges the protracted nature of the crisis, even while it continues pressing the Myanmar authorities to create suitable conditions for repatriation. Donors have a crucial role to play in supporting initiatives that build self-reliance and minimise aid dependence, but they can do so only if Dhaka rethinks its policies, permitting activities beyond emergency relief. In the interim, they should bring humanitarian funding back to a level that lets refugees live in dignity, starting with ensuring that they have enough to eat. To address rising insecurity, Bangladesh also needs to overhaul the way it polices the camps, allow greater civilian leadership among the refugee population and take stronger action against criminals who are exploiting the refugee crisis for personal gain.

Cox’s Bazar/Dhaka/Brussels, 6 December 2023

Rohingya refugees gather on Camp 1E to commemorate the Rohingya Genocide Remembrance Day, in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. August 2023. NURUL ABSAR.

I.Introduction

The Rohingya refugee crisis drags on, with no end in sight.1 In August 2017, Myanmar’s military launched a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine State, after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had attacked police outposts and a military base. In just a few weeks, around 750,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, after the country’s prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, agreed to provide sanctuary to the Muslim minority. (Smaller numbers had already left Rakhine in 2016.)2 It was the third major exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh. Earlier waves followed military assaults on the group in 1978 and 1991-1992. This time, however, most Rohingya have not returned to Rakhine State. Instead, they are demanding that the military address what they consider to be the ultimate cause of their plight: Myanmar’s reluctance to grant them citizenship. Without citizenship, the Rohingya are denied basic rights in Myanmar, including freedom of movement, the right to run a business or own land, and access to such services as health care and education.

The mass expulsion of Rohingya in 2016-2017 horrified the world, but the refugees’ plight has drawn less and less attention as time goes on. They remain packed into camps in the Cox’s Bazar district in southern Bangladesh, which is one of the most sparsely populated areas of the country. Rohingya refugees outnumber local Bangladeshis almost two to one. Most of their camps are contiguous, clustered in an area known as Kutupalong, and together they make up the largest refugee settlement in the world, housing around 800,000 people.3 The Rohingya in the camps are sustained through an expensive aid operation jointly led by the UN and the government. Dozens of international NGOs and local groups are also involved. Over the past six years, the camps have become much more organised and, by all outward appearances, liveable thanks to donor-funded investments in basic infrastructure, including roads, water and sanitation facilities, and schools and clinics. Many of the trees that were cut down to make way for shelters and to provide fuel for cooking have regrown.

Living conditions for the refugees have declined dramatically.

But appearances are deceiving. Over the same period, living conditions for the refugees have declined dramatically, confronting them with an untenable choice between remaining in a state of growing immiseration and going home to the same insecurity that forced them to leave in 2016-2017. Bangladesh continues to advocate strongly for repatriation, eager to shed the burdens of hosting this population. For the most part, Dhaka resists policy changes that might make it more attractive for refugees to stay put.

This report examines the worsening plight of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. It also explains how the deteriorating security situation and the absence of protective safeguards means that large-scale repatriation is unlikely to proceed. Finally, it proposes ways for the Bangladeshi government and international actors to improve the refugee response, in light of the dynamics described above. The report is based on research in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar in June and October 2023, as well as interviews conducted remotely over a period of six months. Interviewees included UN and NGO officials, donors and diplomats, Bangladeshi and Myanmar government officials, independent experts and dozens of Rohingya refugees living in the Cox’s Bazar area. About 60 per cent of interviewees identified as men, and 40 per cent as women. It builds upon earlier Crisis Group reports and briefings published since the Rohingya’s mass flight in 2016-2017, as well as years of fieldwork on conflict dynamics in Myanmar.

II.A Security Breakdown

Security in and around the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar has worsened significantly in recent years. The main reason is that armed and criminal groups have firmed up a foothold inside the camps, something that Bangladeshi law enforcement has failed to stop. Violence has escalated especially rapidly over the past year, with up to a dozen different groups now engaged in turf wars and criminal activity, leading to a steep rise in killings and abductions. For most outfits, the primary goal is to gain a cut of the profits from the lucrative trade in methamphetamine tablets known as yaba, which arrive in large quantities from Myanmar, mainly across the Naf River, before traffickers carry the drugs further into Bangladesh.4 But these groups also make money in other illicit ways, including kidnapping, extortion and people smuggling.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2017 influx of refugees, armed groups such as ARSA maintained a low profile in the camps. By early 2019, however, ARSA had come to pose a clear and growing threat to the refugees’ safety.5 Although the Bangladeshi government officially denied the group had any fighters in the country, the security forces appeared to tolerate ARSA’s presence during this period. Some refugees also supported the group at first because they believed in its supposed political goal of creating an autonomous Rohingya region in Rakhine.6

Lacking any meaningful check on its activities, ARSA quickly established itself as the dominant actor in the camps.

Lacking any meaningful check on its activities, ARSA quickly established itself as the dominant actor in the camps. It set up an administrative system and started taxing refugees. It also worked to intimidate Rohingya who spoke out against its practices, including its involvement in the drug trade; Crisis Group interviewed numerous refugees whom the group has strong-armed.7 “ARSA started to behave violently from 2018”, said one. “They targeted educated people because they were the ones opposing their activities”.8 ARSA also went after women who worked as paid “volunteers” with the UN, international NGOs and civil society groups.9 “After I met a high-ranking official and told him about the problems in the camps, ARSA members came to my home at night and threatened me”, said a woman activist. “I was sick with fear – I had to go to a safe house”.10

ARSA’s reign was not to last, however. From 2020 onward, it came into conflict with other Rohingya armed groups, some of them established by former ARSA members.11 In September 2021, ARSA overreached when its members killed Mohib Ullah, a prominent political figure among refugees.12 His death was reported by major international media outlets, drawing attention to the mounting insecurity in the camps, and finally forcing the Bangladeshi government to acknowledge that ARSA was present and had become a problem.13 The security forces began to take more concerted action against the group, intensifying the crackdown following an incident in November 2022, when a Bangladeshi military intelligence officer was killed in a shootout, reportedly by ARSA members who were trafficking drugs close to the Myanmar border at the Zero Point or No Man’s Land camp near Gundum.14

Around the same time, an older Rohingya armed group, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), re-emerged as an important player.15 In January 2023, its members attacked Zero Point – which Bangladesh did not recognise as an official refugee camp – burning it to the ground as ARSA members fled.16 Media reports said the Bangladeshi security forces – which do not enter the area because they consider it Myanmar territory, although it is beyond a Myanmar-built border fence – had sought the RSO’s aid to clear ARSA from the area.17 Sources in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar later repeated these allegations to Crisis Group, although officials from both the army and government insist they are unfounded.18

Refugees also said they believe the RSO still has the backing of the Bangladeshi army and police. “ARSA is on the government’s bad side.  … So now the RSO is getting support from the security forces to attack ARSA”, said one Rohingya, who serves as a majhi, an unpaid official appointed by the Bangladeshi authorities to manage a section of the camps together with the police and the camp-in-charge, a government official.19 In addition to the Zero Point incident and the RSO’s sudden reappearance over the past year, the refugees pointed to the fact that the RSO can carry out activities during the daytime, when security personnel are on the job, whereas ARSA had previously operated only at night; several said they had seen Bangladeshi law enforcement and RSO members working together in the camps.20

According to official figures, armed groups were responsible for almost 50 killings in the camps in the first half of the year.

Violence has continued to increase through 2023, particularly between members of these two outfits. According to official figures, armed groups were responsible for almost 50 killings in the camps in the first half of the year, more than the number recorded in all of 2022, which was itself almost double the total for 2021.21 The real number of violent deaths in the camps is likely to be higher, as not all are reported. On 6-7 July 2023, a further seven Rohingya were killed during a visit to the main Kutupalong camp by the International Criminal Court prosecutor, Karim Khan, who was gathering testimony for a case against senior Myanmar military officials.22 Clashes began when an ARSA member reportedly killed a Rohingya assistant majhi who had been arranging for refugees to meet with Khan; in retaliation, the RSO shot five ARSA members dead, and the latter group responded by killing an RSO supporter.23

Dhaka has also taken stronger action to stop ARSA over the past eighteen months. The security forces have stepped up arrests of senior members, including a man described as the group’s “finance coordinator”. A personal assistant to ARSA chief Attaullah Abu Ammar Jununi, he was also allegedly involved in the killing of the military officer in November 2022.24 Meanwhile, in mid-2023 the government dismissed many majhis suspected of collaborating with ARSA.

Aware that the group is on the wane, and feeling increasingly vulnerable, low-level ARSA members are defecting to the RSO.25 The ARSA committees that once informally controlled many of the camps, collecting taxes and administering justice, are now largely dysfunctional.26

Support for ARSA among the refugees has also collapsed; in interviews with Crisis Group, most Rohingya said if they had to choose, they preferred the RSO. But they evinced a strong desire to get rid of armed groups completely, if possible, and also expressed concern that if the RSO were to gain firm control it would replicate ARSA’s repressive behaviour. “Definitely people don’t like ARSA”, said a Rohingya woman activist, “but when the two groups fire at each other, we are disappointed with both sides”.27 Many Rohingya live in fear of being caught up in the turf wars, and in general refugees report insecurity as being as big a concern as declining support from aid organisations (see Section III).28 “The camp is never peaceful anymore, never secure for anyone”, said an imam.29

Crime not directly related to the ARSA-RSO battles is also increasing in Cox’s Bazar’s overcrowded camps. An analyst monitoring crime in the camps recorded more than 700 abductions in the first nine months of 2023, up from around 200 in 2022 and 100 the year before.30 A refugee told Crisis Group there were at least five armed entities, including ARSA and RSO, operating in his camp. “They are very active in people smuggling, kidnapping and other unlawful activities”, he said.

But the impact of growing insecurity has been felt unevenly, varying not only from camp to camp, but even from block to block within individual camps, based on factors like proximity to main roads, where security patrols are most frequent, or forests, which enable criminals and armed group members to slip in and out of the camps – and evade arrest – with ease. “The camps are like a city of a million people – there are nice neighbourhoods and bad neighbourhoods”, a humanitarian official said.31

A Rohingya refugee stands with his son and daughter in one of the water taps provided by NGOs, Camp 1E in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. September 2023. NURUL ABSAR.

Certain individuals and groups are also more at risk than others. Men are more likely to be targeted than women, while young and middle-aged adults typically face greater threats than older refugees. Those holding positions of authority, such as majhi, or individuals who are active in civil society, for example members of women’s and youth groups, are particularly vulnerable.32 “Young men are most at risk from armed groups and security forces. When they cannot endure it any longer, they pay smugglers to get them to Malaysia”, a refugee explained.33

The drug trade has contributed to the rise of Rohingya armed and criminal groups in the camps. The porous Myanmar-Bangladesh frontier has long made Cox’s Bazar a hotspot for illicit activity, primarily drug smuggling. Myanmar’s emergence as a major global producer of methamphetamines in the late 1990s, combined with the growth of Bangladesh and India as markets for these drugs, has turbocharged the profits from this trade.34 Local syndicates that predate the 2016-2017 Rohingya refugee influx into Bangladesh have cooperated with Rohingya armed groups to recruit refugees to move drugs across the border at great personal risk.35 Meanwhile, sharper conflict in Myanmar since the 2021 coup has eroded Naypyitaw’s influence over the main drug production centres, primarily in Shan State; instead, non-state armed groups have tightened their grip, prompting a surge of illicit activity, including drug production.36 Local experts claim that both ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and the Myanmar security forces – or at least individuals within the military – are probably involved in trafficking.37

Politics in Bangladesh also appear to be quietly enabling crime in Cox’s Bazar by shielding certain actors from law enforcement. Bangladesh’s Department of Narcotics Control and at least four other agencies have identified Abdur Rahman Bodi, a ruling Awami League member who was formerly MP for Teknaf, a city across the Naf estuary from Myanmar, as the “godfather” of the methamphetamine trade.38 The department has also implicated dozens of his relatives.39 Though the Bodi clan have denied the charges, the fact that they have avoided any sanction leads to speculation that they have political protection.40 An Anti-Corruption Commission charge against Bodi from 2007 is unresolved, while he is on bail having appealed a three-year sentence imposed in 2016 for concealing his wealth from the Commission.41 When the Awami League eventually forced him to give up his seat in parliament in 2018, it selected his wife to run in his place. She was subsequently elected.42 Yet Bodi has been quoted saying he is still an MP: “My wife is the MP. So am I. … After all, our religion directs women to abide by their husbands”.43

The 2017 refugee crisis has provided useful cover for Bangladeshi involvement in the local illicit economy.

More generally, the 2017 refugee crisis has provided useful cover for Bangladeshi involvement in the local illicit economy, with much of the blame shifted to the Rohingya.

Armed groups have also benefited from a weak, poorly coordinated response to their activities by Bangladeshi security forces. In July 2020, the Bangladeshi army handed responsibility for internal security to two Armed Police Battalion units overseen by the Ministry of Home Affairs, with a combined 1,176 members when at full strength.44 The UN had advocated for the transfer of security responsibility to a civilian force in line with the humanitarian principle of maintaining the civilian character of refugee sites, but it quickly became apparent that the Battalion units were unable to fulfil the role.45

Although a third Battalion unit is now also involved, these units lack the resources – both in terms of officers and equipment – to properly police the camps, particularly given the lack of roads.46 Battalion commanders also concede that most officers are unmotivated and have poor service records.47 Although they are responsible for security around the clock, they tend to delegate night-time patrols to teams of unarmed Rohingya, putting the refugees at risk of harm from armed groups.48 Battalion members have also been accused of perpetrating a wide range of abuses against refugees, including arbitrary detention, torture and extortion.49

Interviews with Rohingya refugees revealed that the Armed Police Battalion units are widely viewed as unscrupulous. “Bribery is a big problem – the majority of [Battalion] police are corrupt. If you do business inside the camp and bring goods from outside, you need to pay a bribe to get through a checkpoint”, said one refugee.50 Another said: “People are very disappointed with [the Battalion]. They will not do anything without a bribe”.51 In some cases, they are also perceived to be colluding with armed groups in the camps.52 (Battalion officials reject suggestions that officers can accept bribes without repercussions. They insist that they take complaints seriously.)53

The authorities are cognisant of the Armed Police Battalion’s failures. In July, the cabinet decided to introduce multi-agency “joint patrols” in the camps, with the Battalion units joined by detachments from three Home Affairs-controlled paramilitary forces – the Rapid Action Battalion, the Border Guard Bangladesh and Ansar – as well as local police.54 Later the same month, Home Affairs Minister Asaduzzaman Khan said the government was considering redeploying the army to help the Battalion units contain the rising violence.55 It has not done so yet, however, in part because each of the army and home affairs ministry wants to be in command.56 Refugees told Crisis Group they would prefer the army to be in charge, as they consider it to be more effective and less corrupt.57 Humanitarian workers privately concur that the army would do a better job, but feel unable to advocate for its return to the camps because it would go against humanitarian principles.58

III.Dwindling Aid

Sixteen Rohingya refugee girls study in a classroom in Camp 3, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. 9 November 2023. NURUL ABSAR.

Rohingya refugees are suffering a further blow as donors significantly reduce funding for the gigantic humanitarian response. Foreign assistance for the Rohingya in Bangladesh remained steady in the first years of the refugee crisis, but in 2022, it dropped below $600 million for the first time. The decline has accelerated in 2023; as of the end of November, the Rohingya response was barely 45 per cent funded, compared to 64 per cent in 2022 and 73 per cent in 2021.59 The drop is primarily the result of competition posed by other crises, particularly that in Ukraine after Russia’s all-out invasion, which has absorbed a great deal of humanitarian funding, particularly from the West. UN efforts to attract support from other potential donors, such as Gulf Arab countries, have yielded little. Rising food prices also mean that the funds that are coming in are not going as far. Looking toward the horizon, the view is even bleaker than it is at present. “Such significant funding requirements are challenging to sustain in the long term”, a senior aid official working in the camps told Crisis Group.60

The cash crunch has forced the UN and humanitarian organisations to make tough choices. Expecting funding to decline, as it generally does in protracted crises, they had begun streamlining service delivery and camp management in 2021. But the scale of the shortfall in 2023 has forced the WFP to cut food support twice, leading to a total reduction of one third. Concretely, it has had to reduce the budget from $12 per refugee a month to just $8, or 27 cents a day.61 The cuts have been devastating for many families in the camps, most of whom do not have an income with which to supplement their rations. Malnutrition rates are now climbing rapidly, particularly among children, and the UN estimates that 85 per cent of refugees may be facing crisis levels of food insecurity.62

Cuts to other vital services, ranging from health and nutrition to protection and education, have also had predictable consequences. In a stark example, an estimated 40 per cent of refugees were affected by scabies in 2023. The NGO Médecins Sans Frontières, which had warned of a growing outbreak in 2022, said it was due to a combination of overcrowding, inadequate water supplies, poorly maintained sanitation infrastructure and shortages of medicine.63

As aid dwindles, Rohingya refugees have adopted dangerous coping mechanisms. Many refugee families are already in debt to local moneylenders, making it difficult for them to obtain further credit, and skipping meals has become commonplace. Many have taken more drastic measures. More young men are joining armed groups and criminal gangs to get a monthly wage. Girls and women, meanwhile, are more frequently turning to sex work or are being married off at a young age, either inside the camps, to Bangladeshis outside them or to Rohingya men who have emigrated to Malaysia, which requires undertaking dangerous trips in boats run by smugglers. “Parents are deciding to send their girls to Malaysia for marriage, despite the risks”, said a Rohingya woman activist. “The men there pay for them to be smuggled. Sometimes they are only thirteen, fifteen years old”.64

The number of Rohingya, both men and women, attempting risky voyages to third countries … is increasing.

The number of Rohingya, both men and women, attempting risky voyages to third countries – with Malaysia the preferred destination due to its large Rohingya population and higher wages – is increasing. In 2022, more than 3,500 Rohingya took to the sea to find sanctuary abroad, according to UN figures – five times the number in the previous year.65 The smugglers often mistreat or abuse Rohingya, and their overloaded boats are prone to sinking: around 10 per cent of the Rohingya who set out on this trip in 2022 died or went missing en route. Yet prospective migrants have not been deterred; it is likely that even more will make the journey in 2023.66 In the space of one week in November, five vessels carrying 866 people landed on the Indonesian island of Aceh, having spent up to two months at sea.67 That the journeys continue shows just how desperate people are to leave, and arrivals have cited violence and poverty as key reasons.68

Tougher policies in destination countries toward Rohingya asylum seekers – including boat pushbacks, refusal to conduct search-and-rescue operations when boats capsize and indefinite immigration detention – have spurred the emergence of new smuggling routes. Rather than travel directly to Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia by boat, from 2019 refugees started travelling through Myanmar using a combination of sea and ground transport, with some even making the entire trek overland, taking advantage of Myanmar’s porous borders.69 As the recent arrivals in Aceh illustrate, some Rohingya still go directly to third countries by boat, but the Myanmar route is increasingly popular.

Although this route is perceived to be safer than travelling directly on smugglers’ boats, Rohingya have died while transiting through Myanmar. It also entails different risks. Because they are not allowed to move around freely in Myanmar, Rohingya who cross township boundaries without official permission face between two and five years in prison under immigration laws.70 When caught, they are routinely prosecuted.71 Similarly, they can be arrested once in Thailand or even after crossing illegally into Malaysia. Tracking such journeys is also much more difficult. Researchers rely in part on Myanmar arrest figures, but many more Rohingya make it to their destination than are caught. Informed sources say at least 10,000 Rohingya likely reach Malaysia each year.72

A Rohingya refugee walks with his children at Camp 4East, in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. August, 2023. NURUL ABSAR.

Alongside the growing insecurity in the camps, the cuts to food aid and other services risk forcing some refugees to return to Myanmar’s Rakhine State, in effect, even though they believe conditions there are unsuitable for repatriation (see Section IV). As a Rohingya woman activist told Crisis Group:

Most people are dependent on the food rations, and when the WFP cut them a second time this year, people lost hope. … Many assume it is a ploy to get us to repatriate. If they don’t increase the rations, it will be difficult to survive, and we will be forced to go back.73

Women and girls are disproportionately harmed by the aid cuts. Traditional gender roles mean that they are responsible for ensuring the family has enough to eat – something that was already difficult, but has now become impossible without supplementary income; when there is not enough food, women and girls are usually the first to miss out.74 Rohingya women Crisis Group spoke to said lack of money was causing an increase in intimate partner violence and divorce, something that aid groups have also noted.75 A Rohingya imam agreed that couples were fighting more often due to financial difficulties: “Every day, I see that women are always worried, always thinking how they can survive. … Many widows and poor families are crying every day. They cannot feed their children”.76 One mother explained that her three daughters are unable to marry because the family cannot pay a dowry; local practices mean that the girls spend almost all their time inside the family’s tiny shelter, rarely venturing outside.77

Although the funding gap stems in part from donors being confronted with competing priorities worldwide, Bangladeshi government policies have exacerbated the problem. Citing its own large population and development challenges, Dhaka is highly sensitive to any measures that suggest the Rohingya population may remain in Bangladesh for the long term, much less integrate into Bangladeshi society. Believing that repatriation is the only solution to the crisis, Dhaka blocks any action that it believes may discourage or delay Rohingya from returning to Myanmar.

The government’s reluctance to publicly acknowledge the protracted nature of the crisis manifests in a range of ways that undermine the sustainability of the humanitarian response. For example, Dhaka has resisted efforts by the UN and humanitarian agencies to shift from single- to multi-year plans, forcing them to mount an emergency-style response year after year. It has also long enforced a ban on refugees seeking employment, leaving many refugees heavily dependent on aid. Meanwhile, aid organisations are impeded from taking steps that would meet refugee needs in a cost-effective way. They can build only temporary shelters of bamboo and tarpaulin, which need to be replaced regularly, even though putting up more durable dwellings would save both time and money – and probably lives as well, given the regular cyclones that hit the region.78

To alleviate pressure on the Cox’s Bazar area, Dhaka has encouraged refugees to relocate to Bhasan Char, a silt island it has repurposed to this end in the Bay of Bengal about 40km from the mainland. Although the island is unpopular among refugees due to its remoteness, around 30,000 Rohingya have been transferred there so far, the government’s stated objective being to reach a total of 100,000. In some cases, refugees appear to have been coerced into moving to the island, including some who were physically brought there.79 Beyond the risks associated with Bhasan Char – particularly from cyclones – the cost of delivering food and services on the low-lying island is higher than in Cox’s Bazar, using up funds that could be spent more efficiently in the camps.80

The lack of a medium-term plan and attendant policies also makes it hard for aid agencies to attract development funding.

The lack of a medium-term plan and attendant policies also makes it hard for aid agencies to attract development funding that could be used to shift away from an emergency response. Being in emergency response mode also adds significantly to the aid operation’s cost. If more refugees were able to support themselves, the WFP could target assistance only to the most vulnerable, for example. The problem was lesser while donors continued to generously fund the UN’s annual humanitarian response plan, but the decline in pledges has finally brought matters to a head. “Being in emergency response mode was fine because we had the luxury to pay for it, but that’s not the case anymore. … I really think we’re at an inflection point in the aid response”, said a senior official at one agency.81

When it comes to employment, Dhaka’s policy is already at odds with reality. Because there are few avenues for Rohingya to work legally – getting a job as a paid “volunteer” with the UN or an NGO is the only possibility – many families rely on the informal economy to survive.82 Tens of thousands of people are thought to leave the camps every day to work in Cox’s Bazar and can be found labouring on construction sites, in markets and on farms. Because they cannot do so legally, however, they receive low wages – in turn driving down pay rates for locals – and are at risk of exploitation or even violence at the hands of employers and security forces. Other Rohingya families operate small shops or businesses in the camps. Whether working informally outside the camp or running a business inside, refugees generally must pay bribes, primarily to Armed Police Battalion officers, particularly when they enter and exit the camps.83

While it has resisted many measures that reflect the protracted nature of the crisis it faces, Bangladesh has made some concessions. In January 2020, Bangladesh agreed to a UN proposal to introduce Myanmar-language education, replacing an emergency learning framework that had been put in place shortly after the Rohingya arrived – something that Crisis Group had been advocating for.84 After delays due to COVID-19, the Myanmar Curriculum Pilot got under way in November 2021. The system was introduced throughout the camps in 2023, with 300,000 students reportedly enrolled in the current academic year.85 The rollout has not been entirely smooth: refugees cited a litany of problems, including poorly motivated teachers, a lack of instructors who can speak Burmese and low attendance rates.86 Still, the Myanmar Curriculum Project is a significant improvement on the early learning centres that preceded it, which Rohingya derisively referred to as little more than a “child-minding service”.87 It provides, at least, a foundation on which further improvements can be made.

Another positive development has been Dhaka’s decision to allow third-country resettlement to resume. Bangladesh had blocked Rohingya refugees from being resettled since 2010, on the grounds that the possibility of resettlement would act as a pull factor, encouraging more Rohingya to cross the border.88 In 2022, however, it signalled that it would allow some refugees to be resettled for the first time in more than a decade.89 The U.S. then announced it was launching a resettlement program for “the most vulnerable” refugees, and at least half a dozen other countries have followed suit, or are considering doing so.90 Yet only around 500 have been resettled so far, partly because countries have committed to only small intakes, but also because of bureaucratic delays, including Dhaka’s sluggishness in issuing exit permits for those approved.91 Resettlement will be life-changing for those who are selected and, as discussed below, it can also have symbolic value. But even if states ramp up programs significantly, the effect will be limited. Far less than 1 per cent of refugees worldwide are resettled each year.92

IV.Repatriation Redux

A.A Trilateral Push

In recent months, Bangladesh and Myanmar’s military regime have resumed efforts to repatriate Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State under a bilateral agreement signed in November 2017. Two earlier attempts, in November 2018 and August 2019, were unsuccessful, due primarily to Myanmar’s then-government, headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, failing to provide guarantees to the Rohingya regarding citizenship, security and other key concerns.93 Negotiations were then put on hold, due first to COVID-19 and then to the February 2021 coup in Myanmar. In January 2022, the military regime restarted talks with Dhaka, and in June of the same year, a joint working group met for the first time in more than three years.94

Already involved in the 2019 repatriation attempt, China re-emerged in late 2022 as a mediator, adding momentum to the negotiations.95 Appointed in December, Beijing’s new special envoy for Asian affairs, Deng Xijun, has paid several visits to both Naypyitaw and Dhaka, raising the repatriation issue each time.96 Beijing also convened a trilateral meeting on the issue in Kunming, China, in April 2023, encouraging the sides to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, principally related to verification of refugee identity and eligibility, that were preventing them from moving the repatriation process forward at a bilateral level.97 All three countries are eager to see repatriation take place, albeit for very different reasons.

• Myanmar’s military regime wants some refugees to return in order to assist with its defence at the International Court of Justice, where The Gambia has brought a case against it under the Genocide Convention for the 2017 crackdown on the Rohingya in Rakhine State.98 From the regime’s point of view, allowing returns would undermine allegations that it committed genocide, which requires showing that the perpetrator had genocidal intent.
  
  More broadly, and however wishful its thinking may be, it believes that repatriation will alleviate international pressure it is facing in the post-coup crisis.99 Yet it will only be willing to take back a limited number of refugees – likely far short of the 750,000-plus who entered Bangladesh in 2016-2017. Myanmar authorities say no more than 500,000 fled to Bangladesh, claiming that some of these people are “newcomers” who had migrated illegally to Rakhine State. They have so far reviewed the eligibility of barely 15 per cent of the Rohingya whom Bangladesh has put forward for repatriation. Of those, they have rejected around one third.100 An official told Crisis Group that the process would move slowly, as the Myanmar side wanted to make sure there were no “extremists” among the returnees. The official added: “Those refugees who have settled in Myanmar for generations will want to come back and getting citizenship should be easy for them. Those who are newcomers from Bangladesh, they won’t want to come back”.101
• Bangladesh’s Awami League government is keen to show progress on repatriation to the public, including ahead of a gene