The recent visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Israel is perhaps one diplomatic affair that has received quite a traction, owing to a number of reasons. First, the visit not only consolidated the emerging diplomatic reset in New Delhi’s policy vis-à-vis Israel, but also depicted New Delhi’s desertion from its anti-colonial standpoint - which was once the bedrock of India’s foundational ideology, and anchored its positioning with the global South. Second, Modi’s visit came at a time, when Israel-led humanitarian onslaught and genocide in Gaza led the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into facing immense political and diplomatic isolation; both from within Israel and the broader states and multi-lateral organisations, with Washington being an exception though. Third, the visit took place at a time when the west Asian eastern stability was about to hit a cliff as Tel Aviv and Washington were gearing up to initiate a military action against Iran. And fourth, a few days before Modi’s visit, Netanyahu voiced his ambition to form a ‘hexagon of alliance’ against so-to-say the Sunni and Shia axes in west Asia, while naming India to be a part of this alliance as well.

Quite naturally, the contextual backdrop of this visit painted it as New Delhi’s way of approving of Netanyahu. During Modi’s address to the Israeli Knesset – which was not attended by most opposition members of the Knesset – both leaders lauded and thanked one another for being reliable and sympathetic. Modi also expressed his deep condolences for the victims of the October 7 attack by Hamas. The meet culminated in both countries signing several agreements and joint initiatives, alongside the India-Israel strategic partnership being elevated to ‘special strategic partnership’.

As the Israel-U.S.-led Operation Epic Fury commenced – throwing regional stability into free fall, Modi’s response was characterised by a condemnation of attacks on the UAE, without any mention of Iran or the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Hence, quite evidently, New Delhi has placed itself in the U.S.–Israel camp; decoupling the issue of Palestine from Israel. In the past couple of years, New Delhi also abstained United Nations resolutions calling for ceasefire in Gaza. However, it could be noted that at the same time, New Delhi has nonetheless supported the two-state solution. India’s warming up with Israel is largely seen as PM Modi’s call. While formal diplomatic relations between the two states were established in 1992, however, since Modi’s rise to power, bilateral ties have picked up pace tremendously; most significantly in the domains of defence trade and counter-terrorism.

Over the past decade, Israel has grown to become India’s largest defence supplier. The Indian military fields a wide range of Israel-origin weapons and weapon systems including missiles and air defence systems such as the Barak Surface-to-Air Missiles and SPICE Precision-Guided Munitions. The Indian military fields Israel-origin Phalcon AWACS and EL/M series advanced naval radar types. Israeli-origin unmanned aerial vehicles, loitering munitions, small arms & light weapons also form a major part of Indian military inventory. In 2017, alongside other countries, the Indian Airforce also participated in the Exercise Blue Flag hosted by Israel. Furthermore, in 2024, the Indian military conducted a joint military drill with Israeli forces in New Delhi.

However, it is to be noted that Israel has been cooperating with New Delhi over security matters prior to Modi’s rise to power as well. For instance, Tel Aviv has provided military assistance – albeit limited – to New Delhi during its military confrontation with China in 1962, as well as its military confrontation with Pakistan in 1965, 1971, and 1999. More interestingly, India’s Special Operations Group, which was involved in the infamous Operation Blue Star was established and trained with assistance from Israel. Likewise, India’s National Security Guard, a paramilitary force for internal security risks also receives trainings from Tel Aviv. Following the 1999 Kargil conflict, Israel provided New Delhi advanced military technologies for counter-insurgency purposes.

However, New Delhi now seeks to transform India-Israel military cooperation from a buyer-seller model to a co-development and co-production model. Prior to Modi’s visit, Indian sources had claimed that Israel had offered New Delhi the co-production of key military systems including the Ice Breaker cruise missiles, the Golden Horizon missiles of the Sparrow series, and the Arbel technology for small arms. Following the visit however, little has surfaced regarding India’s expectations of joint military productions with Israel. Nonetheless, both leaders have committed to deepening bilateral defence and strategic ties, with both leaders charting their visions for future defence cooperation.

While agricultural cooperation and access to Israel’s labour markets also features among Indian interests, however, New Delhi’s cooperation with Tel Aviv is primarily rooted in its defence modernization needs, defence-technological collaborations, and counter-terrorism cooperation. For Tel Aviv, as its largest weapons buyer, New Delhi has been pumping money into its defence industry. Going forward, Tel Aviv seeks to scale up its defence production by outsourcing select manufacturing processes to India, whereas New Delhi can benefit from technology transfer and military-industrial growth.

However, while deepening military-industrial cooperation, New Delhi may be expected to keep its ties with Israel as transactional as it possibly can. At the very least, New Delhi could be expected to continue its support for the Two State Solution. despite Tel Aviv’s wish to let go of this policy position. Support for Two State Solution will give flickering resemblance of New Delhi committing to its global south positioning, while evading the ire of completely abandoning its moral position on Palestine’s independence question. Hence, India’s classic aversion for alliances may factor in India-Israel ties as well.

Hence, while strengthening ties with Israel, New Delhi would seek to balance its ties with if not with Tehran, then with other West Asian states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Both states have increasingly grown apprehensive of the emerging Israel–United Arab Emirates nexus.

New Delhi continues to depend on energy imports and labour markets in the region. While more than half of India’s oil imports, and over thirty percent of India’s gas imports are sourced from the Gulf states. Likewise, more than seven million Indian migrants are reportedly working in the Gulf region, representing the largest expatriate community in the GCC. These workers are estimated to generate approximately $40 billion in annual remittances.

And lastly, despite Netanyahu’s announcement the ‘hexagon of alliance’, New Delhi could be well-expected to shy away from any formal treaty obligations, thereby relying on approach characterised by strategic hedging rather than a comprehensive alliance commitment. So far, New Delhi has also maintained its distance the Gaza Peace Plan. India does not do alliances; instead, it is known for its aversion to alliances.

Hence, going forward, while New Delhi will make the most out of its cooperation with Israel, particularly in defence and technology, however, at the same time, it will preserve sufficient diplomatic flexibility to navigate West Asia’s complex geopolitical landscape. In this sense, India’s Israel policy will likely remain defined not by unconditional alignment, but by a calibrated blend of strategic partnership and strategic hedging.