Bangladesh goes to the polls on 12 February 2026 (with a referendum on the “July National Charter”) under a caretaker government helmed by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, and temperatures are heating up. Two narratives are converging: legitimacy on the street (who “owns” the post-outrage moment?) and authority over institutions (who gets to hold power after Election Day?).

Inquilab Mancha violence and questions over state authority

Narratives around police violence against Inquilab Mancha supporters have fast become a red line test for whether the caretaker state is falling back into old patterns. New Age reports indicate violent confrontation outside Shahbagh/Intercontinental, hospitalizations from sound grenades, protests renewed in several cities; Jamaat leaders have released statements criticizing the police use of force and calling for reprimanding of officers involved.

Bracketing the partisan spin from all sides, the trend is significant: when police violence is perceived to be targeting a political camp particularly the movement with strongest claims to having organized under the banner of “July-uprising” or “justice” it reinforces concerns that the government still has old men around/power structures which tolerate elements from previous regimes, and that Yunus doesn’t have full authority over caretaker organs. The political toxicity comes from Yunus staking out a central claim that his handpicked government would not repeat Hasina-era authoritarianism.

Yunus & proposals to reform the presidency itself

Gautam Das raised an important point yesterday, Yunus seeking a presidency with actual powers, rather than Bangladesh’s traditional figurehead presidency, which ties into questions about caretaker intentions and the future shape of Bangladeshi governance.

Yunus has certainly laid out arguments for a recalibrated state where different institutions are held accountable; the July Charter document itself leaves room for stronger presidential checks on governance.

But how realistic is this assertion? Bangladesh’s competitive politicians, whoever they may be, post-election, do not typically want a strong, independent presidency with authority over their heads. There is also the immediate structural limitation: Bangladesh’s current president has signaled his intent to resign mid-term, after the February elections, following an “insult” from the caretaker government. So there’s an incentive (and suddenly an open seat) to think strategically about “what happens to the presidency?”

It leaves Yunus political future bound up in whether he can capitalize on caretaker authority to legitimize the electoral outcome and enshrine constitutional reforms, without seeming to create avenues of power for himself.

Yunus: friends with BNP? friends with Jamaat? What’s real?

Yunus needs both BNP and Jamaat to cooperate: the former for a credible vote, the latter for stability on the street. But what do both sides actually want?

BNP wants this election and likely views itself as the frontrunner. Reuters report: Rahman rules out alliance with Jamaat, forecasts victory.

Jamaat (literally and figuratively) wants a piece of the action. Their supporters are mobilizing post-uprising energy and chanting/sloganizing about a return to “moral order” in the hopes of winning seats and, importantly, influence over which reforms pass and how the constitution is rewritten.

In between stands Yunus: he can’t overtly “align” with either party without jeopardizing his neutrality. The more plausible hypothesis is base-level transactions: staying in BNP’s good graces to assure they participate and stay committed to credible voting, and courting Jamaat to maintain law & order.

Awami League in exile; India’s “complacency.”

India has been sucked into Bangladesh’s political calculus. Key problem:

India is providing a safe haven + political space for Awami League politicians. London-based Guardian ran an interview with exiled AL leaders in Kolkata/Delhi who believe they can make a political comeback, and segments of the Bangladesh media/alarmists believe Hasina is overseeing AL coordination from Indian soil. BJP-ruled India has responded by signaling displeasure through a withholding of normal diplomatic engagement, and Bangladesh is responding by formally protesting and demanding clarification through the ambassador.  Three destabilizing incentives spring from this brewing nationalism/narrative campaign:

All contacts, incentive to disrupt: Awami League networks see some value in unrest/discrediting elections to open political space for their return.

Nationalist backlash: India sheltering exiled political leaders only worsens public perceptions of New Delhi and escalates voices within Bangladesh.

Minority-security fear campaign: Heightened insecurity (real/fostered) among Hindus is already entering international forums; AP reports escalation in violence ahead of elections and communal insecurities that also strain diplomatic ties between India and Bangladesh.

Percentages, we can (and can’t) reasonably speak about

The caveat emptor on “percentages” cannot be overstated. Beyond spokespersons blowing smoke, no reputable polling organization with a transparent methodology is releasing definitive voting intentions that you can quote as verified/share in the last week before an election as volatile as Bangladesh’s.

What we can point to from legitimate journalism:

AL is not on the ballot. Where does that leave loyalist voters? Reuters spoke to former AL voters who say they will defect from the BNP or the Jamaat/Islamist alliance, while others express uncertainty about voting or simply “not voting” due to a lack of direction.

Scenario-framing, not guessing polling:

You have an AL-leaning voter base that either sits out in significant numbers. Even if political conditions change, the public’s anger, fear, and disillusionment remain “sticky” and will influence the election or votes tactically for BNP (experience/order) or Jamaat (“accounts will be settled”/younger candidate appeal). A The BNP-Jamaat split favors BNP structurally as the national party with a reliable voting machine, but Jamaat’s share will depend on youth mobilization and the “anti-Extortionist / justice” vote.

Jatiya Party in disarray, limited utility on “Vote NO” campaign

Jatiya Party is not unified. There are factions. There are disputes over the use of the symbol/logo. A divided Jatiya Party is ill-positioned to mount a national Vote NO campaign, particularly around the referendum on the July Charter, amid intense focus on the parliamentary race and fear-mongering over voter turnout and violence/security. Additionally, The Daily Star notes that the July Charter is a compilation of 72 reform proposals. Many are contentious; poll participants will be genuinely confused about whether to tick yes, no, or both (“yes, no, and confused” literally the point of referendum ambiguity). With these uncertainties in mind, Jatiya Party’s effectiveness is expected to be locally candidate-driven rather than national.

Bring it all together: who *is* Yunus allying with? What’s his future?

Short answer: nobody. Yunus is betting on the political process itself right now: a smooth delivery of elections, a successful referendum on institutional reform, and the establishment of a buffer on caretaker powers. We can expect pressure points and political wild cards to emerge the day after the polls. Effective voting means Yunus can check out of politics and leave as the statesman who delivered “transition”. The marginalized vote will show how wide the political gap is and whether Yunus can include those excluded groups, either through a constitutional position if the transitional council/setup creates room (related: questions over the succession of the current president), or as a historical footnote.

If the vote is mishandled, repression is employed, or police are found to be partisan, Yunus joins the company of predecessors who vowed democratic reform but upheld the legacy of force as the primary means of governance. Inquilab Mancha will feature prominently in that discussion.

If vote disruption and AL-in-exile rhetoric gain steam (with the India backdrop intensifying), the incoming government will be tougher on nationalism, quicker to prioritize security, and less willing to wait for reforms to be implemented.

Is Yunus talking about or positioned for “presidency with real powers”? Probably. Will he get it from anyone who wins a parliamentary majority? Doubtful. His best bet for political staying power is helping lock in reforms that outlive winner-takes-all Bangladesh elections, and that starts with credible police restraint, real accountability for misconduct, and educating voters on what the referendum actually decides.