The Whisper, Not The Policy Memo

A conversation between a US diplomat, unnamed for obvious reasons, and a podcast host is creating ripples across Dhaka’s political and journalistic establishment. Informal, nuanced, and shot through with notes of accommodation bordering on warmth, attempts by members of the Jamaat-e-Islami found space in this interview. This was not an announcement of policy. No démarche was released. But in statecraft, sometimes whisper matters more than words.

Whether that anonymous US diplomat was authorized to speak on behalf of the US government matters less than what that conversation signals: a hardening pragmatism in Washington’s dealings with political Islam in South Asia. Increasingly defined not by ideology but by calculations of stability, leverage, and vote-counting.

In Bangladesh, where Jamaat is among the most divisive political forces, these signals matter and, however provisional, carry real risks.

Why Is Jamaat Back on Washington’s Radar?

Make no mistake: Jamaat-e-Islami today is neither the Jamaat of ’71 nor is it the Jamaat we saw on the streets at the height of the Shahbag protests. Jamaat today is weaker, operationally restricted, but still a part of Bangladesh’s socio-political fabric. It lost a lot of ground after 2008, never regained its electoral legitimacy since 2001, and now survives off of patronage networks rather than votes.

For long stretches of Western engagement with Bangladesh, Jamaat simply did not compute. Too toxic a political brand to engage with because of its wartime baggage, ideological rigidity, and capacity to mobilize on the streets.

Until now? Until suddenly they do.

There are three reasons:

First, the US recalibration with Islamist parties in the wake of the Arab Spring has been ongoing for over a decade. In Tunisia. In pockets of the Middle East. America has proven willing to hold conversations with Islamists as long as they claim to play by or at least don’t outright reject an electoral rulebook.

Second, Bangladesh has been polarized for so long now that Washington finds its list of interlocutors dwindling every year. Once the space for democracy narrows, that’s when diplomats start looking beyond Bangladesh’s two largest parties.

Third, New Delhi. Delhi wants friends, and Dhaka wants development dollars. That puts Beijing here, there, and everywhere. With Jamaat providing leverage with the Hindu-nationalist BJP and India’s state institutions watching Bangladesh closely, the US doesn’t want to find itself in a situation where it is exclusively tied to Dhaka’s ruling party.

In that calculus, Jamaat is unlikely to be Washington’s partner of first choice. But it sure as hell can serve as one pressure point among many.

Talking isn’t the same as trusting, but it’s also rarely neutral

“The US talks to everyone,” read many a Twitter comment. “Diplomats speak to whomever they please all the time.”

They do. To dictators. To insurgents. To boycott-bound countries.

Yes, but…

There’s something particular about Bangladesh’s political landscape. Jamaat is neither a civic institution nor a political party. It is an entity whose deeds are legally documented, morally condemned, and judged by the International Standards of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.

War crimes trials in Bangladesh may not pass the ICC’s threshold of rigor, but for Bangladeshis, Jamaat is an exception they remain a key pillar of the spirit of liberation.

So when Jamaat leaders interpret American WhatsApp messages as a license to return to the political mainstream, or when foreign journalists suggest Jamaat can be palmed for electoral convenience without confronting its history, they do so without understanding that for many in Bangladesh, any soft-peddling by the West is seen not as standard operating procedure, but as revisionism.

Friendly chats with politicians allied with Jamaat may not normalize it. But they sure as hell let it off the hook of historical accountability. And informal diplomacy always leaks.

Weak Signals

Weak signals matter. And they matter most when sent to fragile democracies.

In Dhaka, that podcast got fewer plays than the whiff it created. On one side, government supporters ask if Americans really mean it when they say one thing on human rights and then privately cozy up to political Islam. On the opposition side, the worry is that the US is talking to everyone because it is preparing for both scenarios: a BNP-led government and a post-Hasina Awami League ecosystem.

For Bangladesh’s civil society, this is fodder for an even more toxic takeaway: If international actors are willing to cozy up to Jamaat, why pressure Bangladesh on human rights? If Jamaat can sit across from American diplomats, why can’t legitimate NGOs criticizing the current Bangladeshi government?

Weak signals don’t just embolden Jamaat. They leave Bangladesh’s persecuted minorities feeling anxious. Because when you “engage” Jamaat, they don’t hear “engagement”. They hear, “Who knows what’s going on here anymore?” And it’s not just happening in Bangladesh.

Engaging Islamist Political Parties: The South Asia Spread

Washington’s whisper to Jamaat reflects a larger trend across South Asia. Engagement with religious parties in Pakistan is not new. Business with the Taliban in Afghanistan became a necessity far too soon. Sri Lanka gets a pass on human rights because it serves geopolitics.

Bangladesh is being folded into that list. This is not to say that the US government should have no contact with Jamaat. Far from it. That would be foolish, politically naïve, and diplomatically myopic. What is dangerous, however, is having those conversations without loudly and clearly articulating what is and what is not acceptable. No red lines means diplomats operate in grey zones, and Jamaat knows how to game the international community on optics.

What America Should Say…

If America wants to avoid mixed messages, here’s what they should say publicly and clearly:

First, any engagement with Jamaat must be predicated on buy-in, not exploratory. The United States should not have conversations with Islamists in Bangladesh unless those conversations are directly tied to commitments to democratic principles, to non-violence, and to upholding the spirit of Bangladesh’s Constitution.

Secondly, Bangladesh’s war history is not a diplomatic favor. It is not something to sidestep during a reading of the political tea leaves. Bangladesh’s liberation struggle is not a footnote in history, but the founding of a republic.

And thirdly, engaging Jamaat should not take the pressure off mainstream political parties to restore credible electoral competition in Bangladesh. Having a lengthy contact list does not and should not substitute for advocating institutional reform.

Epilogue: Casual Signals Cost Democracies

Major powers often forget how quiet back-channel signals seep into their small democratic partners. A passing comment on a podcast in DC can become headline-grabbing applause in Dhaka. A diplomat’s sigh can be misconstrued as support.

Bangladesh doesn’t just have elections to worry about. It has to worry about the slippery slope of international ambiguity around Jamaat. If today it is Jamaat, what’s tomorrow? When does a hedge become assistance? When does engaging political Islam stop being pragmatic and start becoming permission?

We often hear what diplomats say. Sometimes, we just hear what they don’t say.