By Adnan Qaiser 28 December 2022
After the inconclusive Battle of Eylau between the French and Russian forces (February 7-8, 1807), Napoleon had famously said: “Death is nothing, but to live defeated and inglorious is to die daily.”
Upon assuming his command, Pakistan’s new Army Chief, General Asim Munir issued a moral boosting statement stating Pakistan remains “ever ready to take the fight back to its enemy.”
As Pakistan faces innumerable internal and external challenges to its sovereignty, territorial integrity and very survival, the statement had been reassuring. The Army Chief’s words essentially snubbed political as well as military voices from archrival India, unrealistically boasting to take over the disputed region of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan from Pakistan, militarily. However, Pakistan walking its talk – which seems more like just “talking the talk” – needs a closer examination in the backdrop of recent events and Pakistan’s posture and response.
First of all, the question keeps lingering as to why the 6th largest Armies of the world with a nuclear overhang did not fire a single bullet when Indian aircrafts molested Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity for good 21 minutes targeting three sites at Balakot on February 26, 2019. Indian aggressive infringement had been first of its kind after nearly 48 years since the War of 1971. Pakistan Air Force’s next day’s response in Operation Swift Retort had been perplexingly restrained: It did not cross the Line of Control (LoC) and simply fired a few glide bombs at empty football grounds next to Indian defence headquarters – duly sparing Indian senior military command.
In my 2019’s paper titled Calling Nuclear Bluff on Balakot: India’s ‘Choreographed’ Corporal Punishment to Pakistan, I had tried to analyze the military encounter and arrived at a conclusion that there was no way Pakistan had taken the Indian beating lying down – and not activating its full defence potential involving: (i) Pakistan’s Anti Access/Area Denial weapon systems (A2AD); (ii) PAKSATs satellite imagery as well as Chinese satellites’ feeds; (iii) Radars and Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) manned by Air Force, Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and Army Air Defence Command; and most importantly (iv) state’s well-entrenched and deep-rooted intelligence prevalence in India’s defence architecture.
One must recall that subsequent to the Balakot triumph, when a frenetic and war-crazy Indian government was rumoured to have decided to punish Pakistan with six missiles strike (if Islamabad did not release a captured Indian pilot), Pakistan’s intelligence not only came to know about New Delhi’s designs well in advance, but Islamabad had also threatened to respond “three-times over.” In my paper, I had quoted a retired Pakistani air marshal who acknowledged in a television talk-show about Pakistan’s capability of getting forewarned about any imminent Indian air attack 30 minutes in advance.
Furthermore, while it is no secret a Pakistani nuclear armed ballistic missile can strike New Delhi within three to seven minutes, Pakistani generals under President General Pervez Musharraf had asked the British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Director of Communication, Alistair Campbell, to remind India on his visit: “It takes them eight seconds to get the missiles over.”
Thus, in all likelihood, Balakot had been a “controlled and choreographed” military encounter right under the watchful eyes of international powers to allow India vent out its public anger at Pulwama terrorist attack two-weeks earlier on February 14, 2022. The bidding was not to cause any harm to either side or escalate the conflict any further. Both sides obliged.
Notably, the downing of an Indian fighter jet by Pakistan Air Force and capture of its pilot remained an unexpected aberration. Never been part of the “script,” Islamabad dutifully freed Wing Commander Abhinandan as a peace gesture two days later on March 1, 2019. Pakistan was made to look the other way and endure global mortification due to its critical economic situation seeking financial handouts.
Two subsequent developments in Indo-Pakistan relations further corroborate Balakot as a “fixed military exchange:”
First, two years later the Directors General Military Operations (DGMO) of the two countries, who had been at each other’s throat until recently, quietly agreed to a ceasefire at the LoC – leaving analysts puzzled at the out of blue rapprochement.
Secondly, reports emerged about Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) involved in backchannel talks with its rival Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in UAE. While the two governments remained hushed-up – and perhaps embarrassed – at the disclosure, the surprise ceasefire at the LoC had been attributed to the Emiratis, who, in my view, had been one of the guarantors and choreographers of Balakot.
Despite analysts having noted Indo-Pakistan conflict entering into a more dangerous phase with chances of a limited war between the two countries, I always maintained that by allowing India to carryout Balakot strike, Pakistan essentially renounced all its options to counter India militarily – including nuclear brinkmanship and Assured Destruction (MAD) through Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence.
A Waned and Weathered National Army
While Pakistan remained preoccupied for two decades with Taliban’s resurrection in Afghanistan, it did not pay heed to the changing world dynamics in which India successfully established its geopolitical clout, diplomatic fraternity, economic viability and military utility, globally.
An emerging G20 economy having strong military presence in the Indian Ocean to safeguard Western security interests, India successfully flaunted its democratic credentials and gained sympathetic hearing to its lamentation on Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism. Unsurprisingly, under the guise of India’s right to self-defence, New Delhi adopted its dangerous military doctrine of “proactive operations under massive (nuclear) retaliation,” if obstructed. Thus, Indian military’s cross-border operation in Myanmar in June 2015 and surgical strike in Pakistan on September 29, 2016 didn’t ruffle any feather, internationally; becoming a new normal, regionally.
Meanwhile, a complacent but economically crippled Pakistan – keeping all its proverbial eggs in (unreliable) Chinese basket – kept losing out its geostrategic significance, Muslim world influence and its nuclear power standing. Moreover, Pakistan Army’s controversial political meddling in the country besides the unhealthy practice of its successive Army Chiefs receiving service extensions kept eroding Rawalpindi’s militaristic stature, weakening its muscle.
Since the Indo-Pakistan military mobilization in India’s Operation Parakram – also called as the Twin-Peak Crisis – Pakistan Army has been noticeably left to quietly endure India’s transgressions and public threats without responding with a matching response or exploiting New Delhi’s domestic and external vulnerabilities. Consider, for instance:
1) As India unilaterally broke its 2003’s ceasefire agreement with Pakistan over allegations of its troops’ beheadings at the LoC in January 2013, Pakistan Army did not come forward to give a meaningful response to the world that a professional Army entrusted with UN Peacekeeping Missions around the world does not dehumanise its enemy. Moreover, except for just proforma press conferences by Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) on India’s repeated ceasefire violations at the LoC, Pakistan never gave a matching response that could stop India’s belligerence.
2) Pakistan again took Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s August 5th, 2019’s decision to integrate the disputed Jammu and Kashmir into the Union of India lying down. Except for giving hollow war threats and getting the issue discussed in a closed door meeting at the UN Security Council (through China’s help), Pakistan could do nothing. Since New Delhi must have tied up all loose ends internationally to avoid any unexpected fallout, the world didn’t come out in support of Islamabad, making Pakistan realize having no role to play anymore in the seven-decade old territorial dispute.
3) Pakistan’s outlook further departed from realism when its former army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa – known for his “Bajwa Doctrine” of invoking military diplomacy – outlined a doctrinal shift towards “geo-economics” – though without putting his own house in (political and economic) order first.
4) Moreover, except for submitting (unconvincing) dossiers of Indian “terror campaign” here and there, Islamabad keeps silently enduring New Delhi’s subversive and terrorist activities under India’s “secret war” in Pakistan’s erstwhile tribal areas and restive Baluchistan province. Despite arresting India’s serving Naval spy, Commander Kulbhushan Jhadav on March 3, 2016, causing terrorism and subversion in Baluchistan, Pakistan continues to foot-drag implementing his death sentence awarded through a Field General Court-Martial (FGCM) on May 8, 2017, probably under international pressure.
5) Thus, unsurprisingly, Pakistan did not exploit India’s vulnerabilities in its bloody insurgency in Maoist-Naxal Red Corridor seeking secession from the Union of India. Although, it had been India which had played a catalyst role in the break-up of Pakistan by directly intervening in East Pakistan and leading to Pakistan’s disintegration in December 1971, a weak and weathered Pakistan finds its interventionist options foreclosed.
6) Pakistan also did not take advantage from the 70-day military standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at Doklam, Bhutan from June 16 to August 28, 2017.
7) Pakistan even did not respond in kind by flaring up separatist movements in India’s north-eastern “seven-sister states” bordering Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Pakistan has frosty relations with Bangladesh with hardly any interaction with the Myanmar junta.
8) Moreover, with Khalistan movement gaining momentum, – not only in India but also in Canada and Europe through an international referendum for the creation of a separate homeland for the Sikh community – Pakistan again chose not to incite India’s break-up campaign. Despite winning immense goodwill from the Sikh community worldwide by opening up Kartarpur Corridor at Baba Guru Nanak’s 550th birth anniversary on November 9, 2019, Pakistan keeps abstaining from inflaming the secessionist Khalistan movement in India.
9) Furthermore, as India’s rightwing government of Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) tried to outcast Muslim minority by snatching away their right to citizenship through the discriminatory anti-Muslim Citizenship Amendment Act (National Registry) leading to violent protests, Pakistan again stood at the sidelines as a silent spectator.
10) Worryingly, a browbeaten Pakistan’s defence mechanism not only failed to detect but also did not respond when India’s BrahMos cruise missile veered well into Pakistan’s sovereign territory on March 9, 2022. Amid conflicting theories ranging from “accidental firing” to “testing” Pakistan’s defence preparedness and response measures, Rawalpindi’s inaction showed Pakistan’s well-thought policy of surrendering to India’s repeated intransigence and not stirring up the hornet’s nest.
11) While India continues to hype a “two-front war” against China and Pakistan simultaneously, similar to its docility during the Doklam Standoff in 2017, Islamabad silently stood at the fence during the Indo-China violent clashes at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Galwan Valley at Ladakh in 2020. As Indian forces’ incapacity to face dextrous Chinese troops became evident, forcing them to relinquish their sovereign territory, analysts expected Pakistan taking advantage of India’s battlefield battering to at least get the Siachen Glacier freed from Indian occupation. Pakistan again demonstrated cold feet.
Although I am re-postulating my thoughts, positing Pakistan’s lack of political will and economic and military wherewithal to confront India in a “regional new-normal,” I had highlighted India’s inability to confront Chinese and Pakistani forces simultaneously in my 2018’s paper titled The Hindutva Itch: India’s Perverse Strategic Thought.
I had noted, for instance: “The Indian army chief’s rhetoric of a two-and-a-half-front war, taking into account several ongoing insurgencies and separatist movements in India, seems to be based on Germany’s First World War’s Schlieffen Plan (1914) that aimed to deal with a smaller enemy to the west (France) quickly; before taking on the larger adversary in the east (Russia). The two short wars (out of three) in 1965 and 1971 that India fought against Pakistan gave India enough confidence to defeat Pakistan swiftly before taking on a mighty China. However, in their book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China through Military Power, Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab underline the stark difference between the Indian and Pakistani armies. The authors posit: “Let alone China, India cannot even win a war against Pakistan,” because, while “Pakistan has built a military power, India has just put together a military force.””
The times, however, have changed. In the backdrop of Balakot attack, Pakistan’s repeated inaction at India’s belligerence and brinkmanship demonstrates its lack of capacity, resolve and determination to wage a war over India, even if push comes to shove. Pakistan’s “presenting the other cheek demeanour” further manifests its prohibition by international powers from the use of nuclear riposte.
12) The loss of Pakistan Army’s face and military punch comes from the self-serving and avaricious outlook of its successive Army Chiefs starting from President General Pervez Musharraf. Although a “Colonel’s coup” or revolt by junior ranks, similar to those in Arab or African countries, is not possible in the Pakistan Army, the Army Chiefs remained preoccupied with avoiding any internal upheaval in the rank and file to sustain their prolonged periods of power. Thus, in order to accommodate the under command who could find their career growth stymied, these Chiefs “unrealistically and unsustainably” kept enlarging the pyramid of Pakistan Army granting hefty salary raises, perks and privileges. Unsurprisingly, a state has now arrived when present-day’s secretive and questionable military budget finds it hard to pay the salaries and pensions of officers and soldiers or to buy new military hardware.
13) Lastly, since political leadership and civil administration hardly play any role in the strategic affairs of Pakistan – including fighting insurgency in Baluchistan and terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces – it has always been the Army that has kept these matters in its own hands and ruled the country directly, or by staying behind the scenes, through hybrid governance.
Since the issue of Khaki-Mufti relations has always dogged the country, I had analyzed this dichotomy in my 2016’s paper titled Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations: Internal Battlefronts Exposed from Media Leak. I noted, for instance that while the Army has been blamed for imposing martial laws as well as controlling democracy, little introspection has gone into the insidious role played by the disloyal, corrupt and at times treacherous Pakistani politicians in harming the country. Army’s interventions have always come as a last resort to save the fourth “national security state” in the world from total collapse, repeatedly.
However, while terrorists and tribal militants continue to run riot killing innocent people, various factors have led to Army’s soft stance towards the religious extremists:
(i) One, the senior military leadership – until 2020-21 – had been thoroughly indoctrinated into the fundamentalist political Islam under the “Islamization” policies of former President General Zia ul Haq during 1980s (As a young commissioned officer then, I remain witness to such systematic religious brainwashing). Thus, Pakistani generals found it difficult to: (a) Shed their staunch religious dogmas; (b) View Afghan Mujahedeen, including the Taliban, as an existential threat to Pakistan’s security, and; (c) To part ways with their anti-American sentiments.
(ii) Secondly, Pakistan’s three decade long drift towards religious extremism introduced a so-called “Kalashnikov Culture” of Afghan jihad in the country. Since the Army could not insulate itself from the national ethos, militants’ aiders, abettors, financers, facilitators and sympathizers seeped into the rank and file of Pakistan Army too. A number of terror attacks at armed forces’ fortified installations – including the audacious attack at the General Headquarters at Rawalpindi on October 10, 2009 – thus underscored Army’s internal faultlines and vulnerabilities. Syed Saleem Shahzad made quite a revelation in his book Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, before the author was brutally tortured and murdered by unknown elements, ten days later.
It is, therefore, not surprising to see Pakistan continue appeasing the terrorist Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by signing peace-deals and ceasefire agreements with the militants – who, in return, (a) keep rubbishing the ceasefire; (b) carry on killing the security forces; (c) threaten innocent population to follow their Sharia edicts and (d) extort money from politicians and traders alike.
A national army, whose heart and soul have never been fully invested in the Global War on Terror (GWoT), unsurprisingly faced a lot of setbacks and losses in its “selective operations” in the former seven tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan. Apart from finding it difficult to convince its semi-literate and religiously staunch soldiers why a Muslim Army had been killing faith-fellows, the Army bizarrely termed the existential GWoT as LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) rather than COIN (Counterinsurgency). Thus, while military operations Al Mizan (2002–2006); Rah-e-Haq (2007); Zalzala and Sher Dil (2008) had failed; Operations Rah-e-Rast (2009); Rah-e-Nijat (2009–2010); Zarb-e-Azab (2014) and Rad-ul-Fasad were forgotten and not pursued with the same vigour and resolve.
As the Pakistani government decided to review its strategy after TTP militants called-off their June 2022’s truce, threatening bloodshed in the country, I noted in my Tweet of December 1, 2022 that Pakistan’s appeasement policy towards the militants comes from the State’s (read the Army):
(i) Conviction about its “wayward brothers and sons” getting reformed one day and laying down their arms
(ii) Pusillanimity and lack of spine fearing militants’ retribution under use of force harming innocent citizens as well as well as causing troop losses as collateral damage
(iii) Continued policy of supporting the Afghan Taliban – who in turn keep backing TTP as well as Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K)
(iv) Preoccupation with internal political conflicts, economic dire straits and Baluchistan insurgency
(v) Propitiation of clergy, turning them into a religious mafia in the country
(vi) Negligence towards implementing National Action Plan (NAP) of December 26, 2014 as well as making National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) effective, and
(vii) Lack of financial resources to fund yet another military operation
Such a misplaced ideological orientation ingrained in the psyche of Pakistan Army and misconceptualization of the Global War on Terror keeps failing the Army in its fight against terrorism and religious extremism in the country.
As the affected population came out in throngs to protest for days, and media began to outcry, the new Army Chief had to once again come out publically to assuage fears and reassure the nation about Army’s commitment in fighting terror – of course without conducting any kinetic military operation on ground – underlying a talk, that never walks.
Indo-Pakistan New Normal
Pakistan has probably accepted the fact that it cannot match an economically spurring and culturally appealing India, making international headlines. As Pakistan’s long-standing benefactors like United States, China and Saudi Arabia have begun to forsake a failing and defaulting state, the country finds itself directionless and abandoned.
Pakistan has also reckoned that under the new world order its geostrategic utility’s shelf-life has expired. The country had been successfully encashing its geographic location as well as its militaristic prowess in the Muslim world in the past. The country’s formidable intelligence apparatus has long provided valuable support to the tyrant Gulf monarchies. However, with those states coming of age and not needing such services anymore, Pakistan finds itself left in a lurch.
To be fair, Pakistan had not only stopped the onslaught of Soviet socialism as a frontline state in Afghan jihad, but also helped in exterminating the menace of Islamic terrorism of al Qaeda – though half-heartedly under U.S. pressure in War on Terror (for reasons discussed above in point. 13). However, with Afghanistan becoming a past and closed transaction for the world, an isolated Pakistan seems to be left to its own devices to handle the scourge of terrorism that comes in the shape of Afghan Taliban, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Moreover, India has been damaging Pakistan by two means:
(i) One, through the use of cross-border terrorism employing Pakistan’s religious militant extremists like TTP in the erstwhile tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province as well as in the mutinous Baluchistan province seeking independence (owing to Islamabad’s perpetual political and economic neglect). India’s use of Afghan – and Iranian – soil for causing subversion and terrorism in Pakistan had not only been acknowledged by the former U.S. defence secretary, Chuck Hagel in 2013, but also stood confirmed with the arrest of India’s serving Naval Commander Kulbhushan Jhadav working for Indian intelligence Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).
(ii) Secondly, Indian media has been playing a major role in hysterically voicing New Delhi’s so-called “terror victimhood” narrative at the hands of a “villainous” Islamabad. I realized this fact when I was invited to participate in a few Indian television talk-shows. Having compelled to leave the discussions halfway – with heavy editing of my comments and microphone put on mute – Indian media’s strategy of using their platforms for Pakistan bashing in frenetic and shrieking voices belatedly dawned upon me. However, such black propaganda not only incites a sense of jingoism and hyper-nationalism among the Indian people but also sows seeds of mistrust and misgiving among the Pakistani population against their government and armed forces – thus eroding the very foundations of a nation-state.
Henry Kissinger had once noted “stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement.” Despite strategic stability (read: nuclear armed parity) between the two countries, Indo-Pakistan conflict does not stand at stalemate. India’s deft diplomacy won New Delhi many a sympathisers internationally. Following the unfortunate incident of 9/11, India further made good use of the term “terrorism” and conjoined it with Pakistan’s sub-conventional strategy by non-state actors in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region.
Subsequent to a few terror incidents in India – such as Indian parliament attack on December 13, 2001; the Mumbai attacks on November 24, 2008; Pathankot attack on January 2, 2016; Uri attack on September 18, 2016; and Pulwama attack on February 14, 2019 – to bleed India by a thousand cuts and to draw world attention towards the unresolved dispute of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan got the blame and pressurized internationally at the UN Security Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee as well as by grey-listing by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). While Pakistan’s “three time grey-listing” by FATF from February 28, 2008 to October 21, 2022 largely remained Pakistan’s own failing, India too played a major role in keeping Islamabad bogged down in international finance for not putting in place anti money-laundering checks and terror-financing safeguards.
Historically speaking, the use of non-state-actors by countries has remained a norm globally. However, the trend abruptly came to an end after the 9/11 incident when the international community suddenly woke up and became loath to the use of proxies, especially those having religious kinship.
Admitted by President Musharraf, for years Pakistan used the jihadist elements to pursue its defence and foreign policy objectives in the region. However, under international condemnation Pakistan had to forsake its policy of using jihadist proxies. As India and Pakistan mobilized their armed forces and stood eyeball to eyeball for good ten months in 2001-02 after the terrorist attack at Indian parliament, General Musharraf had to publically renounce support for jihadist elements in Kashmir. Both countries agreed to a ceasefire at the LoC after the said policy change.
In my 2017’s paper titled Pakistan’s Jihadist Cauldron: Between National Interest and Liability, I had tried to examine Pakistan’s “constraints” in breeding the jihadists and how they later become a “millstone” around the country’s neck.
Pakistan, meanwhile, remains devoid of any viable option to confront India, either:
1) Diplomatically: As no other country is willing to buy Pakistan’s narrative out of their: (i) Geopolitical policy priorities; (ii) Geo-economic interdependence upon India’s booming market economy of 1.4 billion people; and (iii) Their need for a democratic policeman in the Indo-Pacific to watch the strategic interests of the Western world (especially against an autocratic China)
2) Militarily: (i) Undisputedly, Pakistan lacks conventional military wherewithal or economic capacity to withstand a war against India; (ii) The country also does not possess any leverage to employ sub-conventional attrition by proxies or non-state actors anymore; and (iii) A nuclear armed Pakistan finds its hands tied to even think of exercising its nuclear option
3) Employing Third-Party Intervention: A foreign power is often pulled into a conflict for either of three reasons: (i) Conflict attention and prioritization; (ii) Conflict escalation and/or restructuring and transformation; or (iii) Conflict resolution. However, despite a looming threat of nuclear conflagration such a course is no longer available to Pakistan due to: (i) U.S. strategic alignment with India against a mutual threat of China; (ii) China’s deeply entrenched trade partnership with India and Beijing’s alienation from Islamabad due to latter’s inability to protect Chinese nationals employed at “struggling” – almost “stalled” – China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from terrorism; (iii) Seven-decade old Indo-Russian fraternity; and (iv) UN and European Union’s non-relevance in Indo-Pakistan conflict management
Having no policy alternative to counter India, all the Pakistani civil and military leadership is left to do is to: (i) Lament Indian mischief at their press conferences; (ii) Keep submitting dossiers of Indian terrorism to all and sundry around the world; (iii) Rally support to deny India a permanent membership at the UN Security Council, and (iv) Bury their dead in terrorism as martyrs.
Like a “twelfth man” in the game of cricket – awaiting any unexpected incident or an inadvertent injury to step in and play his role – Pakistan’s has always acted as a stop-gap arrangement in the geopolitical game-play offering its “transactional services” in the past. While it waits for another miracle – or a catastrophe to happen – the country has run out of world patience – and time.
In this backdrop, Pakistan’s current Army Chief’s reiteration of giving a befitting response to the enemies – both internal as well as external – is confounding, to say the least; as it does not materially support Pakistan’s demonstrated military posture, and its power and punch.
In an interview to Best Defence former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage had worryingly noted: “Twenty-five years from now … I can assure you there will be a nation called Afghanistan, with much the same borders and the same rough demographic makeup. I probably couldn’t say that about Pakistan.”
Adnan Qaiser is a foreign affairs expert having had a distinguished career in the armed forces and international diplomacy. He tweets @adnanqaiser01 and can be reached at: [email protected] and. Views are personal and do not represent any institutional thought.
Detailed listing of Endnotes can be found at the Author’s website: www.cwmc.wix.com or at his LinkedIn account: https://www.linkedin.com/in/adnan-qaiser-90774021/
 Adnan Qaiser (Author), Calling Nuclear Bluff on Balakot: India’s ‘Choreographed’ Corporal Punishment to Pakistan, South Asia Journal, Sept 2, 2019
 Jeffrey Lewis, “Night of Murder”: On the Brink of Nuclear War in South Asia, Interactive & Visualization, Nuclear Threat Index (NTI), Nov 6, 2019
 Matt Waldman, The Sun In The Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI And Afghan Insurgents, Discussion Paper: 18, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2010
 Nitin A. Gokhale, Securing India The Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More, Bloomsbury Publishing (2017), pp. 256
 Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis, South Asia, Stimson Center, Sept 1, 2006
 Some of the Press Conferences by Directors General, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) on India, YouTube
(1) DG ISPR Press Conference, 10 Mar 2022
(2) DG ISPR Live Briefing – India Pakistan Jang – Hamla Kab aur Kaise Hua – BOL News
(3) DG ISPR Press Conference, 14 Apr 2022
(4) DG ISPR COMPLETE Press Conference today – India Air Strike in Pakistan
(5) DG ISPR Asif Ghafoor Press Conference On Kashmir Issue, 4 Sept 2019
 Praveen Swami, India’s secret war, Frontline, Feb 16, 2018
 Ethnic Insurgencies and the Crime-Insurgency Nexus in India’s North Eastern Region, European Foundation for South Asian Studies
(2) Muhammad Waqas Sajjad, Islamabad Paper on “Current Status of Insurgencies in Northeast India”, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Oct 15, 2019
 Muslims Face Discriminatory Policies; Protesters Targeted
“Shoot the Traitors” Discrimination Against Muslims under India’s New Citizenship Policy, Human Rights Watch, Apr 9, 2020
(2) India: Protests, Attacks Over New Citizenship Law, Human Rights Watch, Apr 9, 2020
 Riaz Khokhar and Asma Khalid, The Indian missile launch in Pakistan: A skeptical view, SouthAsiaSource, The Atlantic Council, Apr 5, 2022
 Sushant Singh, The Challenge of a Two-Front War: India’s China-Pakistan Dilemma, Stimson Center, April 19, 2021
 Adnan Qaiser (Author) The Hindutva Itch: India’s Perverse Strategic Thought, South Asia Journal, USA, Sept 1 Sept 2018
 Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China through Military Power, Aleph Book Co., (2017), 488 pp
Book Review: https://lifestyle.livemint.com/how-to-lounge/books/book-review-dragon-on-our-doorstep-111646900722018.html
 Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab, At the Crossroad, FORCE (Army), Jan 2014
 Adnan Qaiser (Author), Pakistan’s Civil-Military Tensions: Hybrid Governance through a Soft Coup, Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Canada, Sept 15, 2015
 Adnan Qaiser (Author), Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations: Internal Battlefronts Exposed from Media Leak, Global Village Space, Oct 14, 2016
 Aarish Ullah Khan, The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 11, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sept 2005
 Nadeem F. Paracha, Years of the gun: A political history of the AK-47 in Pakistan, Dawn, Dec 26, 2013
 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, Pluto Press; (May 20, 2011), 280 pp
 Abdul Sayed, The Evolution and Future of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dec 21, 2021
 LTC(R) Robert R. Leonhard, The Evolution of Strategy in the Global War on Terror, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
 Zahid Ali Khan, Military Operations in FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan, Institute of Strategic Studies
 Adnan Qaiser (Author) Tweet on National Security, Twitter, Dec 1, 2022,
 Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008
 Yogesh Gattani, The Resilience of Baloch Insurgencies: Understanding the Fifth Period, E International Relations, Feb 2, 2021
 ‘India financed problems for Pakistan’ from Afghanistan: Chuck Hagel, The Express Tribune, Feb 26, 2013
 Author’s participation in Television Talkshows at India’s Republic TV
(1) TV Talkshow Participation by Adnan Qaiser at India’s Republic TV, Oct 19, 2021
Briefly participated in Arnab Goswami’s show “The Debate” to discuss Indian submarine’s intrusion into Pakistan’s maritime waters on Oct 19, 2021
The abject quality of discussion plus Anchor’s hyper-nationalistic frenzy (shouting and shrieking); not giving me adequate time to present my arguments while letting Indian participants to speak freely and muting my microphone showed Indian media not willing to listen – and absorb – counter argument. Thus, making me walkout of the show halfway
Edited version: https://youtu.be/Dl8CLT4EjdE
Complete Program: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xirAodrvLoM
(2) TV Talkshow Participation by Adnan Qaiser on Pakistan’s Politics at India’s Republic TV, Nov 21, 2021
Participated in India’s Republic TV’s show Blitzkrieg discussing Pakistan’s politics and its government’s (run by Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf party) policies and future in the backdrop of civil-military tensions
It is unfortunate that in a repeated show of anti-Pakistan bias and prejudice several of my arguments and comments were edited, redacted and removed
Edited version (12:50): https://youtu.be/cqgKyWWLnD8
 Adnan Qaiser (Author), Pakistan’s Jihadist Cauldron: Between National Interest and Liability, Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Canada, Aug 23, 2017