The Indus Waters Treaty was one of the most durable treaties in South Asia for over six decades. It was signed in 1960 and brokered by the World Bank and has survived three wars. The Kargil war and repeated tensions strained the diplomatic relations between Pakistan and India.  Even at the height of hostility, the Permanent Indus Commission of IWT continued to function. It successfully separated the water management from broader geopolitical and security disputes. This history of practical co-operation came to an end in April 2025. Following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, on April 22 that killed 26 people, most of them were tourists. After the attack, India responded by putting the treaty “in abeyance with immediate effect” until Pakistan takes “credible and irrevocable” steps to end cross-border terrorism. Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “blood and water cannot flow together.”This suspension has revived bilateral relations and dynamics of water in the South Asian region.

IWT Unilateral Suspension and Legal Limits

This is the first unilateral suspension of the treaty in more than six decades. This unilateral decision raises concerns about the future of international agreements that govern the shared rivers. Article XII of the Indus Waters Treaty states that its provisions shall remain in force “until terminated in accordance with a duly ratified treaty” between the two governments. India's action challenged the fundamental rule of international law, called “pacta sunt servanda” (the obligation to perform agreements in good faith). Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT), the suspension and termination of treaty obligations is permitted in very specific and exceptional circumstances. This includes material breach by the other party (Article 60), impossibility of performance (Article 61), or fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62). No amount of political tension, security threat or even a claim of terrorism is enough to justify unilateral withdrawal from a water-sharing agreement.

The abeyance has effectively paralyzed the Treaty’s core institutional mechanisms. Data sharing has been halted, and meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission under Article VIII have been suspended. The Treaty’s dispute resolution process under Article IX is now uncertain. In June 2025, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the Treaty does not allow unilateral abeyance. India has challenged the judgment as “illegal”. However, Pakistan has continued to follow the treaty’s dispute resolution. It also stressed that the “rules should be respected”.

India-Pakistan’s legal standing

The stakes are far too high for Pakistan, which is the lower riparian state. About 80 to 97% of its irrigation water comes from the Indus system. The agriculture sector contributes almost 20% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs a significant proportion of the country's workforce. On 10 June, 2026, India’s Minister of Jal Shakti (Water Resources) C.R. Patil publicly stated that “not a single drop” will go to Pakistan in the coming years. Meanwhile, India is reportedly developing canal projects to divert water from Chenab River system into the Beas basin, which could affect flows in the Chenab downstream to Pakistan. Although in the short term, full diversion of rivers is technically difficult. However, the uncertainty and lack of data transparency have already increased the risk to food security, hydropower production, and rural livelihoods.

Even in crisis the Indus Waters Treaty already has mechanisms for settling disputes. The treaty created the Permanent Indus Commission and a step-by-step process for settling disputes. This includes recommendations by a Neutral Expert and decisions by a Court of Arbitration. These mechanisms have operated in the past. They helped resolve disputes over the Baglihar and Kishanganga projects in 2013. The cases demonstrate that the treaty was meant to resolve the problems of technology and law rather than politics. By putting the treaty on hold, it raises questions about India’s legal standing at the international forum. It compromises the concept of treaty interpretation, international legal obligations, and rule-based governance.

Similar challenges can be seen in the Mekong River, which flows through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. China's construction of dams in the upper part of the river has raised concerns in downstream countries, especially Cambodia and Vietnam, over reduced water flows, fisheries, and environmental damage. The Indus case is unique. The Indus Waters Treaty includes well-established legal rules and a formal system for resolving disputes, including third-party arbitration.

India says its move is linked to security concerns. It states that Pakistan has made it impossible for normal cooperation under the treaty due to its alleged support for cross-border terrorism. Indian authorities have responded to the decision, claiming that the treaty will not be revived without "credible and irreversible" action by Pakistan against cross-border terrorism. Some senior leaders also claimed it would not come back unless there was “fundamental behavioral change”.

Pakistan has rejected India's terror claims stance and stated that the treaty obligations cannot be put on "hold" unilaterally. It has taken the issue to the United Nations for weaponising the water. It also reiterated its support for the agreement, warning that any disruption would have “far-reaching humanitarian, environmental and peace and security implications.” The problem there is the question of whether this will affect international law. The practice of suspending treaties in times of geopolitical tension could undermine confidence in the agreement over shared waterways and lead to similar measures by other countries.

The Indus Waters Treaty is closely linked to security concerns in the South Asian region. These realities need to be considered when evaluating the current crisis. Meanwhile, international law obligates both countries to abide by the treaty. The treaty also has clear alternatives to resolving issues rather than setting them aside unilaterally. Replacing these legal mechanisms with political and security considerations risks weakening not only India-Pakistan relations but also trust in rules for managing shared rivers. In the long run, both countries would benefit from restoring a working framework. Sustained collaboration on water issues will require discussion, common norms, and the willingness to handle conflicts without violence.