The recent sentencing of Indian businessman Sanjay Kaushik in a U.S. federal court for illegally exporting sensitive American technology to Russia marks more than an isolated criminal conviction. It reflects a widening concern in Washington and European capitals about India’s role as a re-export hub for controlled and dual-use technologies, particularly amid intensified sanctions against Russia and heightened competition with China. The case underscores a growing trust deficit between India and its Western partners at a moment when strategic alignment is publicly emphasized but operational reliability is increasingly questioned.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Kaushik orchestrated a deliberate scheme to obtain U.S.-origin aviation and navigation components—items with clear dual-use and potential military applications—by misrepresenting the end user and routing the technology through India to Russia. His 30-month prison sentence, following a guilty plea for conspiracy to violate U.S. export control laws, was accompanied by unusually strong language from prosecutors describing a calculated effort to evade sanctions and profit from geopolitical conflict. The message was unmistakable: enforcement will be aggressive, personal, and deterrent.

What gives the case broader significance is not merely the violation itself, but the pattern it fits into. U.S. authorities—particularly the DOJ, FBI, and Bureau of Industry and Security—have steadily expanded scrutiny of third-country networks facilitating sanctions evasion. India has emerged as a focal point in this effort, not because of ideological hostility, but because of its expanding trade footprint, sophisticated intermediary firms, and ambiguous strategic positioning vis-à-vis Russia and China.

The Kaushik conviction is not an anomaly. Over the past decade, several high-profile cases involving individuals of Indian origin or India-linked networks have alarmed U.S. security institutions. The conviction of Noshir Gowadia for selling classified B-2 bomber stealth technology to China remains one of the most serious espionage cases in U.S. history. More recently, the arrest of a senior Indian-origin defense analyst for unlawful retention of classified materials has revived concerns about insider risk within sensitive policy ecosystems. While these cases differ in nature and gravity, together they reinforce a perception problem: access without adequate safeguards.

Parallel concerns are now evident in Europe. The European Union’s sanctions packages since 2024 have increasingly named Indian firms accused of enabling Russia’s military-industrial complex through the supply of dual-use items such as electronics, aviation components, CNC machine tools, and UAV-related equipment. EU officials have openly acknowledged enhanced monitoring of India-based transshipment routes and intelligence sharing among partner governments. This convergence of U.S. and EU enforcement priorities signals a coordinated Western approach rather than unilateral suspicion.

For India, this trend is strategically consequential. New Delhi seeks recognition as a responsible global actor, a key Indo-Pacific partner, and a trusted participant in advanced technology ecosystems. Yet trust in such domains is not built on diplomatic rhetoric alone; it rests on regulatory discipline, enforcement credibility, and demonstrable alignment with international norms. Persistent cases of sanctions evasion—whether driven by private profit or weak oversight—undermine India’s claims to be a reliable stakeholder in sensitive supply chains.

From the Western perspective, the issue is not India’s strategic autonomy per se, but predictability and compliance. Export control regimes are designed to prevent advanced technologies from enhancing adversaries’ military capabilities. When these regimes are circumvented through third-country networks, the response is not diplomatic indulgence but legal action. The Kaushik case illustrates that individuals—and by extension jurisdictions—will be held accountable regardless of broader geopolitical partnerships.

At a deeper level, the episode highlights a structural tension in India’s foreign policy. While seeking closer ties with the United States and Europe, India has simultaneously expanded energy trade with Russia and resisted full alignment with Western sanctions. This balancing act may serve short-term economic interests, but it creates vulnerabilities when private actors exploit gray zones between policy positions and enforcement realities.

The implication is clear: strategic partnerships in the 21st century are increasingly conditional on technological trust. Access to advanced aviation systems, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and defense technologies requires more than political alignment; it requires rigorous internal controls and a willingness to police one’s own networks. Failure to do so invites not only prosecutions but also broader restrictions, licensing hurdles, and reputational damage.

For Pakistan and other regional observers, these developments are also instructive. They reveal how global power competition is increasingly mediated through lawfare, export controls, and compliance regimes rather than overt confrontation. States that position themselves as neutral or multi-aligned must still operate within tightening regulatory architectures shaped by great-power rivalry.

Ultimately, the Kaushik case is a warning shot—not just to individuals seeking profit through sanctions evasion, but to states navigating the space between autonomy and alignment. In an era where technology is power, trust is currency. And trust, once eroded, is far harder to rebuild than rhetoric suggests.