ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) delegation meets with Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus, proposing an international conference with Bangladesh, China, and ASEAN nations to seek a durable solution to the Rohingya crisis.

A Crisis Without Borders

The Rohingya crisis, which marked its eighth year since the cruel military assault in Myanmar’s Rakhine State in 2017, hangs over South and Southeast Asia like a dark cloud. Now a “textbook case of ethnic cleansing,” the forced mass displacement of over a million Rohingya Muslims across the border to Bangladesh has created one of the most pressing humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Once an internally contained issue, it is now a regional security, economic, and diplomatic fault line. As posited by Professor Muhammad Yunus, Advisor to the interim government of Bangladesh, when he met with ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), “It is not only a Bangladeshi burden; it is a regional moral responsibility.”

This article analyzes the extensive implications of the Rohingya crisis for Southeast and South Asia and provides new proposals for regional collaboration. It argues that the future will need to be settled by regionally connected, inclusive diplomacy, regional integration, and human understanding.

Bangladesh: The Frontline State and Its Burden

Bangladesh has borne the greatest brunt. With an estimated 1.2 million Rohingya refugees spread across sprawling camps along Cox’s Bazar, the nation is facing unsustainable strain on its economy, environment, and internal security. Beyond humanitarian aid from the international community, the UN, and donor agencies, the budget deficits have piled up.

The 2025 funding only met 45% of Rohingya’s yearly humanitarian appeal, and draconian food ration cuts and camp conditions followed. As Chief Adviser, Professor Yunus concluded, “The situation has become unsustainable. We are willing to help, but we cannot carry this burden alone.”

Aside from the short-term humanitarian concerns, there are also strategic interests to consider. Militancy, human trafficking, and cross-border narcotics smuggling have thrived within and outside of the camps. While Bangladeshi law enforcement officials raise the alarm, the Rohingya youth’s perpetual statelessness and ineducability may lead to a “lost generation.”

Myanmar: State Denial and the Paralysis of ASEAN

At the core of the crisis is Myanmar’s refusal to confer citizenship status on the Rohingya. The military junta has not apologized even after several Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on repatriation, which were merely symbolic in nature. Since then, things have only deteriorated after the 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar, with the Arakan Army now having encroached on Rakhine State land, rendering repatriation planning complex.

ASEAN responded in pieces. Non-interference serves as a brake, even when the regional organization reaches a 5-point consensus for peace in Myanmar. As APHR’s Co-Chairperson Charles Santiago acknowledged: “For the last two-three years we had been quiet because we were focusing on restoring democracy in Myanmar.”

But the novel APHR action to hold a global summit with Bangladesh, ASEAN, and China is a new policy direction. This will match Professor Yunus’s idea of a new regional agreement with Bangladesh as ASEAN’s sectoral dialogue partner. “Create a platform of ASEAN which does not exist now. Tell the rest of the world about the crisis we are facing,” Yunus urged.

China: A Strategic Balancer or a Humanitarian Stakeholder?

China’s position on the Rohingya question is still ambiguous. While, on the one hand, Beijing has been Myanmar’s aggressive champion long enough to spurn UN Security Council sanctions in the name of non-interference, it has economic and geopolitical interests to be made out of making moves to promote stability in the Bay of Bengal littoral along which the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) passes.

Professor Yunus’s bullying of China into participating in a three-way summit is a concession that a regional solution would not have been possible without China’s inclusion. The strategic position of China, situated between Myanmar’s junta and South Asia’s economy, makes it well-suited to participate in confidence-building. “China needs to shift from passive neutrality to active responsibility,” he has argued.

ASEAN States: Diverging Responses, Converging Interests

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), long the leader of its ideals of non-interference and solidarity, has been bitterly polarized in dealing with the Rohingya atrocity, one of the most brutal humanitarian tragedies in the region in recent times. While the world condemned the Rohingya tragedy, general ASEAN immobility testifies to a structural deficiency and strategic reticence in the bloc.

Malaysia and Indonesia: Voices of Conscience

Among ASEAN’s ten members, Indonesia and Malaysia have been the most vocal in denouncing the Rohingya persecution by Myanmar. It has been an issue of concern for Malaysia to raise it persistently in such global forums as the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation under past and present governments. Former Prime Minister Najib Razak also publicly labeled violence in the Rakhine State as “genocide” in 2017, and Malaysia also accepted thousands of Rohingya refugees without such a constrained domestic capacity.

Indonesia, the region’s most populous Muslim country and a potential diplomatic superpower, has also grappled with the complexities of quiet diplomacy and ethical duty. Jakarta has been a chief mediating power through its “humanitarian diplomacy,” which has shipped supplies to Rakhine and maintained links with Myanmar’s military leaders and civilian politicians.

Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore: Politics of Silence

Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore, meanwhile, have pursued an energetic policy of quiet diplomacy. Preoccupied with their own separatist conflicts and internal ethnic tensions, their governments do not wish to condemn Myanmar because they are afraid that that would set embarrassing precedents. Proximity to Myanmar and the shared experience of Thailand having experienced a similar experience in coping with stateless border migrants provide more significance to Thailand’s resistance. Vietnam and Singapore, nevertheless, place more importance on ASEAN solidarity and economic interests than on humanitarian issues.

This failure is symptomatic of the overall weaknesses of ASEAN: poor enforcement and consensus on action. The “ASEAN Way,” previously an asset in preserving stability, is now a diplomatic liability in the face of gargantuan human rights abuses.

“ASEAN need to see that doing nothing on human rights will ultimately undermine its credibility and cohesion.”— Wong Chen, Member of the Malaysian Parliament

New Regional Momentum: APHR and Dhaka Summit Initiatives

The recent Dhaka trip of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) and its encounter with Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus is a watershed. Representatives such as Raoul Manuel (Philippines) and Chonlathan Supphaiboonlerd (Thailand) pointed out that during this period of diplomatic freeze in ASEAN, parliamentarians and civil society activists can be agents.

The ASEAN-Bangladesh-China proposed conference, facilitated by APHR, backed by Professor Yunus, is crucial to a new paradigm of multi-stakeholders. The approach can overcome traditional diplomatic hurdles and provide an open platform, thereby compelling Myanmar—except for the intransigence of the military junta—to shift back to international standards.

Professor Yunus’s Strategic Proposal: Beyond Inclusion, Toward Integration

Professor Yunus’s call for Bangladesh to be granted “sectoral dialogue partner” status in ASEAN is no figure of speech. It is an attempt to bring the Rohingya issue into regional discussions. Bangladesh’s current marginalization from ASEAN amounts to being already outside the door when it comes to being heard, and its national security and humanitarian concerns are thus already engaged at the door.

“We would like to become an ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner. As we are not members of ASEAN, we cannot place the issue on the table. We badly need it, because the issue is a burden to us.” — Professor Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser of Bangladesh

His intention is also to establish an ASEAN Parliamentary Caucus on the Rohingya, which can provide a platform for non-executive voices—parliamentarians, human rights organizations, and policymakers—to articulate their concerns, prompt governments to take action, and encourage cross-border activism. This vehicle can complement diplomatic efforts and serve as a pressure valve to break the silence of recalcitrant nations.

China’s Influenza and ASEAN’s Conundrum

Among the remaining ASEAN challenges is China’s gigantic role in Myanmar. Myanmar’s largest investor, arms dealer, and diplomatic supporter on the UN Security Council, Beijing, keeps ASEAN from collaborating. ASEAN countries economically integrated with China do not wish to alienate their largest trading partner.

This geopolitical test creates a de facto split between “moral pragmatists” like Malaysia and “realist centrists” like Vietnam and Cambodia, undermining the institutional legitimacy of ASEAN. APHR’s action would have to navigate this geopolitical dynamic diplomatically—on a shared set of values and overlapping strategic interests.

The Need for Converging Action

The varied ASEAN positions only serve to underscore the imperative of a new convergence—a convergence of views in terms of humanitarian responsibility, as well as strategic imagination. The Rohingya crisis is no longer a bilateral crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar; it is a proof test of ASEAN regional cohesion and its role as an ASEAN player in future international human rights governance.

APHR’s initiative summit, led by Professor Yunus’s moral diplomacy, provides ASEAN with an opportunity to overcome its limitations and establish a rightful solution based on justice, empathy, and collective responsibility.

“A regional order based on empathy and justice is not only morally correct—it is good strategy.” — Professor Muhammad Yunus.

If ASEAN is going to remain viable with increasing international attention, it will have to move beyond neutral spectatorship into active participation. The futures of tens of millions of people—and the credibility of an entire regional grouping—are at stake.

Regional Spillovers: Security and Political Risks

The Rohingya crisis was initially framed as a regional Bangladesh-Myanmar humanitarian crisis, but now it is a regional tinderbox. Its open-ended and chronic nature not only stokes domestic tensions within Bangladesh but is now causing ripples in South and Southeast Asia, manifesting in the form of security concerns, diplomatic puzzles, and political contradictions. Above all, the regional response has been multifaceted and, in some instances, expanded through double standards and hidden agendas—particularly from India.

India: Strategic Ambiguity and Self-Interest Disguised as Security

India’s reaction to the Rohingya crisis is representative of its attitude toward the region generally—to try to position itself as a regional democratic power, but often to be willing to compromise humanitarian interests for the sake of strategic calculation. India has remained at one level to express security concerns against Rohingya “infiltration” along its vulnerable northeast frontier, mainly in the frontier states of Assam, Manipur, and Mizoram. The government has equated Rohingyas with “illegal immigrants” and security threats and has assigned to them links with Islamist militancy, even though there is not much credible proof.

Using these pretexts, India has forcibly returned dozens of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, which has attracted the fiery outrage of human rights groups and the United Nations for violating the principle of non-refoulement. Ironically, India has not taken any aggressive diplomatic stance against the Myanmar military junta despite the global criticisms over the ethnic cleansing exercises in 2017. New Delhi boycotted pivotal UN votes and continued arms sales and infrastructure contracts in Myanmar behind the veil of “strategic necessity.”

“India’s policy is more influenced by its China containment policy and Myanmar’s economic interests rather than any regard for justice or by refugee issues.”

— Human Rights Watch (2024)

India’s balancing act falls short of its desire to have Myanmar’s army dictatorship by its side as a counterbalance to rising Chinese power in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, to safeguard the energy pipelines through Rakhine, and to pursue its ‘Act East’ policy. Such realist pragmatism abdicates its moral leadership as a humanitarian democracy and distances itself from its own regional neighbors most affected by the stream of refugees.

Thailand and Malaysia: Refugee Trafficking and Human Rights Abuses

Thailand, which serves as a transit point for Rohingya refugees on their way to asylum in Malaysia, is presently a center of networks trafficking refugees and camps detaining refugees. The sporadic crackdown on human traffickers follows, yet Thai authorities are most frequently accused of complicity with the traffickers, with documented detention, abuse, and abandonment at sea. Thailand avoids explicit political criticism of Myanmar but is increasingly urged by international NGOs to bring its refugee regimes into conformity with international humanitarian standards.

Malaysia itself, though, has criticized Myanmar’s response to the Rohingya for years. Kuala Lumpur hosts an enormous Rohingya refugee community and has persisted in calling on ASEAN to act on the issue. The tolerance of the public is, however, wearing thin, and political leaders have started making the refugees an internal problem—fostering a poisonous mix of compassion, fatigue and nationalism.

Indonesia: Balancing Boat Arrivals and Diplomacy

Indonesia has been coping with successive boat landings of desperate Rohingyas seeking their journey to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Jakarta has promoted regional intervention, particularly via ASEAN, and offered support to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, and Rakhine State, Myanmar. Indonesia also has its own balancing act of public opinion, resource constraints, and diplomatic politics.

The Implication of Militarization and Strategic Manipulation

The inability to construct a regional response has rendered it easy for the securitization of the Rohingya situation to transform a humanitarian crisis into an international chess game. With states now regarding Rohingya refugees as no longer victims but strategic cargo, there is a new threat of militarized borders, increased surveillance, and transnational repression.

Worst of all, indigenous players are already beginning to use the crisis to further their respective strategic interests. India uses it to press deeper into northeast Myanmar and Bangladesh, and to enhance military ties with Myanmar’s junta even more. China nudges mostly in the background, attempting to protect its infrastructural investments in Rakhine while remaining at arm’s length. Russia keeps arming Naypyidaw, encouraging the military even more to brutalize its minorities.

“Neither a refugee crisis, but a breakdown in regional ethics, and a sign of the way power overcomes people in South Asia’s geopolitical calculus.” — Professor Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser, Bangladesh (2025)

A Crisis of Regional Morality and Strategic Myopia

What was started as an ethnic cleansing campaign in a remote Myanmar state has now turned into a test of acid for South and Southeast Asia’s regional political and moral conscience. India’s duplicity—tough-talking on regionalism while engaging in backroom realpolitik—is the safest bet on how national interest is relegating the aspiration for collective responsibility to the back burner.

Without a regionally grounded humanitarian architecture of collective responsibility, the Rohingya crisis will continue to destabilize political economies, fuel resentment, and erode the moral fault lines of regional cooperation. While Bangladesh bears the unequally skewed cost, the rest of the region must question itself: Is security without solidarity feasible? And is a strategy without ethics feasible?

Toward a Regional Humanitarian Compact

ASEAN, South Asia, and the central great powers need to come together now to establish a binding regional arrangement for the Rohingya issue. A fresh political leaders’ summit—such as suggested by APHR—must have:

  • A repatriation plan with measurable assurances of dignity
  • China-, Japan-, and West-backed ASEAN-led humanitarian funding coalition
  • Education and income initiatives within the camps to prevent radicalization
  • An independent regional organization to oversee abuse and repatriation procedures

Bangladesh must accept Professor Yunus’s offer to add Bangladesh to ASEAN’s format. Being precise on his part to express that, “Since we are not part of ASEAN, we cannot bring the issue to ASEAN. It is important for us.”

Conclusion: A Test of Leadership and Empathy

The Rohingya crisis is no longer a crisis of stateless people in limbo. It is a crisis of regional leadership, multilateralism, and humanity. Political convenience and national interest have triumphed over humanitarian imperative for far too long.

Recalling the APHR delegation, Professor Yunus said, “Leadership is not about domination, it is about accountability to those who have no voice.”

If South and Southeast Asia are to retain their shared values of compassion, coexistence, and dignity, then a fair and sustainable resolution of the Rohingya crisis must start now—with collective responsibility, creative diplomacy, and above all, humanitarian leadership.