Why has India reimagined its role from Vishwaguru to Vishwamitra?

Sanchari Ghosh

One of the most evocative terms invoked in the lexicon of India’s recent self-identity is “Vishwaguru,” i.e., the idea of India as a “teacher to the world”. However, since 2023, there has been a noticeable shift in official discourse. Increasingly, India is being framed not as a Vishwaguru, but as a “Vishwamitra”, a “friend of the world”. This pivot from an educational guide to a collaborative partner shows a significant recalibration in how India sees its global role and how it wishes to be seen.

The Vishwaguru narrative found prominence in the early years of the Modi government, especially between 2014 and 2019. However, the idea of India as a Vishwaguru was not new. It drew upon a long tradition of civilisational nationalism pioneered by the likes of Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo, wherein India’s ancient philosophical, spiritual, and intellectual traditions are projected as sources of moral leadership for the world.

Under Modi, this projection found renewed vigour. Internationally, it allowed India to project soft power through instruments including yoga diplomacy, the celebration of Ayurveda, and narratives of India’s ancient scientific and philosophical achievements. Domestically, it resonated with the BJP’s ideological base and burnished the government’s broader Hindutva-infused nation-building project.

On the flip side, projecting oneself as Vishwaguru comes across as condescending in a foreign policy context, which is bound to alienate rather than attract international partners. Claims of civilisational superiority appear out of step because of the teacher-student metaphor implicit in the Vishwaguru label that inadvertently reinforces hierarchies.

Moreover, there is also a reputational risk. Lofty claims of being a guide to the world may ring hollow if not matched by military might and inclusive growth. The notion of India as a Vishwaguru becomes especially problematic when viewed from the perspective of smaller nations in the Global South and India’s immediate neighbourhood. For these countries, India’s self-ascribed role can come across as paternalistic. While New Delhi frames the Vishwaguru identity as an inclusive, civilisational offering to the world, smaller states often perceive it as an implicit assertion of superiority. This is particularly acute in South Asia, where India’s economic and military weight relative to its neighbours already generates apprehension about hegemonic intent. The narrative can undermine the very solidarity it claims to promote.

Notably, in recent years, Modi himself has gradually reduced his public use of the term. Instead, it is now more frequently invoked by party members, cultural organisations, and lower-ranked ministers.

In contrast, the idea of Vishwamitra offers a more inclusive and pragmatic framing. It has been increasingly used in India’s official discourse, describing India’s evolving global identity not in terms of teaching the world, but in being a reliable partner.

The term Vishwamitra also aligns well with India’s recent emphasis on the Global South. During its G20 presidency, India made a concerted effort to speak on behalf of developing countries, organising the “Voice of the Global South Summit” and positioning itself as a bridge between North and South. The language of Vishwamitra sits comfortably with such initiatives.

This shift also reflects an evolution in India’s diplomatic posture. As India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has noted, the Vishwamitra frame displays a departure from the traditional defensive non-alignment of the Cold War era. It signals a more confident, outward-looking India that is willing to build issue-based coalitions and participate in multiple alignments without being bound by ideological rigidity.

Ultimately, terms like Vishwaguru and Vishwamitra, along with their lofty role conceptions, function less as guiding principles for foreign policy and more as instruments for domestic political messaging.

India’s multi-alignment strategy – engaging with the United States and other partners through the Quad grouping, participating in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, expanding ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and deepening partnerships in Africa and Latin America – is best served by a posture of partnership, not preaching. Vishwamitra thus provides the narrative scaffolding to support this balancing act.

Initiatives such as Vaccine Maitri, humanitarian aid to conflict zones, and development partnerships with smaller states showcase India’s willingness to act as a responsible stakeholder. These actions are better framed through the lens of friendship and solidarity than through the metaphor of a global teacher.

The transition from Vishwaguru to Vishwamitra in India’s civilisational rhetoric should not be seen as a rejection of national pride. It should be seen as a recalibration of how that pride is expressed on the global stage. As India’s global engagements deepen, the government seems to be conscious of the need to align its symbolic language with strategic interests. It allows India to retain its cultural distinctiveness while avoiding the pitfalls of moral exceptionalism.

A civilisational identity premised on the Vishwaguru image suggests a degree of moral authority and hierarchical distinction. This does not align well with the demands of 21st-century diplomacy, where equity and functional cooperation often matter more than philosophical leadership. On the other hand, Vishwamitra offers a framework that affirms friendship over hierarchy, cooperation over superiority, and solidarity over sermonising.

But in an international system often defined by the realist dictum of “no permanent friends, no permanent enemies – only permanent interests”, even the self-image of Vishwamitra risks being little more than empty rhetoric. While India may seek friendship with all, few states treat it as a permanent friend. Their engagement is instead shaped by shifting strategic and economic priorities.

The recent strain in India–US relations, coupled with visible diplomatic warmth toward Russia and a renewed willingness to engage China, serve as a reminder that friendship in international relations is transactional and ephemeral. The US remains a strategic partner but has shown readiness to exert pressure when interests diverge; Russia is a long-standing defence partner but is increasingly intertwined with China; and China itself remains a rival on key strategic fronts despite occasional diplomatic engagements.

Ultimately, terms like Vishwaguru and Vishwamitra, along with their lofty role conceptions, function less as guiding principles for foreign policy and more as instruments for domestic political messaging by projecting strength and moral authority at home. The global order, governed by strategic interests and shifting alliances, rarely accommodates such grand civilisational self-images without corresponding military and economic might. Recognising this gap is important for understanding the tensions between India’s aspirational self-identity and its actual international standing.

The article appeared in lowyinstitute