The emerging rapprochement among China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh has shifted the strategic equation in South Asia. This development is shocking to the international observers, as at the time of the ousted prime minister, Hasina Wajid, Bangladesh had close relations with India, but the trajectory of those relations is now changing. Various factors have driven this change in Bangladesh, primarily public sentiment that has pushed for greater autonomy and a distance from India’s influence. It is worth mentioning that every nation has some strategic patience embedded in its identity and history. However, when the particular regime and foreign policy do not reflect the will of its people, the result is evident in the case of the Monsoon Revolution in Bangladesh.

The notable shift in the relations among these three countries has some geopolitical reasons, as China which has long been ambitious to engage with Global south constructively, and given the current scenario Bangladesh is important for China from a maritime perspective because of its ports and it would not be inappropriate to argue that this development is a part of China’s incredible “String of Pearl Strategy”. In addition, under the leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India has strained relations with Muhammad Yunus’ interim government because of India’s arrogant, hegemonic posture, which intimidates Bangladesh; consequently, Bangladesh is now engaging with Pakistan, deliberately ignoring India, and meeting its defence needs.

The fact is endorsed by Bangladesh’s foreign affairs advisor, Tauhid Hossain, who has indicated that Bangladesh is now pursuing strategic alignment with Pakistan and is inclusively engaging in defence and economic cooperation, marking a shift from established subcontinental alignments. The trilateral initiative could be an alternative to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In SAARC, constructive engagement among SAARC countries stalled due to India’s passive stance, which dragged politics into multilateral engagement and sabotaged cooperation. On December 5, 2025, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister expressed that the trilateral alignment among China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh would expand the horizon of cooperation and would emerge as a new sub-block in South Asia.

The question concerns the strategic necessities that compel the rapprochement, and to address it, it demands examining the contextual reasons for the prevailing situation. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad Alliance, is the core ambition of U.S. Indo-Pacific Diplomacy.  The Quad brings together three democracies, Australia, India, Japan, and the external resident power, the United States. The Quad, however, does not have any hard-power ambitions; it was primarily founded to contain China’s rise to power. This is a pragmatic assumption as the Quad countries account for one-third of global GDP. India’s “Necklace of Diamonds” strategy is a geopolitical countermeasure to China’s “Pearl of String” strategy. India’s strategy aimed to encircle China through strategic naval access, such as Chabahar in Iran, Sabang in Indonesia, Duqm in Oman, and Changi in Singapore, and to strengthen cooperation with Japan, Vietnam, and Mongolia to ensure maritime security and counter Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean Region.  

Bangladesh, for that matter, suits China best for serving Beijing’s interests, as China now has access to Bangladesh’s key ports, including Chattogram and Mongla. It is a part of China’s grand strategy to engage with the Global South under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and to enhance connectivity through sea lanes under the string of pearls strategy, which involves major projects like the Gawadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Djibouti, whose aim is to encircle India and challenge its regional dominance. Therefore, the emerging alignment, coerced by geopolitical reasons, is relatively beneficial for the three nations.

In June 2025, this diplomatic momentum was institutionalised at a trilateral meeting in Kunming, where the deputy foreign ministers and foreign secretaries of Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh resolved to enhance cooperation in trade, investment, maritime security, health, and education. These are the key areas where the interdependence persists. Bangladesh balanced its economy by forging cooperation with China and engaging with Pakistan, equating its identity and legitimacy with theirs, as both share the same legacy, and also filling the gap in the Security domain.

Bangladesh's political atmosphere is unstable, with the 2024 monsoon revolution and the 2026 election further exacerbating the state's burden. The assassination of the leader of the youth, Sharif Osman Hadi, has brought out the masses' sentiment against India and caused widespread protests in the country. Hence, Bangladesh could easily be pressured and coerced by New Delhi and other notable Western nations because of its strategic alignment with Islamabad, and the future is unclear. Besides this, Nepal and Bhutan's willingness to join a strategic bloc with India creates a hostile environment for Bangladesh.

The politics of South Asia has now been put on a thin thread; the model needs a practical investigation to guarantee the integrity and cooperation in the region. The first meeting of the 9th Joint Economic Commission after a gap of more than 20 years is laudable. In the meeting, consensus was also reached on various areas, and the MOU on Halal trade was signed by Pakistani and Bangladeshi authorities, which could yield benefits for both nations. Nonetheless, the struggles remain, and each state is driven by its foreign policy in pursuit of its interests, and no imperative is greater than the changing geopolitical realities.