SANCHARI GHOSH

At first glance, India’s Maritime Doctrine 2025 appears to be a routine update to earlier editions. Read closely, the new doctrine shows a subtle modification in how the Indian Navy understands the environment in which it operates.

Most notably, the new doctrine is an acknowledgement that contemporary conflict rarely conforms to a clear line between peace and war. The document repeatedly refers to a condition described as “No War No Peace” – the space where countries pursue their objectives without crossing the threshold of open armed conflict. Rather than treating war as a discrete event, the doctrine situates it along a continuum of cooperation, competition, confrontation, and conflict.

Maritime rivalry today seldom erupts into open conflict. It unfolds through forms of pressure, such as ships shadowing one another, increased patrols, and competing legal claims. The doctrine’s attention to such dynamics suggests that the Indian Navy sees maritime competition as an ongoing contest for advantage.

The doctrine addresses this environment by discussing “grey-zone operations”, a term that has gained traction in debates over the past decade, particularly in the context of the South China Sea. These activities typically exploit legal and political ambiguity, rely on proxies or indirect instruments, and seek to impose costs on adversaries without triggering conventional retaliation.

Modern naval power depends as much on networks and information flows as on ships and weapons.

By explicitly defining grey-zone operations, the doctrine attempts to bring conceptual clarity to an area where terms such as hybrid or irregular warfare are used interchangeably. This shows that the Indian Navy views such activities as a persistent feature of the maritime environment rather than an exceptional circumstance.

The doctrine also highlights that modern naval operations are not confined to physical engagements between fleets but encompass a “cognitive” element. It involves influencing how adversaries perceive situations and make decisions. This focus appears in the discussion of “manoeuvre warfare”, traditionally associated with mobility and surprise, but also as a method of disrupting an adversary’s cohesion and decision-making processes. Such thinking points to a change in Indian military doctrine – acknowledging that the battle for influence also unfolds in the realm of narratives and interpretation.

Technological developments reinforce this perspective. The doctrine highlights the importance of space, cyber, and information networks in shaping military operations. Much of contemporary naval activity now rests on satellite-based surveillance, cyber capabilities, and digital communication systems.

The changing nature of conflict is also visible in the doctrine’s treatment of logistics and intelligence. Intelligence is elevated more explicitly within the framework of the “principles of war”, taking into account that information superiority has become central to operational effectiveness. These adjustments indicate a recognition that modern naval power depends as much on networks and information flows as on ships and weapons.

The geographic imagination of the doctrine has also expanded. Earlier editions focused primarily on the Indian Ocean region as the core theatre for India’s maritime strategy. The 2015 update expanded this outlook by identifying primary and secondary areas of interest stretching beyond the region. The 2025 doctrine reframes this spatial logic by presenting India, the Indian Ocean region, and the Indo-Pacific as a connected continuum rather than a hierarchy of operational priorities. This modification matters because it embeds the Indo-Pacific concept within the doctrinal framework guiding naval planning.

The 2025 doctrine also makes explicit reference to India’s ambition as a “preferred security partner” and “first responder” in the region. While these phrases have appeared frequently in diplomatic statements in recent years, the inclusion in a formal naval doctrine is notable.

The doctrine also acknowledges a deeper recognition that maritime power today is exercised continuously, often in ways that blur the boundary between deterrence, competition and conflict. It signals an awareness that the Indian Navy must operate in a space where the shadow of conflict persists even when war itself does not occur. For a maritime power situated at the centre of the Indo-Pacific, understanding and managing that reality will likely shape naval strategy in the years ahead.