The Corruption Conundrum in Pakistan’s Democracy



by: Omar Waraich

The dark side of Nawaz Sharif’s ouster

A supporter of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif passes out on the ground, holding a photo of him.
A supporter of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif passes out after the Supreme Court’s decision to disqualify him in Lahore, Pakistan, on July 28, 2017. Mohsin Raza / Reuters
Once again, a leader of Pakistan has been forced to leave office without completing a full term. On Friday, Nawaz Sharif stepped down as prime minister after the country’s Supreme Court disqualified him on corruption-related charges. For Sharif, this ends a 35-year career in politics that saw him elected prime minister and unceremoniously removed from office three times. For Pakistan, it marks a rare moment of accountability but also raises questions about the future of the country’s flailing democracy: Next year’s general elections will likely see one elected civilian government successfully transfer power to another for only the second time in the country’s history. But no leaders voted into power have lasted long enough to defend their record in front of the electorate.

The source of Sharif’s miseries is the release of the so-called Panama Papers last year, in which a consortium of investigative journalists around the world came into the possession of documents from a law firm based in the Central American tax haven. According to the documents, Sharif was one of 12 world leaders in Pakistan whose family or associates were found to own assets stashed offshore but never declared to the Pakistani people. Sharif’s revealed wealth includes companies scattered across continents, luxury apartments in London, and business connections with Persian Gulf royals. Over months of legal proceedings, Sharif faced intense pressure to vacate the prime minister’s hilltop residence in Islamabad.

The ruling sets a troubling precedent. Sharif’s most determined opponent is the former cricketer turned politician Imran Khan. From the moment Sharif returned to power in 2013, Khan has been campaigning for his removal, often taking to the streets for weeks of protests. But even Khan has criticized the morality clause in the past, not least when people have tried to use it against him. “Only an angel,” Khan said, could be deemed to meet the clause’s exacting standards.

In Pakistan, politicians have long courted allegations of venality. They never occupy their official residences in Islamabad for long, and yet many of them emerge with suspiciously deep pockets. The arbitrary nature of their rule, long resistant to transparency, gives them control of government contracts, the power to disburse other forms of patronage, and, in the most crude of cases, demand an “administrative fee” for even the most perfunctory pieces of government business. In more recent years, members of parliament, ministers, and other politicians, have become more innovative—using a series of shell companies, frontmen who work through shadowy middlemen, and secret auctions, where bids are privately entertained, before lucrative contracts are announced.

In 2008, when democracy returned to Pakistan, I interviewed a freshly appointed minister at his office in Islamabad. I had a list of questions about how he was preparing to serve Pakistanis. When I arrived, I found he had already gotten down to business. A queue of supplicants was positioned strategically outside his office door, and ran down the hall. Inside, he was busily signing slips of paper, apparently handing out jobs in exchange for political support. Other ministers arrived, carrying files of their own. Then a member of his party walked through the door, a young woman on each arm. “Sir,” he bellowed, “these are two of my greatest supporters. They’ll make fine air hostesses.”

In Pakistan, everything can be negotiated—the rules are rarely fixed. For the right price, through the right connections, or in return for a favor, you can get things done. Many politicians who enrich themselves rationalize their corrupt practices as somehow serving a noble purpose: they justify their actions on the grounds that they are either helping out their constituents, their party, or even their own family.

Instead of implementing robust accountability, corruption charges have traditionally been wielded as a tool to weaken civilian leaders and ultimately lever them out of power. During the 1990s, rivals Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each served as prime minister for two abbreviated terms. Each time, the dismissal of civilian-led governments was justified on the grounds of corruption.

When Musharraf seized power in the 1999 coup, toppling Sharif’s second government, he famously declared, like dictators before him, that he would cleanse the country of corruption. The narrative he promoted was that grasping politicians were the biggest problem facing the country. Once they were cast aside, the country could embark on a prosperous future. It never happened. Soon after settling into office, he tried to end Sharif and Bhutto’s political careers, but peeled away their supporters to augment his ranks, included those accused of corruption.

The article appeared in “The Atlantic” on 28/07/2017