Isel van Zyl

A Houthi missile and drone strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on 10 October killed at least 12 people and injured more than 300(Opens in new window), the deadliest attack in Saudi Arabia in more than a decade. The incident capped a week of attacks on Saudi airports(Opens in new window) and triggered the suspension of all flights in and out of the capital. US President Donald Trump is now weighing whether to join Saudi strikes(Opens in new window) against the group.

The Houthi focus on the strait is no accident. The Bab al-Mandab carries around 30% of global container traffic and 12% of global trade(Opens in new window). Since Iran largely closed(Opens in new window) the Strait of Hormuz after the United States-Israel strikes commenced in February, the Red Sea has also provided an alternative route through which Saudi Arabia could export oil. The country recently completed a pipeline to its Red Sea port of Yanbu(Opens in new window). By threatening the Strait and striking Saudi infrastructure, the Houthis are targeting the Gulf’s main remaining workaround.

The strike against the airport in Riyadh marks a rapid escalation. In July, the Houthis abandoned the 2022 truce(Opens in new window) with Yemen’s Saudi-backed government and declared a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia(Opens in new window). In September, a lightning offensive carried them roughly 150 kilometres down the Red Sea coast(Opens in new window), seizing the port of Mokha and islands in the Bab al-Mandab strait and forcing more than 145,000 people from their homes(Opens in new window). On 4 October, the government launched a counter-offensive(Opens in new window) and within a week had recaptured the strait(Opens in new window) and Mokha. The Riyadh strikes were the Houthis’ retaliation.

Losing control of Mokha does not necessarily end that threat to shipping. The Houthis still hold Hodeidah(Opens in new window), Yemen’s main Red Sea port, and their anti-ship missiles and drones do not need to overlook the strait to threaten maritime traffic using this waterway. As Sahan analyst Matt Bryden told ISS Today(Opens in new window), hitting a handful of vessels would be enough to deter carriers and drive up insurance costs.

Rather than improvise again, Australia should decide now what it can offer.

Retaking the Yemeni coast makes little difference on the other side of the water. Across the strait lie Djibouti, Eritrea and Somaliland, all of which have become drawn further into Gulf and Red Sea politics. Djibouti hosts US, Chinese, French and Japanese military bases, but Bryden notes(Opens in new window) that navies there are likely to be cautious about acting against the Houthis, given the risk of reprisals against their own facilities. Somaliland has become a newer flashpoint: since Israel formally recognised its independence(Opens in new window), the Houthis have threatened any Israeli presence there.

The Houthis are extending their reach across the Gulf of Aden, deepening ties with al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, trading weapons and training for funding and smuggling routes(Opens in new window). Piracy may be the newest strand. Since late April, six commercial vessels(Opens in new window) have been hijacked off the Horn of Africa, compared with three in the previous 14 years. As Christopher Hockey has argued for Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), unconfirmed reports suggest(Opens in new window) the Houthis have trained, equipped and even financed some of the pirate groups involved, a way to disrupt shipping without provoking the military response their missile attacks draw. Taken together, the picture is stark. Iran and its partners now hold sway over both of the western Indian Ocean’s main exits, Hormuz directly and Bab al-Mandab through the Houthis, while piracy disrupts the waters in between. This is not just a supply problem; it is a geopolitical crisis.

Somalia offers fertile ground. Al-Shabaab governs large parts of the country(Opens in new window), Islamic State remains active in Puntland, and the federal government controls little beyond the main towns. Mogadishu and Puntland’s authorities have traded accusations over the piracy surge, while the African Union mission’s future is uncertain following the withdrawal of US support. Warships can contain the threat at sea, but the conditions that sustain it lie on land, on a shore where, for Australia’s part, Canberra has few relationships and little presence.

For Australians, this can seem like a distant worry. Australia imports around 80%(Opens in new window) of its refined fuel, mostly from Asian refineries running on Middle Eastern crude, while domestic refineries meet only about a fifth of demand(Opens in new window). When Iran closed Hormuz in March, some service stations ran dry(Opens in new window) and fuel prices rose 32.8%(Opens in new window) in a single month. The Reserve Bank has warned(Opens in new window) that those costs are now flowing through to other goods and services. A Houthi campaign against the Red Sea route would tighten supply to the very refiners Australia relies on.

Australia listed the Houthis(Opens in new window) as a terrorist organisation in 2024, and sent troops to assist with the Combined Maritime Forces under Operation Manitou(Opens in new window). Yet in December 2023, it declined a US request(Opens in new window) to send a warship, and a similar request may soon follow. Rather than improvise again, Australia should decide now what it can offer. Targeted contributions such as surveillance, intelligence and staff for counter-piracy and arms interdiction in the Gulf of Aden would cost far less than a warship. So would building diplomatic and analytical capacity on the Horn itself. Canberra should also back renewal of the UN mandate to interdict weapons bound for Somalia, which expires in November(Opens in new window).

For a maritime trading nation, the Houthis’ war on Red Sea shipping should not be someone else’s problem.

The article appeared in the lowyinstitute