India: a middle power, more or less?

India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently asserted(Opens in new window) that India is not a “middle power” but a “power in the middle”. Jaishankar’s comments are the latest evidence of India’s long-term ambition to shape the international order rather than merely respond to decisions made elsewhere. The ambition is understandable given the considerable ground India has covered in recent decades.

But the remarks also expose a paradox. Although India seeks a greater say in global affairs, it continues to rely on groupings(Opens in new window) with other middle-power countries to advance(Opens in new window) many of its goals. This leaves open the question of whether India’s capacity to shape international outcomes has caught up with its ambitions.

If it has not, India should be willing to accept that it remains a middle power in practice. New Delhi rejects the middle-power label, yet it works with other countries to push for changes it cannot bring about on its own. This includes initiatives such as its recent joining as a co-sponsor(Opens in new window) in Partners for Multilateralism, International Law, Peace and Prosperity (P4M), the G4(Opens in new window), India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA)(Opens in new window) and the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative(Opens in new window) with Japan and Australia. There is nothing unusual about India acting in this fashion. But it is harder to explain why it resists a label associated with this very approach to diplomacy.

Of course, India has legitimate reasons to resist conventional classifications. Its population, geographic position, and aggregate economic output(Opens in new window) distinguish it from many countries commonly described as middle powers, such as Australia, Japan, Canada, and South Korea. Yet a closer look shows that although India’s aggregate economic size is consequential, it masks(Opens in new window) a much lower level of per capita income.

Japan, which is itself described as a middle power, has a nominal GDP per capita of around US$36,000 in 2025. The figures for South Korea, Canada, and Australia are approximately US$43,512, US$60,105, and US$75,172, respectively. India’s, by contrast, is only about US$2,749, ranking it outside even the top 100 countries internationally.

India also remains heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced military equipment. It was the world’s second-largest arms importer(Opens in new window) in 2021–25, accounting for 8.2% of global arms imports, despite growing efforts(Opens in new window) to strengthen domestic defence production. The constraints extend to technology as well. As much as 95% of India’s semiconductor demand is met through imports(Opens in new window), resulting in substantial foreign exchange outflows and leaving critical sectors vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions.

Because of such shortcomings, India’s attributes do not automatically confer the ability to set international rules or act independently of other major powers.

A country may have a large economy without commanding the financial reach or institutional authority needed to shape outcomes across multiple domains. The United States and China, for instance, possess extensive technological and economic leverage that India is still seeking to develop. India’s exclusion from the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council is another reminder that its growing weight has not yet translated into equivalent institutional authority.

The reluctance to accept India as a “middle power” stems from a strand of moral exceptionalism(Opens in new window) that infuses Indian diplomacy, based on the belief that the country’s history, civilisational identity and distinctive international role set it apart from other states. India’s anti-colonial past and its legacy of non-alignment have always strengthened the view that it has a distinctive contribution to make to world affairs, which cannot be measured by material capabilities alone. This moral positioning consistently helped New Delhi obscure the gap between its international ambitions and its material capabilities.

Although this tradition has helped India claim a voice beyond its material capabilities, it can also make an ordinary assessment of its limitations harder to accept.

India’s status as a rising power and its acceptance of a middle power status are not mutually exclusive. Some have also noted(Opens in new window) that India has the potential to become a great power, but its vast population may not be matched by sufficient wealth to make that transition. So, accepting middle-power status would not require India to abandon its ambition to become a leading or great power. On the contrary, it would give New Delhi a more realistic basis for pursuing that ambition. India’s challenge is to recognise where it stands today and build the capabilities needed to occupy the role it seeks tomorrow. Its diplomatic practice is more pragmatic than the rhetoric about middle-power status suggests. The self-description of its place in the world should also reflect that pragmatism.

The article appeared in the lowyinstitute