Credit: Daily Times

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Credit: Daily Times

On August 8, The New York Times ran an article titled “India’s Modi Left Soul-Searching After a Failed Courtship of Xi and Trump”, penned by Mujib Mishal and Hari Kumar.

The headline alone serves as a fitting self-description of the subject in question. The article delved deeply into the contradiction , structural weaknesses and lack of dynamism that characterize Modi’s foreign policy which seems to be failing to shape a coherent foreign policy for India, grounded on vision and philosophy and more importantly, trust.

Realistically speaking, there is no textbook formula for pursuing a foreign policy of a given nation —it is shaped primarily by its aspirations backed by economic and military strength.

For example, the United States and Russia have long pursued unshakable core objectives, never hesitating to assert their interests even under the threat of overwhelming force. Whereas, China, also a global economic and military power, tends to exert its influence through its vast economic reach, a country that resorts to harder measures only when its vital territorial interests are threatened.

India, however, seems unable to articulate clear core foreign policy objectives—nor the strategies needed to achieve them.

Since 2014, India has suffered what I would call “strategic amnesia.” On one hand, it loudly proclaims an “autonomous” foreign policy; on the other, it readily aligns with superpowers, shifting allegiances whenever expedient. Such inconsistency undermines credibility and erodes trust on the world stage.

This is puzzling. India is the world’s third-largest economy, home to a vast talent pool, a dominant force in global tech, a world-class health sector, a celebrated film industry, and a civilisation with millennia of cultural depth. Yet under the current Hindutva-driven BJP government, a sectarian government, its age-old tradition of religious harmony is under siege—recent attempts to raze Mughal-era monuments and erase Mughal (Muslim) history which in many ways shaped Indian identity are glaring examples of naked sectarianism pursued by the Modi government.

It is somewhat apparent that deep in its psyche, India carries a sense of insecurity and inferiority which somehow believes that the world has denied India its rightful global standing, contributing on the one hand, cosying up to the powerful nations and on the other, treat its smaller neighbours with suspicion and hostility.

Geographically and economically larger than all six of its neighbours combined, India nevertheless maintains a posture of confrontation and harbours distrust toward them, projecting India in the eyes of its smaller neighbours as an intolerant and hegemonic nation, leaving it with virtually no friends.

Mr. Modi’s fall from Donald Trump’s favour carries its own intrigue. During Trump’s first term, Modi found a kindred spirit, cultivating a warm and very public camaraderie—even campaigning, albeit unsolicited, for Trump’s re-election. But when Joe Biden entered the White House, Modi pivoted quickly. By 2024, rumours swirled that while wooing Indian-American voters for Kamala Harris, Modi snubbed a dinner invitation from Trump. The slight infuriated Trump, and the grudge appears to have endured, which is obvious in recent souring of U.S.–India ties, since Trump became president.

The fallout starkly visible: a 50% tariff hike on Indian goods, India’s reported suspension of Boeing aircraft and arms purchases, and disputing over Washington’s claim to have mediated a ceasefire in a recent India–Pakistan short war. From once basking in great-power courtship, New Delhi now appears increasingly isolated—its closest partner today being Israel, bound more by shared ideology which is anything but noble, than broad-based goodwill.

Now, ditched by Trump, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit China on August 31 for the SCO summit. This will provide Modi an opportunity to meet President Xi Jinping where attempts would no doubt be made to thaw decades-long frosty relations between these two important Asian countries. However, as can be imagined, Beijing is not oblivious to New Delhi’s West inspired embrace of anti-China initiatives for example, joining the Quad and hosting the Malabar naval exercises aimed at containing China. No matter how desperately India seeks rapprochement, China’s response is likely to be measured.

Relations with Bangladesh remain equally fraught. No Bangladeshi denies India’s supportive role in its 1971 war of liberation, yet India’s post-liberation treatment of Bangladesh has been anything but honourable. India’s hegemonic intents bred resentment and widened the gap between India and the people of Bangladesh. Other times, India’s cunning vis-à-vis Bangladesh resembled a courtship in which a bouquet of roses concealed a poisonous serpent beneath.

For example, after engineering from behind the General Election in Bangladesh in 2008 and installing Sheikh Hasina in 2009, India declared a “golden era” in bilateral ties, for it had it all for the next decade and half when Hasina ruled through India-inspired rigged elections – control of Bangladesh’s energy sector, free transit, numerous government contracts etc. etc. at the cost of the country and its economy. Although India prides itself being the world’s largest democracy, it had no qualms in backing Sheikh Hasina as she dismantled the last vestiges of democracy in Bangladesh.

However, when a people’s uprising in July/August 2024 toppled Hasina regime which was marked by authoritarianism, gross human rights violations and corruption, India was unhappy and became quite hostile towards the post-revolution Interim Government led by the Nobel Laureate Prof, Muhammad Yunus and more generally, against Bangladesh. This abrupt reversal mirrors the deeper malaise within the India’s ruling party’s world view and in its foreign policy which resembles more and more a big vessel adrift, without captain and no radar.

If India genuinely seeks its rightful place global in the global stage, it must first shed its low self-esteem that shapes its conduct. It should reorient its foreign policy toward genuine partnerships and co-development with its neighbours, provide concessions where needed for long-term gain.

Such a transformation would not only elevate India’s standing but is likely to help turn South Asia into one of the most prosperous regions in the world.