India’s current foreign policy is a class act of ambivalence — a nicely executed dance of straddling between rival blocs, strategic theater, and calculated hedging. No place is this clearer than in its unfriendly attitude towards BRICS, a bloc originally defined as an arena for emerging economies to resist Western domination. But while BRICS members like Russia, China, and Brazil preach de-dollarization and multipolarity, India appears to be somewhat more off-balance — strategically and also ideologically. India’s growing strengthening military and economic engagement with the United States is contrarily set against the BRICS’ founding philosophy.

As much as the other BRICS members have denounced American unilateralism and protested at Western financial institutions, India has rejoiced at dollar stability and lagged to sign up for action against U.S. global dominance. Rather than spearheading the Global South or lobbying an autonomous BRICS currency system, New Delhi floated toward the dollar — a move that cashes in the bloc’s moment. In his New York Times piece *”One of These BRICS Is Not Like the Others,”* correspondent Alex Travelli summarized this contradiction, arguing that India’s growing Western alignment places it at odds with its BRICS counterparts.

Brazilian economist and former vice president of the BRICS Bank Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. has gone even further, warning that India well might become a “Trojan Horse” within the group — a country with split allegiances that could disintegrate BRICS from within. Indeed, Indian conduct warrants such suspicions. New Delhi is occupied of the Quad table of the U.S.-led bloc with Japan and Australia — an informal bloc established to oppose China’s regional primacy — and a full member of the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and site for BRICS summits. This fence-sitting in geopolitical terms, as realistic as it is diplomatic, dismembers BRICS unity and ignites doubts about Indian good faith.

From border clashes in the Himalayas to Beijing’s close proximity with Islamabad, strategic suspicion runs deep. As China and Russia move closer in counterbalance to U.S. hegemony, India moves closer to Washington, declaring U.S.-India ties the “best ever.” It has postponed de-dollarization from obtaining its imprimatur, avoided George W. Bush’s foreign policy aggressions, and even received economic benefits in terms of reduced tariffs and increased access to trade — concessions not missed by BRICS capitals. Domestically, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pro-American leanings have not gone unchallenged. The opposition Congress Party has accused his government of abandoning BRICS leadership and compromising Indian sovereignty to appease Western powers. Critics argue that instead of promoting South-South cooperation, India has adopted a transactional, market-driven approach aimed at gaining a competitive edge over China and avoiding economic friction with the United States.

India’s balancing act can reward it short-term benefits — access to trade, diplomatic capital, and higher global standing — but make it lose credibility over the long term. In getting courted by both sides, India stands to dilute BRICS as a credible counter-hegemonic force in opposition to Western hegemony and sow seeds of distrust among its self-styled partners.

Is India truly non-aligned or opportunistically selectively aligned? Its concurrent membership of anti-China and China-led formations is more than mere hedging strategy; it is higher-order duplicity. Now, when the alignments in the world are on the move and multipolarity is being demanded, India needs to make a choice whether it wants to hegemonize the Global South — or use it as a stepping stone towards its own hegemony.

Sometime or another, running with the hares and hunting with the hounds will no longer be an option. Sometime or another, India will have to decide — and the world will be watching.