Washington, Jamaat, and the Legacy of 1971

When Politics Trumps History

A little over a week ago, Bangladesh felt the rumblings of what might become a foreign policy earthquake. Reportedly, the transcript of a podcast interview with a U.S. diplomat whose name was withheld on security grounds, the Bengali blogosphere went into fits and starts when it was inferred that the U.S. has resumed a cordial tone with Jamaat-e-Islami. Nowhere in the podcast was a new policy outlined, nor any official support expressed. But in Bangladesh, where history and politics are inseparable, even off-the-record signals matter.

The concern stems from one unresolved question that continues to haunt Bangladesh: When will 1971 stop? More pointedly, what will become of Bangladesh’s hard-won moral and judicial reckoning with 1971 when foreign diplomats start getting cozy with Jamaat again? This is less about Bangladeshi politics today. It is about whether Bangladesh can treat 1971 as a fair-weather friendship.

1971 is Not Negotiable

1971 is not ancient history in Bangladesh. It is its origin story. There were rapes and murders; yes. There was genocide, full stop. There was abduction, arson, and indiscriminate violence against civilians seeking safety across the border in India. Jamaat’s ideological opposition to independence and direct collaboration with the Pakistani army is a topic that has been fiercely debated in political arenas, dissected academically, and tried in Bangladesh’s internationally recognized war crimes tribunal known as the ICT.

Critics can carp about the tribunal process until kingdom come. But one thing Bangladeshis can and will agree on is this: settling 1971 was never optional if Bangladesh wanted to have any claim to political legitimacy at home or abroad. Justice for 1971 crimes is the floor, not the ceiling, of Bangladesh’s political morality. Anyone engaging with Jamaat should start there.

“All that happened was…”

It’s a favorite dodge of Western diplomats weary of opening old historical wounds: Jamaat is not the same Jamaat of ’71. The organizational chart gets shuffled. Faces with bullet wounds get replaced with fresh voices. Time marches on. Parties of yesterday are repackaged for modern tastes. Washington engaged with post-Baathist Iraq. Egypt will need to engage with post-Brotherhood politics. The logic goes. Except in Bangladesh.

There has been no wholesale denunciation of the Jamaat’s position in 1971 by its leadership. Zero. No courageous admission that sparks internal party recrimination or reform, the likes of which we saw in political parties across South Asia after WWII. It’s fine to distance yourself tactically from past rhetoric. But that’s not the same thing as moral accountability.

If engaging Jamaat means papering over 1971 without extracting some form of recognition that what happened was not okay, then Bangladeshis will see that for what it is: rewarding a party that has never faced its dark past.

Opening Dialogues, Shutting Down Justice

Whether stated outright or implied through informal channels, when U.S. diplomats say they are open to engaging with Jamaat, that message may be filtered through many degrees in Dhaka, but the bottom-line translation will be heard loud and clear: the injustices of 1971 are diplomatically inconvenient.

 

Why should that matter?

For starters, it validates Jamaat’s decades-long victim-blaming strategy, a revisionist history, calling 1971 “nothing but a difference of political opinion.” It signals to perpetrators that justice can take a backseat to realpolitik. If you fight long enough, international actors will abandon their principles and let you off the hook. And, most troublingly, it demoralizes every woman raped in 1971 and never told she was believed; every student abducted and never told his story deserves justice; and every minority community that saw their friends and neighbors targeted for death because they were Hindu and asked, “Why does anyone care about us?”

Remembering 1971 is bigger than symbolism in Bangladesh. It’s the basis of what constitutes legitimate political participation.

Spotlighting Democracy Without Context

Make no mistake: Bangladeshis welcome U.S. interest in democracy promotion. Strengthening electoral integrity, civic space, and institution building are laudable goals. But democracy without justice is hollow. Electoral democracy is insufficient if actors with blood on their hands never have to answer fundamental questions about their past. Pushing for democratic reforms in Bangladesh but turning a blind eye to history perpetuates the same injustice victims suffered in 1971: victim-blaming.

Bangladeshis deserve better than democratic credentials without context.

Democracy without Justice is Particularly Dangerous in Bangladesh

Bangladesh is hardly alone in having troubling relationships with its past. In pursuit of short-term strategic interests and manageable foreign governments, the United States and its allies have cozied up to all sorts of political elites with checkered pasts. Hindu-nationalist parties with legacies in military rule? Been there, done that, Pakistan style. Religious-political parties that got a leg-up through ethnic violence? Congratulations, Afghanistan, you too! Turn a blind eye to past atrocities and renounce international criminal justice? But Bangladesh won its independence through one of the most clear-cut examples of mass atrocities in the 20th century. If we let Bangladeshis wriggle off the hook for 1971, where do we draw the line?

Terms of Engagement

Accepting Jamaat into mainstream political life in Bangladesh isn’t inherently a bad thing. But if U.S. diplomats genuinely want to engage with Jamaat without destabilizing the national consensus on 1971, it will take more than wishful thinking and carefully parsed language.

First, it must be universally recognized by all parties engaged with Jamaat that 1971 was morally reprehensible. Silence is complicity.

Second, any dialogue must be contingent on the Jamaat making unequivocal commitments to democratic principles such as minority rights, the protection of women’s rights, and the protection of a secular constitution, meaning matching words with actions.

Finally, and most importantly, the U.S. must be vocal in supporting Bangladesh’s continued pursuit of justice for 1971 to domestic audiences. Engaging Jamaat does not absolve the international community of standing by Bangladesh in its pursuit of justice, however flawed it might be.

Otherwise, engagement is tacit endorsement.

Forgive and Forget?

Predictably, Western actors love social progress that comes with the venial wrappings of amnesia. Fight tyranny? Great! Overthrow a dictator and elect a democrat in his place with absolutely zero accountability for his actions? Two birds, one stone! Promote human rights and dignity? Outstanding. But only if it doesn’t require nations and victims to face difficult historical truths.

History is the first thing forgotten when someone wants you to forgive.

There is no incentive for perpetrators to reckon with their past when Western governments signal bad-faith attempts at peace and reconciliation, which absolve actors from domestic justice. International actors have an opportunity in Bangladesh to get it right.