It was pure spectacle—red carpets unfurled, guards in flawless formation, and a polished limousine gleaming under the Tianjin sun. For Myanmar’s embattled junta chief, the welcome went far beyond protocol. It was a lifeline of legitimacy, a rare acknowledgment from a global power after years of near-total isolation.
At home, Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has been defined by repression—crushing dissent, waging brutal offensives against ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and resistance forces, and losing territory at an unprecedented pace. Yet here, in Beijing’s embrace, he found a stage that promised both prestige and political breathing space, a memory he will likely cling to for years.
Min Aung Hlaing traveled to Tianjin in northern China to attend the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit and is scheduled to join Wednesday’s commemorations in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of the country’s victory over Japan in World War II—known in China as the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. By extending this high-level welcome, China signaled that Min Aung Hlaing had met certain conditions, particularly a willingness to advance the junta’s political roadmap, including holding a controlled election. For the embattled general, the trip offers six key takeaways: a blend of diplomatic optics, political maneuvering and strategic reassurance.
Self-proclaimed legitimacy endorsed
In diplomacy, words can be more powerful than ceremonies—and Beijing’s choice of words was deliberate. For the first time since the 2021 coup, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to Min Aung Hlaing by his self-proclaimed title; in this case, as Myanmar’s Acting President—a title he conferred upon himself last year. (Prior to that he had proclaimed himself prime minister.) For the past four years, Chinese statements had carefully avoided using formal titles for Min Aung Hlaing, instead using neutral phrases like “Myanmar leader” to maintain strategic ambiguity.
This shift signals a calculated diplomatic elevation. By adopting the junta leader’s self-proclaimed title, Beijing is offering symbolic validation of Min Aung Hlaing’s authority and, by extension, his political roadmap, which includes plans for December elections. This represents a vital boost for the junta boss at a time when his grip on power is under severe strain from territorial losses and armed resistance. For China, the decision reflects a strategic choice: hedge less and align more closely with Naypyitaw’s existing authority, securing Beijing’s economic and strategic interests without navigating chaotic domestic landscapes that could threaten them.
The implications reach beyond bilateral ties. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) capitals, India and Russia are likely to interpret Beijing’s language as a signal that the junta has secured recognition from its most critical neighbor. By invoking his self-proclaimed title, China has not only given Min Aung Hlaing a diplomatic lifeline, but also challenged the narrative of his isolation on the global stage.
Strategic assurance for projects
During the ongoing visit, Min Aung Hlaing is accompanied by key business figures, including top private-sector representatives from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) and the junta-controlled Myanmar Investment Commission. China provided him with an opportunity to meet the local business community at the Myanmar-China Economic Cooperation Promotion Meeting.
The trip has resulted in at least seven signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs), reflecting a blend of soft-power diplomacy and strategic economic planning. Two of these agreements specifically involved cooperation between Myanmar entities and Chinese business associations: one between the UMFCCI and the China Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (CASME), and another between the Myanmar-India-China International Cooperation & Economic Development Association (MICA) and CASME.
The most strategically significant deals, however, involved companies with close ties to both the military and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Among the signatories were Shwe Than Lwin Holding Company, backed by the military, and China Harbor Engineering Co. Ltd. (CHEC). Official announcements highlighted the MoUs in general terms, without providing details on the specific projects.
The Irrawaddy has learned that CHEC, a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), is central to Myanmar’s infrastructure expansion under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Before the coup, CHEC planned major projects including the construction of the Mandalay-Tigyaing-Muse Expressway, the Kyaukphyu-Naypyitaw Expressway, and a new Goteik Bridge. The Mandalay-Tigyaing-Muse Expressway alone is valued at US$4 billion, while the new Goteik Bridge project is estimated at $100 million. CCCC also has investments planned for the New Yangon City project, and is widely known for large-scale BRI projects across Asia and Europe, some of which have faced controversies involving alleged fraud, corruption, and bribery.
Another MoU was signed between Yunnan Baoshan Hengyi Industrial Group (HYIG) and Myanmar’s Transland Public Co. Ltd., formalizing cooperation on the Myanmar segment of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) international corridor—specifically the Kanpiketi-Myitkyina-Pansaung expressway. Under the BRI, China plans to extend the Baoshan-Tengchong highway to Houqiao on the Chinese side, then to Kanpiketi, and from there to Myitkyina, as a major component of the BCIM corridor. The Kanpiketi zone in Waimaw Township will also link to China’s Houqiao Cross-Border Zone in Tengchong, a key trading hub along the Myanmar-China-India corridor.
Before the coup, HYIG had already reached agreements through subsidiaries to develop the Myitkyina Economic Development Zone, Maday Island terminal and cross-border cooperation zones such as Kanpiketi. The Myitkyina Economic Development Zone, for example, stems from a $400 million agreement signed in 2018 with the Kachin State government along the historic Ledo Road (also known as the Stilwell Road), which links northeastern India through Myanmar’s Kachin State to China. The newly signed MoU on the Kanpiketi-Myitkyina-Pansaung expressway builds directly on this foundation.
Importantly, the MoU could not have been finalized without India’s tacit approval for the cross-border extension of the Stilwell Road, highlighting the geopolitical complexity of the project. The strategic positioning of these projects, integrated into larger regional corridors, underscores China’s aim to secure influence over critical trade routes and connectivity with India and Southeast Asia. By signing these MoUs amid domestic political tension, China is positioning itself to lead implementation while subtly pressuring the junta to align with Beijing’s vision.
India joins diplomatic dance
Myanmar’s engagement with India has added another layer of complexity. During a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Tianjin, Min Aung Hlaing discussed potential cooperation in rare earth mining, connectivity, energy and security. Modi reportedly emphasized the importance of free and fair elections. Yet, given that the junta has been in power since the coup, India’s stance appeared more accommodating than critical, signaling a willingness to engage with the military-led government rather than challenge it.
The practical impact of these discussions is limited, as key areas of northern Shan State and Ahnyar (central Myanmar) remain under the control of the EAOs and resistance forces, making election-related commitments largely aspirational. Nonetheless, the engagement suggests that India could tacitly support the junta’s election plans, reflecting a strategic alignment that balances New Delhi’s interests with China’s dominant influence in Myanmar.
The SCO card: a diplomatic win
Perhaps the most consequential outcome of the trip was Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pledge to support Myanmar’s bid for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian security group led by China and Russia. Currently a dialogue partner, Myanmar’s elevation would anchor it in a bloc dominated by China and Russia—emphasizing sovereignty and non-interference over democratic norms. For a regime struggling with international isolation, this represents a critical lifeline.
Full SCO membership would give Min Aung Hlaing access to new security and economic platforms, diplomatic insulation from Western criticism, and opportunities for investment and development cooperation from member states. It would also enhance the junta’s regional legitimacy, signaling that major powers recognize its authority despite ongoing conflict and human rights concerns.
Membership would further integrate Myanmar into China-led initiatives such as the BRI and CMEC, accelerating infrastructure development, trade routes and industrial zones critical to China’s strategic ambitions. The pledge also serves as a clear geopolitical message: Beijing asserts influence over regional decision-making and reinforces its role as Myanmar’s primary security and economic guarantor. The SCO card thus provides the junta both a protective shield and leverage to deepen China-aligned partnerships, entrenching Beijing’s strategic footprint in Southeast Asia.
Clear message to EAOs, resistance forces
Xi’s remarks on securing peace along the border carried a pointed undertone of warning, underscoring China’s increasing leverage over Myanmar’s internal affairs. Beijing has pressed EAOs to safeguard Chinese projects and maintain uninterrupted trade flows, while Min Aung Hlaing publicly acknowledged China’s “constructive role” in northern Myanmar—a phrase encompassing both mediation and coercive influence.
Recently, under Chinese pressure, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) formally announced a pause in its support operations for allied EAOs such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP). This move signals potential ripple effects not only for ethnic armies in northern Shan State, but also for resistance forces in central Myanmar.
The military regime cited disruptions caused by clashes in northern Shan as justification for requesting China’s intervention to halt fighting and reclaim key townships. In the lead-up to the planned elections, these dynamics suggest that EAOs could face heightened Chinese-backed pressure to comply with bilateral ceasefire agreements. For ethnic armed groups, this increasingly means carefully considering how to negotiate ceasefires to the best of their ability while also trying to secure legitimacy over the territories they control.
High-stakes strategic bet
The ceremonial treatment of Min Aung Hlaing in Tianjin highlighted the visit’s political weight. Senior Chinese Communist Party officials and extensive state media coverage framed it as a milestone, signaling to neighbors, the West and domestic rivals that Beijing views Min Aung Hlaing as the legitimate authority on security, trade and connectivity.
The junta’s pivot toward Beijing—and to a lesser extent New Delhi—reflects a strategic realignment toward non-Western powers, strengthening economic lifelines while deepening reliance on external actors whose priorities may not align with local democratic aspirations.
Chinese pressure on EAOs may fragment resistance forces, producing localized ceasefires that secure trade corridors but leave broader conflicts unresolved. Ambitious infrastructure projects promise growth yet risk dependency, mounting debt and domestic backlash.
The Myanmar junta boss’s Tianjin visit was a calculated bid for survival, legitimacy and strategic cover. For Beijing, Myanmar represents both a gateway to the Indian Ocean and a buffer against Western influence. Yet, as Beijing’s grip on Myanmar tightens, this strategic bet carries significant risks, limiting the regime’s ability to chart an independent path in politics and democracy.
The article appeared in irrawaddy
0 Comments
LEAVE A COMMENT
Your email address will not be published