Making Greater Russia again?

WILLIAM GOURLAY

Russian President Vladimir Putin once classified the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical disaster of the century”. This, alongside his lament for the demise of “historical Russia”, is often taken to demonstrate intent to reconstitute the Russian empire, or at least to extend Moscow’s reach in its near-abroad.

Thus, US President Donald Trump’s heralding of a new world order, one that includes a Russian sphere of influence, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s talk of a return to a multipolar world, must be music to Putin’s ears. With an inward-looking America no longer interested in containing Russia, the geopolitical scene would appear to be set for Moscow to exert soft and hard power as it sees fit.

But just how well placed is Russia to reassert itself as a world – or regional – power?

With their long experience of imperial Russian and Soviet domination, the Baltic states have been vocal in their support of Ukraine.

Whether Putin’s intention really is to reinflate the Soviet Union, an immediate goal appears to be consolidating the so-called Triune Russian nation, namely, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko is firmly under Moscow’s thumb, yet the February 2022 “special military operation” aiming at swallowing Ukraine has been a spectacular failure. Russia is currently making incremental gains in Luhansk and Donetsk provinces, but the entire war has brought to light how unfit for purpose Moscow’s military edifice is, and recent minimal gains at the frontlines have only been maintained through massive loss of Russian lives.

At imperialism’s peak, the Great Powers expanded their reaches through diplomacy and overwhelming military superiority. Observing the war in Ukraine, it might be claimed that Russia’s current ability to exert hard power is questionable at best. Nonetheless, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on Russia’s western border, all of whom were absorbed by the tsars in the 18th century and, eventually, won independence from the USSR in 1991, are wary of Russian encroachment. Russia is already employing hybrid tactics to destabilise these three Baltic states and it is here that Putin would be most likely to open a new front.

With their long experience of imperial Russian and Soviet domination, the Baltic states have been vocal in their support of Ukraine, and all maintain a high degree of military preparedness. Kaja Kallas, formerly Estonia’s Prime Minister, has since July 2024 been the European Union’s foreign policy chief, which theoretically should cement European resolve to confront Russia, but questions remain as to how willing NATO would be to act in the event of a Russian assault on any of its three Baltic members.

To the south, the Caucasus states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, are also familiar with Russian and Soviet domination. Despite Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, for which Putin received token slaps on the wrist from EU leaders, and its ongoing presence in Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there is little likelihood of a Russian military push into the region.

Russian soft power is also declining in the Caucasus. The general public in Armenia and Georgia, in particular, want to build stronger relations with the EU and to shun Russia. Sizeable crowds have joined popular protests in Tbilisi every single day since the Georgian Dream government of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, widely regarded as a Russian puppet, called a halt to EU integration efforts in December. And the government of Nikol Pashinyan in neighbouring Armenia has been making concerted efforts to shrug off Russia’s embrace, extracting itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, pursuing accession talks with the EU and signing a strategic partnership agreement with the United States. Meanwhile, Pashinyan visited Türkiye, Armenia’s arch enemy, in early July, demonstrating both Armenia’s determination to escape Russia’s clutches and Ankara’s preparedness and ability to expand its own clout in Eurasia at the expense of Moscow.

Even Serbia, long a staunch Russian ally, is less willing to do Moscow’s bidding.

Elsewhere in Europe, a succession of Russian overtures and intrigues has run up against brick walls. Moscow’s attempts to subvert Romanian electoral processes were repudiated with the victory of pro-EU Nicuşor Dan in May, just as they had been in November last year in Moldova with the re-election of Maia Sandu. The formidable Sandu, who has been an outspoken supporter of Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy, had long warned of Russian “saboteurs”, but she emerged victorious over a Russian-backed competitor and remains, like Armenia’s Pashinyan, intent on winning EU membership. Even in Belarus, where Putin’s buddy Alexander Lukashenko rules, popular sentiment amongst one of the “triune” peoples appears to be distinctly anti-Russian and pro-democracy, presidential elections routinely invoking street protests.

In the Balkans, Albania, once a hermit communist outpost, is now firmly pro-EU and has played an active role in coordinating diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine and sanction Russia. And even Serbia, long a staunch Russian ally, is less willing to do Moscow’s bidding. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic recently visited Kyiv and offered to contribute to rebuilding efforts in Ukraine.

As Russia grows increasingly on the nose in Europe, it has stepped up to be the first government to recognise Taliban rule in Afghanistan, also expanding its reach in Africa. Despite a slowing economy, Moscow is positioned to continue slogging on in Ukraine, but the mayoralty has had to resort to bread and circuses throughout the summer to distract public attention from the ongoing stalemate. None of this would suggest that Russia is about to reassert itself as a world power.

The article appeared in lowyinstitute