Bangladesh's political history has produced many extraordinary reversals of fortune, but few are as consequential as the predicament confronting former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The leader who presided over the prosecution and execution of several political opponents under the International Crimes Tribunal now faces a death sentence imposed by the same judicial institution. More remarkably, her administration strengthened the statutory provisions restricting her right to appeal.
There are also obvious constitutional, retroactive-legislation, judiciary, mob-psychosis and other questions for which India, as the receiving country, must bear some responsibility.
Hasina was sentenced to death on 17 November 2025 by the International Crimes Tribunal over killings committed during the crackdowns in July-August 2024. She was sentenced along with ex-Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, also to death. Given that she ruled Bangladesh unbroken for over 15 years, this was a stunning turn of events.
The Constitutional Framework Hasina Inherited and Reinforced
The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 provides for trial for the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, amongst others. The First Amendment in the same year added Article 47A to the Constitution to give it constitutional sanction.
Under Article 47(3), laws relating to certain international crimes cannot be challenged on the grounds set out therein. Persons subject to such law would be deprived of the benefit of some provisions of Articles 31 and 35 and all of Article 44, as provided in Article 47A. They would also have limited recourse to the Supreme Court for constitutional relief.
These provisions do not eliminate every legal right of an accused person. Nevertheless, they establish an exceptional framework in which ordinary constitutional safeguards are substantially narrowed.
Although Hasina did not create these constitutional provisions, her government revived the tribunal and subsequently amended its governing legislation in ways that profoundly affected the prosecution of accused war criminals.
A key change came in February 2013, allowing the prosecutor to appeal any sentence imposed by the Tribunal. This change became especially significant in the case of Abdul Quader Mollah, one of the top leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami.
Shahbag, Quader Mollah, and the Politics of Execution
On 5 February 2013, Abdul Quader Mollah was sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICT for his crimes during the Liberation War in 1971.
Large numbers of people gathered at Shahbag to demand the death penalty. This soon grew into a large-scale movement not only for punishing the 1971 war criminals but also against Jamaat.
Hasina's government capitalized on this atmosphere politically.
On February 18, 2013, Parliament enacted an amendment permitting the prosecution to appeal against a sentence it considered inadequate. Crucially, the amendment took effect retrospectively from July 14, 2009.
This permitted the prosecution to challenge Mollah's life sentence. The Appellate Division subsequently increased the punishment to death, and Mollah was executed in December 2013.
The Supreme Court's judgment confirms the amendment's retrospective character and its significance to the prosecution's appeal.
The sequence raises troubling questions about the relationship between popular demonstrations, executive preferences, and judicial decisions.
Shahbag was not simply an artificial movement manufactured by the government. Many participants genuinely believed that justice for the victims of 1971 required stronger punishment. Nevertheless, the government benefited from the demonstrations and responded with legislation that directly affected an ongoing criminal case.
It cannot be established with certainty that Hasina herself instigated the rallies. All that can be said with certainty is that the Government used these to push through an amendment to allow Mollah to be hanged.
Of course, there is nothing wrong with members of the public calling for appropriate punishment. But an offender's sentence should be a matter of law and the available evidence, not public demonstration or Government desire.
The Thirty-Day Appeal Provision: Hasina's Legal Predicament
Section 21 of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act provides the statutory right of appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
Under Section 21(3), as amended in 2013, an appeal must be filed within thirty days of the relevant judgment or sentence. The provision expressly prohibits appeals after that period expires.
Section 21(4) further directs that appeals be disposed of within sixty days of filing.
These laws were all strengthened under Hasina and now seem to be turned against her.
Because she failed to appeal her conviction in November 2025 within the given time frame, the Attorney General, Md Aminul Islam, believes she has no further right of appeal.
The Law Minister, Md Asaduzzaman, also stated on 14 November 2026 that past Prime Ministers were not beyond the reach of the law.
Yet an important legal distinction remains.
The statutory wording is stringent, but whether an appellate court could entertain a delayed appeal in exceptional circumstances is a question of judicial interpretation. The Attorney General has acknowledged that the Appellate Division ultimately determines this.
It would therefore be premature to declare that every possible judicial remedy has been conclusively extinguished.
The more fundamental principle is that the law must apply consistently. Hasina cannot claim exceptional treatment merely because the provisions she once supported have become personally inconvenient.
The Abul Kalam Azad Precedent
An especially important legal controversy concerns Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, commonly known as Bachchu Razakar.
Azad was sentenced to death in absentia in 2013 for crimes against humanity committed during the Liberation War. Having remained outside Bangladesh for many years, he did not exercise his right to appeal within the prescribed statutory period.
According to the account now circulating in Bangladesh's legal debate, Azad subsequently returned, surrendered to the tribunal in January 2026, and became involved in proceedings concerning the admissibility of a delayed appeal.
The significance of this case extends well beyond Azad himself.
If the Appellate Division permits Azad to pursue an appeal despite the statutory deadline having expired, Hasina's lawyers may seek to invoke similar reasoning. Conversely, rejection of Azad's application could strengthen the prosecution's position that the thirty-day limitation must be enforced strictly.
However, the two cases are not necessarily identical. Differences in knowledge of proceedings, circumstances of absence, procedural history, and applicable legal arguments could justify different outcomes.
The central question is whether the courts will develop a coherent principle applicable to all defendants, irrespective of political identity.
A justice system cannot credibly maintain one interpretation for a convicted Jamaat leader and another for a former Awami League prime minister without a defensible legal distinction.
The Crimes of 2024 and the Evidence of State Repression
The proceedings against Hasina cannot be separated from the extraordinary violence accompanying the 2024 uprising. A large body of documents, forensic evidence, and witness testimony was adduced to show that it was Hasina who had given orders to open fire on the protesters. Most notably, the former IGP, Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun, gave evidence as a prosecution witness about his own part in these crimes. He told the Tribunal that the Home Minister at the time, Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, told him to use deadly weapons against the protesters on 18 July 2024 on instructions from Hasina, and these were then passed down the ranks to all areas of the country and acted upon. Although vigorously challenged on cross-examination, including as to whether it was voluntary, the Tribunal was prepared to rely on the former IGP's evidence and the rest of the prosecution case. It was highly persuasive, coming from the head of law and order in the land, and detailing direct instructions from the top to crack down violently on the protesters.
An investigation published in February 2025 concluded that around 1,400 protesters had been killed, and many thousands injured. It found reasonable grounds to believe that high-level political and security figures were responsible for, or complicit in, a range of violations. These included summary executions, arbitrary detention and torture.
The report described a systematic effort by the former government to suppress opposition and preserve political power.
These findings provide substantial independent support for demands for accountability. They do not, however, remove the obligation to ensure that every accused person receives a fair judicial process.
Indeed, Bangladesh's moral authority in prosecuting Hasina will depend partly upon its willingness to uphold standards that her own government was frequently accused of undermining.
India's Humanitarian Argument and Its Contradictions
India's decision to offer Hasina refuge presents another profound contradiction.
New Delhi has characterized its treatment of the former prime minister as a humanitarian response to a person facing grave danger. An Indian parliamentary committee has acknowledged this position while confirming that Bangladesh's extradition request remains under consideration.
Yet the humanitarian argument cannot be considered in isolation from the documented suffering of Bangladeshis under Hasina's administration.
India maintained exceptionally close political relations with Hasina throughout her years in power. Its government cannot reasonably disregard the extensive international reporting of enforced disappearances, political repression, and the violent suppression of the 2024 uprising.
The United Nations investigation has placed the scale of that repression firmly on the international record.
Furthermore, India and Bangladesh are parties to an extradition treaty signed in 2013 and subsequently amended. The treaty specifically excludes murder and several other serious offenses from the ordinary political-offense exception. Nevertheless, it also provides grounds upon which extradition may be refused, including concerns about whether a prosecution is pursued in good faith.
India therefore faces a difficult legal and diplomatic choice.
Protecting an individual from possible injustice is a legitimate humanitarian consideration. Shielding a former political ally from accountability for serious crimes would be an entirely different matter.
India must explain how its humanitarian obligations toward Hasina are reconciled with the rights of the victims and families who suffered during her rule.
Is Hasina Preparing Another Political Maneuver?
Hasina's reported interest in returning to Bangladesh raises questions about her intentions.
A politician of her experience undoubtedly understands the significance of the thirty-day appeal provision, the possibility of seeking presidential clemency under Article 49, and the legal consequences of returning as a convicted fugitive.
Under Article 49 of the Constitution, the President can remit, commute, suspend, or pardon any sentence. Similarly, section 20(3) of the Act provides for execution of the sentence as ordered by the Government. None of these requires that Hasina be executed within 7 days. She may well wish to return to face trial and judgment. On the other hand, her remarks may be an attempt to rally her supporters, garner sympathy abroad, and exert pressure on the Government of Bangladesh.
There is insufficient evidence to establish which explanation is correct.
What is clear is that Hasina has demonstrated considerable political skill throughout her career. It would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that discussions of her return serve a broader political purpose.
The Ultimate Test of Justice
This issue therefore goes much further than the trial of one ex-Prime Minister.
Many provisions could be used against others who were prosecuted during Hasina's own time in office. None is more glaring, however, than the retrospective law passed to secure the death sentence for Quader Mollah.
Of course, none of these abuses should be repeated in her case. She should be tried and convicted, if the evidence so warrants, of any offences she may have committed, and be afforded all legal safeguards, including appeal, if the Supreme Court is of the view that this is open.
The controversy surrounding Abul Kalam Azad's delayed appeal may prove especially important in establishing a consistent judicial interpretation.
Bangladesh cannot build a credible democratic future upon selective justice. Nor should India confuse humanitarian protection with political immunity.
The deepest irony of Hasina's predicament is that the legal system she once employed against her adversaries may now determine her own fate.
Whether that outcome strengthens Bangladesh's rule of law or merely perpetuates another cycle of political retribution will depend upon the independence, consistency, and integrity of its judiciary.
The ultimate measure of justice is not whether Sheikh Hasina receives the punishment her opponents demand, but whether Bangladesh can demonstrate that no political leader, however powerful, stands above the law.
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