The question of militant sanctuaries in Afghanistan remains one of the most serious security issues between Pakistan and the Taliban authorities. Kabul has repeatedly denied allowing Afghan territory to be used for attacks against Pakistan. Yet Pakistani security assessments, together with successive United Nations reports, point to the continued presence of terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and persistent cross-border activity.

The problem is not only about political narrative rivalry but also about the placement of the military leadership, recruitment, training, financing, weaponry, and planning of operations. The United Nations Monitoring Team has found out time and again that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was one of the biggest terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan. In one UN report, the number of the strength of the TTP ranged from 6,000 to 6,500 and the TTP attacks on Pakistan were reported to have increased. In another UN assessment, the absence of the terrorist organizations was denied by the Afghan authorities, whereas none of the reporting member states supported such an assessment.

Security assessments done in Pakistan also reveal some other aspects of the composition of the militant infiltration. On 21 December 2025, Field Marshal Asim Munir disclosed that around 70% of Fitna al-Khawarij formations infiltrating Pakistan from Afghanistan were Afghan nationals. The Pakistani security officials have reiterated this assessment stating that Afghan nationals formed a significant part of the militants infiltrating Pakistan from the Afghan-based networks. The statistics are assessments of the Pakistani authorities, not independently confirmed UN statistics.

There are many casualties attributed to Pakistan’s toll. As of September 2026, according to statistics released by Pakistani sources, terrorism involving Afghan land had caused 1,327 deaths and 2,484 injuries among Pakistani citizens within the year. Similarly, these statistics show that the total number of named Afghan terrorists killed in Pakistan amounted to 260 and included names, addresses, and families, while unknown militant casualties were excluded from these statistics. The following statistics have been presented by Pakistani sources, whose methodology has not yet been verified publicly.

The question of weapons adds another dimension. Pakistani authorities have alleged that militant organisations operating against Pakistan have obtained weapons and equipment originally left behind by US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Weapons cited in Pakistani reporting include M4 rifles, Remington sniper rifles and night-vision equipment. The presence of such equipment among militant groups has been reported, although claims specifically attributing its transfer to Taliban authorities are contested and have not been independently verified in every individual case.

Training infrastructure is another major concern. Pakistani reporting has identified parts of Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktika as areas where militant networks allegedly maintain training and operational facilities. The broader existence of terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan is consistent with UN assessments, which have documented the presence of TTP, Al-Qaeda and other extremist organisations. A UN report has also described cooperation and interaction between TTP and Al-Qaeda-linked elements, including training activity in Afghanistan.

The problem therefore extends beyond a single organisation. UN reporting has documented the presence of multiple terrorist groups in Afghanistan and warned about their potential spillover into neighbouring countries. Its 2026 reporting specifically stated that TTP had been given greater liberty and support by the de facto authorities, contributing to increased attacks against Pakistan. At the same time, the Taliban authorities have rejected allegations that they provide sanctuary or support for attacks against Pakistan.

It is evident from recent happenings how rapidly the situation can escalate into something more serious. For example, Pakistan launched airsick in eastern Afghanistan in September 2026 in response to several incidents in Pakistan. Pakistan termed these sites as hideouts for militants, while Afghan government criticized the attack and mentioned civilian casualties. This example shows the increasing dangers of viewing the problem of cross-border terrorism merely as a diplomatic problem, when there should actually be an effective mechanism in place for enforcement and verification of the problem.

The single demand made by Pakistan from the very beginning is that terrorist organizations should not have any training camp or other facilities in Afghanistan to plan attacks on Pakistan. As far as Kabul is concerned, it has denied providing a sanctuary to these organizations and has criticized the Pakistani attack.

It is clear that solving this conflict would need more than just verbal arguments. Counter terrorism coordination would need definite steps taken against terrorist leaders, disruption of their training and financing networks, as well as preventing their infiltration across borders and investigating their attacks. The fact that organizations like TTP and other terrorist groups continue to be active in the region, as monitored by international bodies, implies that the security repercussions do not limit themselves to the Pakistan-Afghanistan issue alone.

The central issue is therefore accountability. If Afghan territory is not being used to facilitate terrorism, credible measures should demonstrate that terrorist groups cannot freely recruit, train, equip and plan attacks there. Conversely, if militant networks continue to operate from Afghan soil, addressing them becomes essential not only for Pakistan's security but also for preventing Afghanistan from remaining a base for regional terrorism.