From Kabul to Kyiv, Trump’s pattern is clear – negotiate with enemies, sideline allies

MICK RYAN

The past week’s events surrounding the new Russian-American plan to end the war in Ukraine provide an opportunity for America’s friends, allies and adversaries to reflect and learn about how much the US view of its role in the world has changed. The dedication of previous American administrations to preserving a world where the strong did not prey on the weak, and where changing borders by force was deterred by democracies with the Leader of the Free World at the forefront, is in its twilight.

During the first Trump administration, the United States conducted secret talks with the Taliban to end the Afghanistan war. The deal was negotiated without input from the Afghan government at the time. The final deal, known as the Doha Accord, had its ultimate manifestation in the humiliating, chaotic and tragic evacuation of troops and civilians in late August 2021. While blame was laid at the feet of the Biden administration, the foundations were cast by Trump.

Now, with the Russian-American 28-point peace plan for Ukraine, there is a similar demonstration of perfidious behaviour by Trump’s representatives to secretly negotiate a war termination deal with an enemy behind the backs of friends and allies. The demonstrated behaviour of Trump in two different administrations towards two different wars provides insights into how the Trump administration thinks about its relationships with foreign nations.

How might the Australian national security community apply this knowledge as Ukraine navigates its extraordinarily difficult position?

First, American allies will be disheartened by the Trump administration’s posture towards Ukraine and its willingness to absolve Russia of all its heinous behaviour. America appears to have eschewed any notion of a values-based approach to dealing with democracies and authoritarian nations, and has embraced a strategy where the best proposed deal wins regardless of its source. All of America’s allies – including Australia – will henceforth need to retune their methods of interacting with the Trump administration and to recast their expectations of American fulfilment of alliance commitments.

Xi Jinping may well present the Trump administration with a 28-point plan for Taiwan, either in secret or publicly.

Second, those nations which rely on America for their security but are not treaty allies will have much greater cause for concern than America’s allies. The obvious case study at present is Ukraine, but another nation that finds itself with a difficult predicament is Taiwan. Government officials in Taipei are surely wargaming various potential outcomes of the next few weeks in Europe, and what each outcome might mean for the future of their nation. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te has also sought to get ahead of the problem with a timely commitment to speed up increases in Taiwanese defence spending. Taiwanese government officials understand that America is unlikely to assist a nation in its defence if it does not help itself first. But all of America’s allies must adopt a similar approach. For Australia, this demands a significant commitment to more defence and national security spending in the forthcoming 2026 National Defence Strategy. To not do so will provoke both more Chinese aggression against the nation and more American scepticism about a national willingness to defend Australia.

In the wake of any agreed Trump-Putin pact, Europe will continue to re-cast its security calculus and its view of the US relationship. No country in Europe seriously believes a break in the US-Europe relationship is necessary. Europe still needs America, but the relationship will evolve. The same will probably be the case in the Pacific in regards to America’s relationships with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia.

Finally, China, which will have been observing events in Europe with huge interest. It is being provided with a tutorial in how to conduct its interaction with the Trump administration. Even if there is no agreement reached on the latest war termination process, China’s President Xi Jinping now probably sees an opportunity to present his own version of a 28-point plan for the absorption of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China. Xi has always preferred to assume control of Taiwan through means other than war. Not only is this a cultural and political preference, it also avoids the risk of having the PLA fail and be proven before the eyes of the world as an inferior military force.

As such, Xi may well present the Trump administration with a 28-point plan for Taiwan, either in secret or publicly. This is likely to align with China’s aspirations described in its White Papers on Taiwan, but with trade sweeteners for Trump. This is ahttps://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kabul-kyiv-trump-s-pattern-clear-negotiate-enemies-sideline-allies scenario, should it eventuate, that offers the potential to drastically reshape the politics of the western Pacific. It would also recast the strategic military balance in the region, raise concerns about other potential “conquests” by China and force higher defence spending from democracies, including the prospect of nuclear weapons development.

While the Thanksgiving holiday in America offers a chance for all parties in the Ukraine peace process to consider the path ahead, there are many salutary lessons from the behaviour of the Trump administration and its representatives in the past couple of weeks. Clever nations, thinking clearly and strategically about their future relationship with the world’s richest democracy, will need to quickly and effectively reconsider their respective approaches to 21st century national security. Australia, along with its regional friends and partners, has little choice but to do so.

The article appeared in the lowyinstitute