By Adnan Qaiser 2 June 2023
Editor’s Note: In this nine-part study, Adnan Qaiser, a foreign affairs expert having had a distinguished career in the armed forces as well as international diplomacy examines:
Pakistan’s Garrison State-I: Courting East Pakistan Moment
Pakistan’s Garrison State-II: Societal Paradoxes and Political-Military Divide
Pakistan’s Garrison State-III: Reality of Politics, Elections and Democracy
Pakistan’s Garrison State-IV: Military Mindset, Support Base and Legitimacy
Pakistan’s Garrison State-V: Intelligence’s Preoccupation with National Security
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VI: General Musharraf’s Treason Trial and Civil-Military Divergence
Pakistan: The Garrison State-VII: From Religious Extremism to Radical Terrorism
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VIII: A Reluctant War on Terror Ally
Pakistan’s Garrison State-IX: From Water Scarcity to Water Starvation
The aphorism, “While countries have armies; Pakistan army has a country” became part of country’s national ethos years ago in reference to the military’s multiple takeovers.[1] However, while the military establishment – comprising of the General Headquarters and its premiere Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – gets blamed for playing politics and regime change[2] in the past 75 years, little effort has gone into understanding military’s constraints, which compel the Army to intervene politically.[3]
Thus, military’s four martial laws, one emergency rule and behind the scenes removal of four democratically elected governments continue to be viewed with scorn without introspecting the Army’s dilemma to safeguard either the state, or the constitution.[4]
In his epic scholarship of 1968 titled “Political Order in Changing Societies,” Samuel Huntington had long identified the malaise of military interventions lying “… not in the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but in the political and institutional structure of the society.”[5]
Pakistan’s Internal Paradoxes
Pakistan often laments being a victim of history and geography[6] without acknowledging its own doings toward bringing the country to such a sorry pass:
1) First of all, Pakistanis tried to “build a nation-state without a nation.” Fixated with their ethnic identities, linguistic moors, clans/tribes (Baradari) distinctiveness, and castes anchorage, Pakistani nation never adopted their state identity or nationhood wholeheartedly.
In his book, “Pakistan’s Drift Into Extremism: Allah, then Army, and America’s War Terror,” Hassan Abbas underlines how the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic mosaic of a nation-state failed to forge into national cohesiveness. He observes, for instance, “When Pakistan came into being [in August 1947] it did so as a state but not as a nation. The historic experiences of the Muslims of India were not such as would forge the spirit of nationhood among a disparate peoples.” Abbas also notes the missing patriotism among Pakistan’s feudal elites right from the outset: “Among the available political elite … only a few were committed and capable. The rest were a bunch of feudal lords who had joined the [independence] movement in the last days to reap the benefits and save their lands.”[7]
2) Secondly, despite belonging to an ancient “Indus Valley civilization” – having strong racial and cultural linkages with subcontinent’s Hindu civilization – Pakistani’s continue to relate themselves to the Muslim civilization of the Arab heartland. Ironically, Pakistan’s school textbooks begin their history lessons from the invasion of Mohammad bin Qasim in 712AD, with a jump to the Mughal dynasty from 16th to 18th centuries.
3) Third, Pakistan’s obsession with religion – used by the state (military establishment) as a unifying or cohesive force to keep divergent ethnicities tied-up – not only turned the clergy into a religious mafia with violent street power, but also transformed the society into religious fundamentalism, fanatic extremism and radical terrorism.
The Lahore Resolution’s slogan “Pakistan ka matlab kya; La Ilaha Il-lal Lah” in March 1940 gave birth to the subcontinent’s “two-nation theory” – highlighting the inability of subcontinent’s Muslims to coexist with Hindus peacefully; thereby needing a separate homeland. Later, the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan changed the very outlook of the country by making it an “Islamic Republic” through 1949’s Objectives Resolution. Such a carte blanche to the clergy, unsurprisingly, led to anarchy and street violence of Anti-Ahmadiya riots in 1953[8] and 1974 followed by Nizam-e-Mustafa movement of 1977[9] – forcing the moderate and secular forces into retreat and obscurity. Former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s “Islamic measures” of 1974 and his adoption of “Socialist Islam” remain manifestation of pressure and blackmail by the religious lobby.
Holding Pakistani politicians to account for their “politico-clergy courtship,” veteran journalist Babar Ayaz documents in his scholarship “What’s Wrong with Pakistan:” “Pakistan is today being consumed by the religiosity that was whipped as a ‘means’ to achieve a separate homeland.” Blaming Pakistan’s “genetic defect” on the (Hindu-Muslim) “two-nation theory,” Ayaz concludes that Muslim elites “used religion unabashedly” to protect their self-interests after their complete rout-out in the 1937 elections.[10]
The Afghan jihad against former Soviet Union during the 1980s further brought a religiously militant “Klashnikov culture” to Pakistan. Finally, President General Zia ul Haq, a staunch religious fundamentalist tarnished the very fabric of the society by creating anti-Shia sectarian outfits to counter the spill over effects of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.[11]
4) Fourth, Pakistan’s ills lie in its broken social structure and flawed political system. The oft-lauded 1973’s constitution had in fact been a feudal social agreement, which has since been only advancing the interests of landlords (Jagirdars, Sardars, Nawabs and Khans) having income-tax free large agricultural holdings in the country.[12]
A Brookings Institute study on “Patterns of Pakistan’s Conflict” characterized the military establishment as a “parallel state for its influence over the state’s policies and priorities.” Apportioning blame on the army for allowing the “Islamic establishment, comprising of religious theocrats and militant Islamists, to encroach in the political spheres,” the research missed to spot the self-serving interests of a bungling political class that has only remained interested in the perpetuity of its dynastic politics.[13]
Since it had not been in the interest of the feudal elites, neither proper land reforms could be introduced in the country – like those instituted by India in 1949 and 1972, or Japan’s Meiji Restoration and Modernization in 1868 – nor state institutions given any autonomy. While a few governments in Pakistan tried to impose agricultural tax twice – in 1959 and 1972 respectively – the exercise remained futile:
(i) One, the imposition of restriction was levied on “individual holdings” – and not on “family possessions.” Consequently, the feudal landlords got their large agricultural properties transferred to their heirs (extended family members) and trustable Haris (land tillers on 99 year lease);
(ii) Secondly, the reforms of 1959 and 1972 had been repealed by Pakistan’s Federal Shariat Court on August 10, 1989 finding them “un-Islamic;” thus making Pakistan politically and socially servile to its feudal/landed aristocracy.
The lack of proper land reforms in the country resulted into four things:
(i) Lower crop productivity: As the feudal landlord never bothers about country’s food security or self-sufficiency;
(ii) Selective crop cultivation: Devouring large quantities of (scarce) water resource but fetching handsome profits from cash crops such as sugarcane (for sugar export purposes);
(iii) Warabandi: Unequal water (volume) distribution based on the size of agricultural land. Thus, small farmers receive inadequate water supply as against feudal landlords. Moreover, a lot of precious water gets wasted into the sea due to unavailability of dams and water reservoirs in the country; and
(iv) Socio-economic imbalance/injustice: Owing to stark income disparities and prevalence of an elitist culture, Pakistan remains prone to increased crime and terrorism at the hands of frustrated and unemployed youth.
Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Program and senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center describes the contemptuous and baneful traits of Pakistani feudals,: “Many feudals thrive on corruption, demand impunity, and jealously guard their vested interests. They steal precious irrigation water meant for poor farmers, and divert floodwaters away from their crops and into vulnerable villages. They obstruct the implementation of necessary new policies, from agricultural taxation to land reform. And they commit crimes while expecting legal protection — protection often granted by the “police insiders””[14]
Resultantly, standing 161 out of 191 in 2021/22’s UN Global Development Index and ranking 92 out of 116 nations in the Global Hunger Index 2021, neither Pakistan meets health, education and standard of living metrics nor finds itself food secure or self-sufficient.
5) Fifth, denying Pakistan a development economy, the country’s self-serving and deceitful political elite kept renting out country’s geopolitical and geostrategic importance for their own riches and interests. Instead of investing in growth, production or export-oriented industries, Pakistan’s “extractive elite” earned their wealth from state resources’ heist, financial corruption and embezzlement of international aid and assistance. Such an “elite capture” of public goods not only made Pakistan an import-driven economy causing socio-economic injustice, resentment and chaos in the society but also produced a political culture of cult, patronage and subservience.
Former ambassador to the US, UK and UN Maleeha Lodhi notes: “… political elite or ‘privilegentsia’ [remains] averse to measures it saw as eroding its political position or undermining its class interests. Their economic policies testify that elite capture of public resources is an abiding reality. This intra-elite conflict is hardly obscured by the highfalutin rhetoric, which it is wrapped in. Its most troubling aspect is that it offers no escape from the quagmire the country is trapped in — of dysfunctional politics, mounting governance challenges, visionless economic management and crumbling public faith in state institutions.”
6) Sixth, the internal conflicts, contradictions and dichotomies of the country resulted into making Pakistan a duplicitous or double standards state. The stark differences between the rich and poor, drastic income disparities and varied parameters for socio-economic justice transformed the populace into an artificial “status conscious society.” Rife with a culture of “sifarish” (intercession), nepotism and cronyism, people naturally tend to cut corners, adulterate food products and defraud. Economic hardships and inflation has further made people to swindle, fleece and rip-off each other at every opportunity.
Renowned analyst Mohammad Amir Rana observed: “Our national character resorts to fancy terms to justify duplicity, such as ‘balance’, which is often used in a geopolitical context, or ‘reconciliation’, for political manoeuvring and to sustain ideological interests with the objective of safeguarding the parallel economic structures of the security and religious elites. Despite the apparent disagreements within them, the power elites appear undivided when it comes to maximising their advantage, and, to that end, they don’t hesitate to even trigger a crisis. After securing their interests, they return to their positions and prepare themselves for another crisis.”
7) Finally, owing to the politicians’ perfidy and insidiousness, the military establishment adopted a role of “guardian of the nation” – essentially turning Pakistan into a praetorian or “garrison state.”
American political scientist Harold Lasswell defined a garrison state as one in which the army constitutes the most powerful societal group carrying monopoly over violence and threat. Owing to national security constraints the militarized ruling elite wields greater influence over the polity and masses, usurping a major share of state resources.
Civil-Military relations are generally governed by two approaches, as outlined by political scientist Samuel Huntington:[15]
(i) In “Objective Control,” the civilians grant absolute professional autonomy to the military in return for armed forces’ complete dissociation from the politics or running of the country. Such a policy while insulates the democratic process from any untoward infringement – fostering military’s professionalism and its de-politicization – results into weak civilian control or oversight of armed forces;
(ii) In the second approach called “Subjective Control,” while the military is involved in the political affairs of the country, the civilians too remain permitted to meddle into the professional domains of the army.
Subjective Control, though, fosters democratic norms and promotes harmonious civil-military relations, Pakistan developed its own model called “controlled or guided democracy” or “hybrid governance” causing historic distrust and mutual acrimony.[16] In such a political tug-of-war, Pakistan’s Khaki-Mufti divide remains perpetual until the country corrects its imbalanced political fundamentals first.
Ethnic and Political Discords
A country born in August 1947 that saw its first general elections after 23 years (in December 1970)[17] unsurprisingly broke apart into two due to the arrogance and obduracy of two politicians. Failing to honour people’s mandate Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rehman midwifed Bangladesh out of former East Pakistan in December 1971 – leaving a dark agonizing blot on the psyche of Pakistan.[18]
Meanwhile, riddled with political conspiracies,[19] Pakistan’s political system has only been advancing the interests of its feudal or elite class.[20] Having two constitutions abrogated, the third one in 1973 had been questionably agreed upon without getting the Army onboard and put under suspension thrice (besides many-a-times abused with twenty-six amendments) so far. Moreover, the controversial 18th Amendment, delegating many a federal subjects to the provinces, opened floodgates of financial misappropriations by the federating units making the federation weaker and weaker.
It is only in a unique country like Pakistan, where:
i) The militants in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) have declared the establishment of an ‘Islamic Emirate of Waziristan;’
ii) The nationalists in the province of Sindh – blackmailing through ‘Sindh Card’ for political power and financial gains – continue to threaten secession for ‘Sindhu-Desh;’
iii) The Baluch Sardars – now joined by alienated middle class – carry on with their struggle for a ‘Free Baluchistan;’[21]
iv) The Pashtun leaders in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province keep dreaming about ‘Greater Pashtunistan’ (joining the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan);[22]
v) Punjabis in the Punjab province keep their jingoism alive with the slogan of ‘Jaag Punjabi Jaag’ (wake-up Punjabis for your right); and
vi) Not to be left behind in the race the Mohajirs (migrants) in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad keep-threatening secession from the country with maps already demarcated for ‘Jinnahpur’
As highlighted in Part-I of this study, Pakistan’s “enemy within” constrained its military establishment to intervene politically and by using the cohesive force of religion (which has backfired) kept the nation unified, ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan.[23]
Former US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Armitage stated in an interview, “Twenty-five years from now … I can assure you there will be a nation called Afghanistan, with much the same borders and the same rough demographic makeup. I probably couldn’t say that about Pakistan.”[24]
Army’s Quandary: Constraints and Reproval
The eternal rivalry between India and Pakistan caused by major territorial disputes of Kashmir, Sir Creek and Siachen glacier along with three major wars made Pakistan a ‘national security state’ granting a permanent role to its military in the national polity.
Propounding Pakistan’s national insecurities to American political scientist Harold Lasswell’s theory of “garrison state” (1937), historian Ishtiaq Ahmed quotes military researcher Brigadier (Retd) A. R. Siddiqi in his book “The Pakistan Military in Politics: Origin, Evolution, Consequences:” “Since there is no other institution to rival the military in organization and discipline, above all, in its control of the instruments of violence, its image grows apace, and presently reaches a point of predominance and power where it becomes an object of mass reverence or fear. A sort of (sic) prussianism is born to produce an army with a nation in place of a nation with an army. The national identity and interest is progressively subordinated to the growing power of the military image.”[25]
However, with the changing tides of time, the Army, which has always stood as upright, disciplined, patriotic and unblemished institution in the country, has begun to draw public ire and contempt. As noted by me in my 2022’s paper titled Talking the Talk of Pakistan’s Military Might: Indo-Pakistan New Normal, the Army has become vulnerable and weak by overstretching itself.[26]
Subsequent to the nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan in May 1998, both countries established “strategic stability” (read: nuclear equilibrium or the theory of mutually assured destruction/MAD) in the subcontinent. Thus, having Pakistan’s security concerns duly addressed there had been no need for the country to continue expanding its Army’s pyramid or to engage in a conventional (weapon) arms race with India.
However, owing to the personal rapacity and lust for service extensions of successive army chiefs – starting from General Pervez Musharraf to General Qamar Javed Bajwa – the natural career growth process of the commissioned officers got stymied, causing resentment. To vent out the frustration, the Army decided to expand its platform and keep using the bogey of Indian threat to buy latest armaments. Resultantly, Pakistan’s budget came under immense pressure to sustain such a large armed force, especially after the drying up of “Coalition Support Fund” from the U.S. for Pakistan Army’s contribution in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan.
Moreover, since armies around the world remain the biggest beneficiary of a country’s “system,” they generally loathe any changes or disruption to the status quo. Under a culture of entitlements, perks, privileges and service benefits of the armed forces of Pakistan, the military thwarts any attempt to radically change the system.
Pakistan Army’s critic and author of Military Incorporated: Inside Pakistan Military’s Economy,[27] Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa notes in an analysis: “The officer corps puts forward a narrative to legitimise their economic ventures and conceal their predatory, kleptocratic behaviour. Their propaganda machine, the ISPR, has become a major media empire with one of the largest radio networks in the country. It finances the production of films and TV programmes, as well as deploying a large squad of social media operators to malign its critics and uphold its reputation. The goal of this publicity is to project an image of the army as the only institution with the will or capacity to protect Pakistan. While dynasticism and patronage are certainly part of Pakistan’s political structure, the military is not a superior alternative. Its generals tend to use institutional power to manipulate national resources so as to lift themselves out of their middle-class background and become part of the elite. They have used anti-corruption rhetoric to justify the removal of several governments, dating back to the 1980s. But the generals themselves, as we have seen, are equally corrupt.”[28]
Conclusion
The irony is that despite ruling Pakistan for 32½ years, the Army too failed in bringing structural reforms in the country that could genuinely empower people; institute social-justice; remove class distinction; develop national cohesion; and bring state institutions out of political influence. Pakistan, thus, remains a sad spectacle of national disharmony and societal decadence, challenged with internal dissensions, economic privation and political turmoil.[29]
A senior retired civil service officer slated the Army for disingenuously derailing the democratic process in Pakistan. He noted, for instance: “The establishment has acquired the art of turning its strategic follies to triumphs. It is this deep state that has curtailed and trimmed democracy, ensuring the country stays rigged in favour of a small but self-aggrandising elite. And until that changes, democracy in Pakistan will remain imperiled.”
Crumbling under the weight of its inherent paradoxes (conflicts and contradictions) the nation has yet to agree on its “religious ideology”[30] and “national identity.”[31] Uncertain whether it was created to become a Sharia governed theocratic state based on Islamic underpinning or to become a forward-looking moderate nation-state, Pakistan keeps struggling towards an uncertain future.[32]
Confronted with innumerable internal challenges and clashing over ethnicity, language, sharing of national resources, provincial autonomy and political representation Pakistan has yet to evolve an honest and strong political leadership that could hold the country together and steer it out of many of its problems. The resultant constitutional chaos and political vacuum[33] has forced its military establishment many-a-times to step-in and save the country from total collapse or falling apart.[34]
Thus, until the rationale behind Pakistan’s creation gets accepted by all and sundry and the country’s edifice is reconstructed by introducing a new social contract (constitution), duly instituting structural reforms and political and military checks and balances, Pakistan’s survivability will remain uncertain – during which the civil-military musical-chair of power will carry on.
Worrying about “wither or whether Pakistan,” in his scholarship “The Future of Pakistan,” author Stephen P. Cohen of Brookings Institute has found the country’s survivability depending upon ‘political dynamics; radicalization of society; the military; economy; relations with India; and the foreign policy.’[35]
The time is out of joint. O cursed spite,
That ever I was born to set it right!
(Shakespeare, Hamlet: Act 1, Scene 5)
Adnan Qaiser can be reached at: adnanqaiser1@yahoo.com and Tweets @adnanqaiser01. Views are personal and do not represent any institutional thought.
Notes
[1] Christine C. Fair, “Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War,” Oxford University Press (2014), p. 27
https://academic.oup.com/book/27124
[2] Kamran Bokhari, The Never-Ending Regime Changes in Pakistan, Newsline Institute for Strategy and Policy, Apr 4, 2022
https://newlinesinstitute.org/pakistan/the-never-ending-regime-changes-in-pakistan/
[3] Anatol Lieven, “Pakistan: A Hard Country,” Penguin Books (2012), pp. 209 to 211
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/bookreviews/8418245/Pakistan-a-Hard-Country-by-Anatol-Lieven-review.html
[4] Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Idea of Pakistan,” Brookings Institution Press (2006), pp. 97 to 130
https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-idea-of-pakistan/
[5] Samuel P. Huntington, Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies,” Yale University, (1968), p. 194
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bf7d/7528a7d3614f3550ec9ef1b869f7f7d731a1.pdf
[6] Arif Hassan Syed, Pakistan: A Geopolitical Analysis (1947-1974), Ph.D. Thesis, 1976, Department Of Geography School Of Oriental And African Studies, University of London
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/29054/1/10731148.pdf
See also:
(2) Noureen Akhtar, Being Pakistan isn’t easy: Geopolitics has made life difficult for Pakistan, Opinion, Pakistan Today, July 27, 2022
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2022/07/27/being-pakistan-isnt-easy/
[7] Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan’s Drift Into Extremism: Allah, then Army, and America’s War Terror,” Routledge, (September 30, 2004), 304 pp
https://www.amazon.com/Pakistans-Drift-Into-Extremism-Americas/dp/0765614979
[8] How protests against the Ahmadis unfolded in Lahore resulting in the imposition of Martial Law
Mapping the Anti-Ahmadiyyah Protests of 1953, Lahore University for Science and Technology
https://archive.lums.edu.pk/interactives/anti-ahmadi-1953/home
[9] The Pakistan National Alliance and the Nizam-i Mustafa Movement, University of California Press
See also:
(2) Rizwan Ullah Kokab and Muhammad Arif Khan, Religious Motivation behind Political Movement: A Case Study of Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement, Punjab University
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Article_8_2018_07_12.pdf
(3) Dr. Khalil Ahmad, Ahmad Ali, Muhammad Afzal, Political Stance and Motives of PNA’s Agitation behind Tahreek Nizam-e-Mustaf: A Critical Study, Pakistan Social Sciences Review June 2017, Vol. 1, No. 1 [98-111]
[10] Babar Ayaz, “What’s Wrong With Pakistan?,” Hay House, (Jan 1, 2013), 364 pp
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/603445/whats-wrong-with-pakistan-by-babar-ayaz/9789384544270
[11] Hassan Abbas, Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School for International Affairs, Sept 2010
(2) A New Era of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan, Report 327 / Asia, International Crisis Group, Sept 5 2022
https://www.crisisgroup.org/327/asia/south-asia/pakistan/new-era-sectarian-violence-pakistan
PDF Report
[12] Cohen, “The Idea of Pakistan,” pp. 131 to 160
https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-idea-of-pakistan/
[13] Mohammad Waseem, ‘Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy,’ Brookings’ Working Paper on US Relations with the Islamic World, Brookings Institution, Jan 5, 2011
[14] Michael Kugelman, Pakistan’s fixation with feudalism, Dawn, Jan 3, 2013
https://www.dawn.com/news/775988/pakistans-fixation-with-feudalism
[15] Mackubin Thomas Owens, Civil–Military Relations, International Studies, Oxford University Press, Nov 30, 2017
[16] The compact between the civilian and military elite that underpinned this hybrid democracy now lies in tatters.
Uzair M. Younus, Pakistan’s hybrid regime is coming to an end. What next?, Dawn, Sept 6, 2022
https://www.dawn.com/news/1708579
[17] Twenty-four political parties prepared to land in the election arena of 1970, held under Gen Yahya Khan’s martial law. Every party had its programme but two parties — the Awami League and the Pakistan People’s Party — were being eyed by the electorate as the winners. The presence of established ruling families posed a formidable force to be broken but the approach of the leadership of the said parties began setting directions of the election results at an early date.
1970 polls: When election results created a storm, Dawn, From In paper Magazine, Jan 8, 2012
https://www.dawn.com/news/686541/1970-polls-when-election-results-created-a-storm
[18] The 1970 general elections were a fierce contest between two social democratic parties – the west-based Pakistan Peoples Party of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the east-based Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
The Watershed Moment in 1970 Elections That Broke Pakistan, The Wire, Dec 7, 2020
https://thewire.in/south-asia/elections-that-broke-pakistan-1970-history
(2) Former Ambassador to Bangladesh looks at the sad saga behind the breakup of East & West Pakistan through the lens of examining what happened to the major characters involved during and after that period.
Ambassador Afrasiab Mehdi Hashmi Qureshi, What happened to those who broke up Pakistan in 1971? Global Village Space, Dec 4, 2019
https://www.globalvillagespace.com/what-happened-to-those-who-broke-up-pakistan-in-1971/
[19] Jamna Das Akhtar, ‘Political Conspiracies in Pakistan,’ Asia Publishing House, Delhi (1969), pp. 17 to 21; pp. 95 to 98; pp. 137 to 141; pp. 253 to 258; pp. 282 to 286 and; pp. 282 to 286
Review: Political Conspiracies in Pakistan, The News, June 15, 2016
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/127960-Political-Conspiracies-in-Pakistan
[20] Zahid Hussain, “The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan, and How it Threatens the World,” Free Press (2010), pp. 46 to 47 and 50 to 51
https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Scorpions-Tail/Zahid-Hussain/9781439120262
[21] Mickey Kupecz, ‘Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency: History, Conflict Drivers, and Regional Implications,’ International Affairs Review, Volume XX, Number 3, Spring 2012
http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/Pakistan%27s%20Baloch%20Insurgency.pdf
[22] Selig S. Harrison, ‘Pashtunistan’: The Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan,’ Security & Defence – ARI 37/2008, Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), Apr 2, 2008 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/5c14d3004f018b08ace5ec3170baead1/ARI37-2008_Harrison_Pashtunistan_Afghanistan_Pakistan.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=5c14d3004f018b08ace5ec3170baead1
[23] Cohen, “The Idea of Pakistan,”, pp. 201 to 229
https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-idea-of-pakistan/
[24] Thomas E. Ricks, The Best Defense Interview: Armitage on Pakistan’s Tactical Nukes, Afghanistan’s Future, and Why We Should Withdraw Now, Best Defense, Foreign Policy, Jun 18, 2013
[25] Ishtiaq Ahmed, “The Pakistan Military in Politics: Origin, Evolution, Consequences,” Amaryllis (2013), pp. 15 and 19
https://www.amazon.com/The-Pakistan-Military-Politics-Consequences/dp/9381506299
[26] Adnan Qaiser (Author) “Talking the Talk of Pakistan’s Military Might: Indo-Pakistan New Normal”, South Asia Journal (USA), Dec 27, 2022
https://southasiajournal.net/talking-the-talk-of-pakistans-military-might-indo-pakistan-new-normal/
[27] Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Military Incorporated: Inside Pakistan Military’s Economy,” Pluto Press; Second Edition (November 20, 2016), pp. 400
https://www.amazon.com/Military-Inc-Inside-Pakistans-Economy/dp/0745399010
[28] Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan’s Army Is Just as Corrupt as the Politicians It Denounces, The Wire, Aug 17, 2022
https://thewire.in/south-asia/pakistan-army-corrupt-politicians
[29] Ahmed Rashid, “Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia,” Allen Lane (2008), pp. 33 to 34
https://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-Ahmed-Rashid/dp/1846141753
[30] Ambassador Zamir Akram, Religion’s Importance in Pakistani Politics, Geopolitics & Security, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, Sept 11, 2014
Also see:
(2) B.M. Chengappa, Pakistan: The Role of Religion in Political Evolution, Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, Columbia University, March 2001 (Vol. XXIV No. 12)
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_mar01chb01.html
[31] Muhammad Ahsan Jahangir, Pakistan’s national identity conundrum Making sense of the composition, evolution and conflict of Pakistan’s national identity, AORG351 Master’s Thesis in Public Administration, Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University Of Bergen, Spring 2019
[32] Ziad Haider, Ideologically Adrift, “Pakistan Beyond a Crisis State,” Oxford University Press (2011), pp.113 to 115
https://oup.com.pk/academic-generalbooks/politics-international-affairs/pakistan-beyond-the-crisis-state.html
[33] Samina Ahmed, Pakistan: Plunging into Chaos?, International Crisis Group, Nov 10, 2022
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-plunging-chaos
[34] Brian Cloughley, “War, Coups & Terror: Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil,” Pen & Sword Military (2008), p. 120
https://www.amazon.com/War-Coups-Terror-Pakistans-Turmoil/dp/B002WTCBMC
[35] Stephen P. Cohen “The Future of Pakistan” Brookings Institution Press (2011) pp. xiv, 284, 287, 289 and 294
PDF Book:
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/01_pakistan_cohen.pdf