Pakistan: The Demise of the GHQ

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Qamar Javed Bajwa - Wikipedia

Qamar Javed Bajwa

Image source: Wikipedia

by Mian Hameed    20 April 2022

The Pakistan army has ushered the last convict, the PM Shahbaz Sharif, into the national governance system on April 11, 2022. In this article I will contrast the conduct among the current Pakistan army brass with a fading soldier who in his book, Looking Back, is looking-back “on the events and experiences” – What he saw. Hence from this contrast, the consequences Pakistan is facing.

In December 2021, a three-star general explained how a general is promoted. He said, “At [a] three star level the difference may be head, neck or shoulder at best. Very rarely an exception would stand out. The selection could be on political affiliation, nepotism, cleverness in creating your impression – and sometimes personality and eloquence adding to the icing.”

He adds, “Cleverness is creating an aura of loyalty by an actually [a] dangerous person.” And they are promoted by, “Whosoever wields the power is [the] selector. Master hoodwinker is the selected.” This is one assessment.

Another assessment; for the late spy master Gen. Hamid Gul, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) could not be appointed without the blessings of the United States. Literature prevails, Gen. Gul was a victim of the U.S. influence in his unsuccessful bid to become the COAS.

There is also an organic means, from a fault line in the army’s governance system, by which a general can turn dangerous to the country. I explain it with the following reflection:

What attributes and traits land the courage to the leaders of N. Korea and Iran to shun foreign dictates? N. Korea’s autonomy in policy perhaps benefits from her nuclear deterrence. Iran is without nukes. Do Iranians behave independently possibly from a sense of civitas worthiness? Or is there more?

The late Gen. Hamid Gul once said to the effect, do urinate on my grave when the United States attack Iran. His wisdom thus far holds.

The vulnerability from the U.S. threats to Pakistani generals—the faggot (bundle of sticks as fuel), lies in the army’s governance and operation in a vacuum, that cannot enjoy the protection from civitas worthiness built by the republic law. This is a major fault line. This faggot is ever dangerous to the integrity of Pakistan.

The armed forces take an oath to protect the country – They have failed by participated in a regime change. If proven, this is an act of treason.

The generals’ alleged ‘neutrality’ has precisely aided and abetted a treasonous crime. They have escorted the convicts and the disloyal into the country’s institutions. The countries’ institutions involved have violated the Constitutional Articles 69, 63-a, 6, 5 and counting.

The retired soldiers and the wives of the martyrs on social media are asking questions: What logic was worth tarnishing the image of the defenders of the country? How can we trust the convicted criminal running the country to benefit the sovereignty of Pakistan? How could you let the justice system fail the country?

Among the acutely concerned voices, some retired officers have appeared in videos. One flashed his picture in military uniform and asked the Joint Chiefs to arrest Bajwa and the DG ISI. Pakistan knows a treason is committed.

The entire country will never abandon their soldiers from a Brigadier rank and lower, but are discombobulated, and are in a shock from what these generals have brought upon the sacrifices Pakistan has made.

The depletion of a soldier’s character happened because of the people’s hope. Since the people could never bank on the corrupt polity, and because of Pakistanis highest regard for their fallen martyrs, they willingly ignored the ills of the higher-ranking officers. A system now has produced the faggot, which has punted the ball.

Devastation come to countries like Pakistan primarily from an army with depleted values. Depleted values propagate when a country lets go of the habit to ponder. To ponder over the lives of the fading soldiers, and if enlightened, to ask for corrective action.

In this instance, perhaps to ponder over as little as a few pages to influence a correction to the defenders of the country. To check against, if the defender’s institution has means to produce selfless soldiers with traits found among the greatest legacy of their past.

The late Brig. M. Hamid-ud Din writes, “I was convinced” to rise to a rank of a ceiling he has set for himself—a rank of a general. He writes, all the British trained officers as he, had created a rank ceiling. They knew how high in the ranks they will rise.

Self-evaluation as their ceiling, insured the system, a soldier was not a part of a lobby, or to play into a behavior of sycophancy to rise beyond that ceiling.

The Brig. writes, sycophancy started during the time of the dictator President Ayub Khan. Soldiers learnt they could rise above one’s professional capabilities by belonging to a lobby and to indulge in sycophancy.

The Brigadier’s boss was the infamous A. A. K. Niazi, that was not to be promoted pass the rank of a Major. This comment was placed in Niazi’s Annual Confidential Report (ACR) by Gen. Haya-ud Din, a decorated soldier of the WWII with the highest British medal for valor.

When the Brigadier’s boss (Niazi), called for him to sign his ACR; during his pep talk, he praised the Brigadier that he had “all the attributes of a general and if he did not become one, he would be very sorry.” –p. 190.

To which the Brig. asked, “Why would I not become one if he had recommended me in Part II.” Niazi reason astonished the Brig. The Brig. was told he criticized his senior officers, which the Brig. phrases as, he had professional differences, and he said it to their faces.

The Pakistan army generals do not groom into saying “no,” to express their professional differences. Predominantly, a conditioning of this virtue, which I suspect make them a “Yes Sir” wet faggot. Pakistan has a cliché, “A general is half dead.” They bend as green sticks; even if it means promoting the interest of the United States at Pakistan’s expense.

The Brig. wrote, “I had always held loyalty to the country, the nation, and the army above my loyalty to an individual.”—p. 191. In contrast, Bajwa’s Corps Commanders, and the Joint Chiefs seem to have no glory to disagree with Bajwa, else all should be tendering their resignations if they had loyalty to the country, the nation and the army.

It is obvious, Bajwa and his minions were promoted from, “the perception of attributes of a general [that] varies from man to man and time to time. –p 191. The perception of attributes we see now, seems have not varied — All are seemingly compromised generals that just sold their country.

The Brig. could have changed his destiny, he writes, if “I had decided to become a different person so that every place and time would have favored me, but I was not cast in that type of mould [mold].” –p. 191. The Brig. writes, he had long made up his mind not be a part of this club.

This club has produced unworthy generals like, (Musharaf, Keyani, Raheel and Bajwa) back-to-back, at no expense to themselves. Musharraf offered the National Reconciliation Order (NRO) to the corrupt polity at the behest of the U.S., Kayani did not utter a word in protest when the U.S. violated Pakistan airspace to raid Osama’s residence or when Mr. ten percent was looting the country, and Raheel pardoning Maryam in the Dawn-leaks – All in retirement are living abroad.

Many, if not all the generals in the club turn vocal and patriotic only after their retirement. This one soared quite brave, but when called upon duty, he quickly revived his “a general is half-dead” trait. In a verbose explanation he, a hollow defender that could not act at his expense, defended his inability to head the letter-gate committee.

The Brig. speaks of Gen. Haya-ud Din, who was “loyal to his profession, at times even at his own expense.” –p. 89. A rare quality. I wonder, how would he have reacted under an imminent and direct danger to his family and the country, compared to the decisions made by these generals?

What Pakistan has lost is a cadre of officers, “They were true soldiers and maintained balance and stability in the army while they were in service.” –p. 89.

This imbalance among the generals have plans to curtail Khan. If they were the brightest, promoted for their professional merit, without being a party to a lobby, with no political affiliation, one could hope their genius to survive this debacle.

The significance of citing passages from Looking Back, holds meaning from the author’s purpose to better his soldiers. He wrote this from the pains a soldier’s wrong would cause him from time to time.

As far as this soldier’s significance for Pakistan, providence brought him unprecedented honor.

This Brigadier, M. Hamid-ud Din, presented the first Guard of Honor and Caution to his Quaid-e-Azam, the founder of Pakistan, when Quaid arrived in Pakistan in 1947. On that occasion, it was the Brigadier’s Baluch regiment that also raised the first flag of Pakistan.

Bajwa is not to be scrutinized alone. This faggot (DG ISI’s Nadeem Anjum, Chair Joint Chiefs Nadeem Raza, Air Chief Sidhu, Admiral Niazi and the Corps commanders) united as the green bending sticks in support to promote falsehood, and to overlook the five Justices’ mockery. This faggot ransacked their honor and helped chartered a destiny for Pakistan, is repugnant to the honor and dignity of the people.

This faggot without the consent and support of the people cannot suppress a revolution. Don’t place a horse before a cart. If you do, you will become the counter revolutionaries, and the masses will denounce the counter revolutionaries.

The successful revolutions have, a capacity to “assemble broad ‘negative’ coalition of domestic and foreign supports, including the elite groups and the middle class.” –Prof. Dix. When a revolution is losing, it can go violent—the last element that wins a revolution per Dix.

The faggot is naïve. Khan’s revolution has a diverse mix of foreign support. The diaspora, the international community, possibly Taliban & Chechen to name a few.

As for violence, eliminate Khan or place him against the wall, violence will breakout sooner. Khan is on record he will not give that “call,” but liquidate Khan or his party, and it will trigger the “call—violence” programmatic routine automatic.

If all fails, the fear of God into the faggot may fall short of what the humans are capable to do to them.

I cannot, but think, the faggot is heavily compensated and directed. A rot has emerged with an option to press forward.

Khan will forgive the faggot—a sensible course he has already taken, but the stature of the likes of the fading soldier, will not.

Where credit is due, Pakistan army has played a vital role in saving the country from balkanization. It is the only army in the world with a record of defeating terrorism on its soil and averting the Arab Spring like outcome on its soil.

At the sight of the first shot fired, it won’t be a civil war – Mob against mob, hired and planned. All will be done to avoid that day. The faggot will apply a Band-Aid, to find it has secreted more blood. A reality it would become – Mob against mob, hired and planned.