India’s Myanmar Conundrum

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Foreign Policy Magazine    21 July 2023

Uniformed Indian Army and police officers walk along a curved road in a foggy green valley. Some of the officers carry rifles, and most wear helmets.

Indian Army and police officers patrol a village near Imphal, the capital of the Indian state of Manipur, on June 20.AFP via Getty Images

India is facing a vexing new foreign-policy headache along its border—and it doesn’t have to do with Pakistan or China. On Sunday, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met his counterpart from Myanmar’s military-led government, Than Swe, on the sidelines of a regional conference in Bangkok. The meeting followed a two-day visit to Myanmar this month by Indian Defense Secretary Giridhar Aramane.

This stepped-up engagement takes place against the backdrop of violence in Myanmar that has intensified since the military took power in a coup in February 2021, and which poses growing risks to Indian interests. Meanwhile, ethnic violence has flared in the Indian state of Manipur, which borders Myanmar to the west. The unrest has pitted the majority Meitei community against the minority Kuki group, which has ethnic ties to the Chin group in Myanmar.

A map shows the border region between India and Myanmar with Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram states highlighted in India and Chin State and Sagaing region highlighted in Myanmar.

The India-Myanmar border—like many in South Asia—is tense. Groups in Myanmar have provided sanctuary to some militants from Manipur, and New Delhi and Naypyidaw have recently collaborated on efforts to apprehend the rebels. However, the Myanmar junta has also reportedly sought to recruit some of these militants to fight against the anti-coup resistance in Myanmar, and it has failed to stop rebels based on its side of the border from staging attacks in India.

The Indian government likely worries that the post-coup violence in Myanmar will further embolden militants, smugglers, and other destabilizing forces, imperiling its security interests. The junta has staged vicious crackdowns in Myanmar’s Chin state and Sagaing region, where resistance is strong; in January, two bombs reportedly landed in India. And since the military took over, border conditions have become more porous, enabling more drug smuggling and human trafficking.

The ongoing unrest in Manipur has raised the stakes for New Delhi. Some Meitei leaders claim that Kuki rebels have entered Manipur from Myanmar, while Kuki representatives assert that any cross-border movement is peaceful. Meitei leaders also accuse Myanmar of financing poppy cultivation in Kuki areas of Manipur; Kuki community leaders counter that it’s funded by Meitei cartels. Regardless, insurgents in Manipur have operated from Myanmar, and Kuki leaders acknowledge some cross-border migration.

New Delhi is also upping its outreach to Naypyidaw because it worries that conflict could affect regional connectivity projects. India aims to strengthen integration with its neighbors to the north and east through the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral and Technical Cooperation. It is pursuing a delayed highway project with fellow initiative members Myanmar and Thailand, which Jaishankar highlighted on Tuesday, emphasizing the need to expedite “projects that have faced challenges in the recent past.”

Jaishankar also described India’s border areas as “seriously disturbed” and said that “any actions that aggravate the situation should be avoided”—strong language that reflects New Delhi’s deepening concerns. He reiterated India’s support for restoring democracy in Myanmar, a position the Indian government has taken since the coup, hoping for less violence and fewer security and economic risks. This stance raises some questions; after all, India is also strengthening undemocratic forces by arming Myanmar’s military.

When it comes to the junta, New Delhi walks a fine diplomatic line. India needs Myanmar’s cooperation on border and connectivity issues, and it wants to avoid Myanmar becoming fully reliant on China. This helps explain why India is a top arms supplier to Myanmar: According to the United Nations, India has sent more weaponry to the junta since the coup. This may reduce Myanmar’s reliance on China, but it is certainly fueling the very violence that poses a risk to India.

India can afford to go a step further by ramping up humanitarian aid and providing more assistance to those in Myanmar displaced by the junta’s violence. This could bolster Myanmar’s democratic forces, including the parallel National Unity Government, which includes elected lawmakers ousted by the military in 2021. It would also show that India is willing to go beyond platitudes in efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar.