Auqib Javeed
As soon as the Jammu and Kashmir assembly election results were announced on 8 October, the Kashmir Valley erupted in celebration, with people dancing and singing on the streets, lighting firecrackers and distributing sweets. The reason to celebrate: they had thwarted the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s efforts to register its first win here, which the ruling BJP government in New Delhi would have used to “justify” its 2019 revocation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution, and with it Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and statehood.
“We were robbed in broad daylight of our identity,” Hilal Ahmad, a businessman, quipped before he cast his vote. “Downgraded and disempowered by the BJP. Now it’s time to register our protest.”
Instead, a regional party, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, swept the election, winning 42 seats out of 90 seats under vote. The Indian National Congress, its alliance partner, got six seats, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) won one seat. This was enough to keep the BJP out of government, even if the party did win 29 seats in the Hindu-dominated Jammu region. The result is likely to mean challenges ahead for the national BJP government, particularly given that the new chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Omar Abullah, has voiced support for restoring the territory’s statehood.
Abdullah had not initially planned to contest the assembly election. The stripping of statehood in 2019 had reduced Jammu and Kashmir to a union territory, governed by a Lieutenant Governor appointed by New Delhi, and Abdullah was unwilling to act as the chief minister of a union territory with limited powers. “I can’t see myself in a position where I have to ask the L-G to pick my peon,” he told the media, or “sitting and waiting outside for him to sign the file.” But, on 16 October, Abdullah took oath as Jammu and Kashmir’s new chief minister. For him, too, like for the territory he now nominally heads, the present circumstances promise many difficulties ahead.
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE earned its win in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley, where it overwhelmingly dominated the seat count. This was remarkable given the obstacles it had faced from the New Delhi government, which appeared to favour the BJP’s bid for victory. This included the redrawing of assembly constituencies in Jammu and Kashmir in 2022, creating six additional constituencies in Jammu and only one in Kashmir.
“This was done to favour the BJP in the elections and find ways to give the only Muslim-majority region [in India] a Hindu chief minister from Jammu,” said a Kashmir-based political analyst, requesting anonymity for fear of government reprisal.
New Delhi is also “thought” to have tried to “divide” the vote in Kashmir by creating more options for voters. But new political fronts such as the Jammu and Kashmir Apni Party, the Democratic Progressive Azad Party and the Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference, which also contested India’s parliamentary elections in May, were unable to make any headway, largely due to the widespread perception that they were being covertly supported by the BJP. Similar perceptions hampered socio-religious political outfits such as Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, which advocates self-determination for the Kashmiri people.
All eyes were on Sheikh Abdul Rashid, alias Engineer Rashid, who stunned everyone with his victory in Baramulla in May’s parliamentary election despite being incarcerated on terror charges. Rashid had defeated heavyweight candidates like Abdullah and the separatist-turned-politician Sajjad Gani Lone, propelling his Awami Ittehad Party into the limelight. Rashid’s sons had run a campaign for their jailed father, convincing a broad section of society, especially youth, to give him what some termed a “sympathy vote”.
A few weeks before the assembly election, Rashid was released on interim bail – a rare occurrence in terror cases in India. This immediately raised eyebrows in Kashmir. A political analyst, who wished to remain anonymous due to security concerns, described the popular perception. “Thinking Rashid would do wonders on the ground and help the BJP to cut the votes,” he said, Rashid “was released from jail just a few weeks ahead of elections.” Rashid repeatedly denied having any ties with the BJP, but ultimately failed to make any real impact in the assembly election.
New Delhi also empowered the lieutenant governor of Jammu and Kashmir to nominate five representatives to the assembly. This included two Kashmiri Pandits, representatives of a Hindu community violently expelled from the Kashmir Valley in the 1990s; two women; and one refugee with voting rights from the disputed part of Jammu and Kashmir that is currently under Pakistan’s control. There were concerns that the governor would nominate BJP members or supporters to all five of these seats in the scenario that the party fell short of a majority by a narrow margin.
In the run-up to the election, the government granted reservations in public education and employment to four communities under the Scheduled Tribes category, and recognised 15 communities as part of the Other Backward Classes in Jammu and Kashmir, with implications for their claims to reservation benefits. This was also seen as a bid to gain their votes for the BJP, but this also failed to work out. At the polls, many tribal communities voted for regional parties.
Sheikh Showkat Hussain, a political analyst based in Kashmir, said that the BJP tried everything it could to disempower Kashmir-based parties. This included granting voting rights to a section of refugees from Pakistan, who were not considered permanent residents until the passage of new domicile laws in 2020.
NONE OF THESE TACTICS proved successful. Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, an international think-tank, argued that the BJP was aware that winning Kashmir would be nearly impossible. “They know very well what the Kashmiris think of their policies and approach to Kashmir,” he said. “That’s why they fielded only 19 candidates in 47 assembly seats in the Kashmir region, and none during the [parliamentary] elections.”
Sunil Sethi, a spokesperson for the BJP in Jammu and Kashmir, said that Kashmir-based voters got “emotional” while casting their ballots, which was why they voted for the National Conference. “Other political parties also couldn’t perform but we did exceptionally well and have reached a stage where we have a pedestal for the future,” Sethi said. He also asserted that the result in Kashmir was not a vote against the abrogation of Article 370, but rather a vote in favour of the return of statehood.
Despite Sethi’s statements, the results in Kashmir and even parts of Jammu can be interpreted as a vote against the BJP. In some parts of Jammu, the vote for the BJP appeared to be based on a sense of nationalist identity rather than government policy, given anger among the traders’ communities that have traditionally supported the party against several initiatives. This includes the shutting down of the Darbar Move – a biannual transfer of key government offices between the city of Jammu and Srinagar in Kashmir – the setup of a toll plaza in Sarore, the installation of smart metres for electricity, and the imposition of property tax, first announced in 2023.
In Kashmir, voters’ motivations were easy to gauge. “This is a sort of referendum against the decision that was taken on 5 August 2019 without taking us on board,” said Mohammad Hussain, a resident of Pulwama in southern Kashmir, referring to the abrogation of Article 370. Many voters also said that issues related to day-to-day governance had remained unresolved in the absence of local representatives, with the New Delhi-based lieutenant governor out of touch with the public. “For the last five years, there was no one to hear our pleas and resolve our issues,” Mohammad Iqbal Khan, a resident of Bandipora district in northern Kashmir, said.
It was clear in conversations across Kashmir that people wanted to reverse an earlier trend of boycotting polls here in protest against New Delhi, and instead use their votes to express their anger at New Delhi and the changes it pushed through in and after 2019.
THE BJP, in response to criticism of New Delhi’s heavy-handed direct rule in Kashmir, has maintained that it has worked for the peace and prosperity of the territory and has provided employment opportunities. It also claims that the changes have brought in investment worth millions of rupees. “Our biggest achievement is that we have ended separatist politics, terrorism, and put a stop to stone-pelting and shutdown calls,” Altaf Thakur, a BJP spokesperson in Kashmir, said.
Radha Kumar, a policy analyst, argued that these claims are “evidently false” as New Delhi’s development initiatives are benefitting national rather than local industry. “Peace is enforced through a combination of threat and censorship, and there is no prosperity,” she said. In 2010, following massive protests against the extrajudicial killings of three youths, Kumar was one of three interlocutors appointed by the Indian government to address political parties and civil society in Jammu and Kashmir.
The BJP has promised that Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood will be restored at an “appropriate time”. Until then, the chief minister of the federally-administered territory will be the weakest among his peers across India, as many crucial powers wielded by state chief ministers continue to remain in this case with the New Delhi-appointed lieutenant governor. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which was amended this July, the lieutenant governor has control over key official appointments and transfers, as well as administration of the police, public order and land. The lieutenant governor also has broad powers to act on matters that would typically fall outside the elected assembly’s purview.
Among the biggest challenges for the new government is a growing divide between the two territories of Jammu and Kashmir, fuelled by deepening communal and regional polarisation in recent years, as well as political, demographic and electoral shifts.
Kumar said she fears that such polarisation could fuel calls for the separation of Jammu from Kashmir. “That demand might be raised in the next year or two,” she said. “But it would be a costly mistake for both Jammu and Kashmir, which are interdependent economically, and for the country, since it will encourage separatism in Kashmir and other parts of the country.”
But Donthi argued that the divide between Jammu and Kashmir has existed in some form or the other for a long time. “The polarised communal politics of the day practised by the ruling party has sharpened the divide,” he said, referring to the BJP. “However, the regional parties of Kashmir are aware of this challenge and have always tried to bridge the gap.” Donthi added, “It’s not going to be easy, but it would be one of the things that will be on the mind of the new chief minister, Omar Abdullah, who might give some representation to Hindu legislators in the cabinet.” Balancing these interests will be a crucial consideration for Abdullah.
Abdullah has been clear on his wish to see statehood restored to Jammu and Kashmir, expressing his hope that the prime minister, Narendra Modi, will stick to his promise on this – a promise he made at an election rally in Srinagar in September – even if the territory did not vote for the BJP. But Abdullah will face an uphill battle to convince New Delhi on this score, particularly with his curtailed powers leaving him on weak ground from the start.
source : himalmag