photo credit : nationalheraldindia x
1.
Ever since ‘Operation 1027’ was launched on 0ctober 23 2023, the Tatmadaw’s journey can be described in a single phrase – downward spiral. ‘Tatmadaw’ is the official name for the military junta of Myanmar, that currently has taken power over the country after ousting the democratically elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 through a coup’d’etat. Despite gaining the power structure echelon, the junta’s grip on the country has been very shaky. While there were protests in the streets of Napidaw and Yangon during the months following the coup, those were violently suppressed by the junta. To put it simply, the actual resistance began from 2022 and gained momentum in 2023. The ‘Three Brotherhood Alliance’ – comprising of the Arakan Army, the MNDAA and the TNLA – launched its surprise assault on the army positions near the various border areas in their unified attempt to overthrow the ruling military.
The additional purpose of this offensive was to curb the scam organizations in these places ruled by various crime lords who were involved in sex trafficking, drug smuggling and many forms of illegal cyber activities. The drug smuggling happened mostly across the borders with China and India, even to some extent with Bangladesh. Even though most of the cyber-scamming organizations across the border areas have been subdued by now and extradited to China, new problems arose amid the intense fighting.
Dire Humanitarian situation
One of them is the displacement of people in the border regions in all of Myanmar’s neighbors, including Myanmar itself. The other problem is the disruptions of livelihood among the people living in these areas, together with the new arms trade many are lately forced into. The reason behind it is the fact that several towns in the northern Shan state (which borders China and Thailand) fell into the hands of the rebel militias, thereby taking control of the key trade routes that Myanmar has with China. Even in the Chin state (that borders India), the junta faced significant setbacks, with the rebels gaining a foothold in some towns along the India-Myanmar border. Same story has been rehashed in the Rakhine state, with the Arakan Army taking over all of the junta strongholds in a decisive counteroffensive in the latest of a series of blows to military dictatorship.
Heavy mortar fires and air strikes hit many border villages of Bangladesh with Rakhine state, especially around the Ghum Dhum area where civilians were reported to be killed. The people who live in these villages are facing worsening living conditions as the days go by, not just in Bangladesh but also in India and China. Often faced with no choice, villagers here have to resort to illegal arms trade on behalf of the rebel groups in control of the regions. This can thought of as some sort of appeasement to the militias in case they turn out victorious and gain permanent autonomy over the states under a democratic government of Myanmar in the near or distant future.
Nonetheless, the arms trade is often thought to be the primary source of the violence currently going on in India’s Manipur. Already the Assam Rifles – India’s oldest paramilitary force – has been deployed to Manipur border but even then it’s apparently not enough in stopping the heavy influx of refugees coming through. One of the reasons behind that is the complexity of the terrain itself – an extremely mountainous place with abundant trees is difficult to control by any means. The India-Myanmar border is 1,643 kilometres, with four Indian and three Myanmar states meeting at the junctures. For India, these are Mijoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. On the Myanmar side, the states are – Chin, Sagain and Kachin. The people living in these states are very much ethnically and culturally aligned with one another. In fact, there are village huts located face to face on two sides of the narrow border road. People have married and integrated into communities across the border and family members or relatives are found in magnitude among the localities over there.
The FMR
The state government of Mijoram has appeared to understand this issue, since he did not consent to the idea of fencing the Myanmar-India border. However, the case of Manipur is different as there is a raging ethnic clash going on over there between the Kukis and Meiteis with several security personnel dying in the process of mitigating the situation. Yet, despite the passing of one year, the violence has not ebbed down. On the contrary, there are fears of further escalations because of the exponential arms smuggling through the border from the Chin state. From the perspectives of many Indian officials, similar forms of violence can spread to other border states in India as well. In fact, according to some experts and analysts, among the zonal divisions, the North Eastern region – which is located east of the ‘Chicken Neck’ – has never been more vulnerable than ever.
They believe that because of the creation of Bangladesh, the geography itself sort of alienated the North Eastern zone from the rest of mainland India. As a result of which, the inhabitants there may tend to feel ‘not-so-Indian’ but rather a different identity for themselves – as is visible by the cultural intimacy they have among one another. Amit Shah’s proposal of border fencing has been looked with mixed reviews in India. Not only that, but Shah has also proposed to ban the Free Movement Regime (FMR) along the Myanmar border as part of a starting process to ‘ensure the internal security of the country’.
Now what is the FMR? In 1826, the British Empire signed the ‘Treaty of Yandaboo’ with the Third Burmese Empire after the latter were defeated by the former. The newly found border was accepted by both states even after their independence. Like the North Eastern zone of India, the Myanmar border villages too are sort of isolated from the industrialized cities like the capital Napidaw. Due to corruption, sanctions imposed by the West regarding human rights violations and excessive military spending, the Myanmar government throughout its history has been unable to provide sustainable development in these parts of the country. But they did permit free movement across the border areas since 1970s with the mutual agreement between the two governments.
Trade happened on a regular basis which managed to improve the lives of many people from the previous impoverished conditions, albeit not so much. Yet it was something and the Indian government recognized the flourishing transactions by formalizing the ‘Free Trade Regime’ in 2016, later implementing it in 2018. However, even there were some restrictions, with ‘free’ movements being able to be carried out for up to 16 kilometers only on either side of the border. Businesses were conducted in Mijoram, Manipur and Nagaland mostly. The problems started mainly from 2023, with the clashes in Manipur and the rebel launch of Operation 1027 some time later which displaced around 50,000 Myanmar citizens – mostly villagers of Zo ethnicity – into India.
2
Bleak Outcomes For Villagers
The Zos have close ties with the Kukis, therefore the already deteriorating relations that the Meities (who are mostly of Hindu origin) have with Kukis became more inflamed . As more and more Zos have sought refuge in the Manipur mountains, the Meiteis looked at the situation very negatively and this eventually led to more violent infighting in the state. Recently, the Myanmar Chin rebels also started taking shelters in the mountainous-forest terrains of Manipur in order to conceal themselves from the Tatmadaw airstrikes and artillery barrages. Amid all this, Shah’s proposal of fencing can prove to be a short term solution to cool down the rising instabilities in this part of the world.
But what about the long term outcomes? When one thinks about it deeply enough, the prospects and challenges do look bleak for the villagers. For one, the trade flow will be disrupted permanently, which will diminish the much needed revenues for them. With the termination of the FMR, how on earth would these people be able to compensate their necessities which grow perishingly urgent in the face of the raging civil war in Myanmar? Therefore, they would have to leave behind their homes and move to the urban cities that are heavily controlled by the military junta. Secondly, many will be separated from their families as both sides across the border have relatives and family members because of marriages and integration.
This is very much evident in the case of Nagaland. The people who live there are commonly referred to as ‘Naga’. Now the Nagas also live in Mijoram, Manipur and even in the Arunachal Pradesh. They even have residency in Myanmar border villages. In the event of fencing, the concept of separation of people belonging to the same ethnicity is evident. And this too is a displacement of sorts – a violation of human rights, according to the UN charter. India by all means has the right to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity but at the same time, it cannot ignore the outcomes such an action on the people of their own home turf.
Like in Myanmar, the villagers in India too might have to move in droves from their side of the border to mainland Indian cities in search of a better life or jobs under such circumstances. This will certainly be beneficial to India economically because of cheap labor availability. With the European Union securing 100 billion investment in India recently, this could not have been better timed. But there is also the question of being able to adapt in urban environment by people who mostly lived in hill tracts. Moreover, with Hindu nationalism rising in India, concerns should also be raised on whether they can integrate casually with the Indian society or whether Hindu Indians are willing to accept diversity and inclusion.
Rash Decisions
Because of these impending questions that can have lots of uncertain answers, it is too early to conclude whether Shah’s cabinet made the right call regarding this issue. Furthermore, there is also the matter of how the junta government would react to this decision. There is the possibility that they might react to it positively for the time being because the movements of the rebel forces would be drastically reduced, confined only within Myanmar borders that would pave the way for Tatmadaw to carry out precision strikes more effectively in eliminating the militia men. If the liberal democratic National Unity Government (NUG) comes into power in future with the help of the armed militias, they might want the fencing to be removed for free trade to resume. But once fencing is implemented, it cannot be undone easily.
At the same time, fencing a 1,643 Kilometres border is easier said than done because the terrain itself is mountainous and with plenty of forest patches. The amount of investment in this project would likely cost millions in cash. Hence, considering all of the factors above, the move from the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs can be said to be a rash one. If the situation on the ground in Myanmar stabilizes, then the border hostilities can normalize for the better. Therefore, the MHA should exercise more caution, patience and resilience before making any reckless decision that is less likely to bring anything productive for certain factions of its own population.