CHIETIGJ BAJPAEE
If 2024 was the year of elections, then 2025 will be the year of geopolitics. At least that is the case for South Asia where every country in the region (minus Nepal) went to the polls within a span of 12 months. However, for India in 2025, geopolitics will trump domestic politics.
The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi was re-elected for a third consecutive term in 2024, albeit on a weakened mandate. The country faces a limited electoral schedule this year, with only two states going to the polls – Delhi and Bihar. In this context, the Modi government’s focus will shift towards strengthening the economy – GDP growth slowed to 5.4% in the third quarter of 2024 – and pursuing a more activist foreign policy.
On the latter, India faces several milestones during the year. New Delhi will host both the US and Russian presidents – the former as part of India hosting the Quad Summit for the first time and the latter as Vladimir Putin makes his first visit to the country since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United Kingdom and India are also likely to announce the conclusion of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (which upgrades their 2030 roadmap) with renewed momentum on concluding their free trade agreement. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s announcement this week that he will step down as party leader also raises hopes of a potential reset in relations between New Delhi and Ottawa, following allegations of Indian complicity in the assassination of a Canadian national on Canadian soil in 2023. Canada-India relations have historically improved under Conservative governments in Ottawa.
India’s foreign policy fortunes are too dependent on a favourable turn of events that are beyond its control.
Progress will also continue on operationalising the agreement that was reached between China and India in October 2024 to de-escalate tensions along their disputed border. This will be accompanied by a possible meeting between Modi and China’s President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the meetings of the BRICS in Brazil, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in China and/or the G20 summit in South Africa.
Pakistan will assume a two-year seat on the UN Security Council where it may use its position to internationalise its perennially difficult relationship with India. Relations with Bangladesh will also be tested as Dhaka submitted a request to extradite Sheikh Hasina who has been residing in India since she was ousted in August.
All these developments come amid a more volatile global geopolitical climate fuelled by the return of Donald Trump to the White House. The fact that both the Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited Washington in the last days of 2024 alludes to New Delhi’s concerns over a more turbulent India-US relationship under the next US president.
The Russia-Ukraine test
One of the first tests for New Delhi will come with Putin’s visit to India during the first half of the year. So far India has managed to maintain close relations with both Russia and the West while distinguishing itself from other countries that are aligned with Moscow, including China, North Korea and Iran. New Delhi claims that India is in a different league from Russia’s other partners given its status as the world’s largest democracy – and thus distinguishing itself from the so-called the “axis of autocracies” – while arguing that it is not a strategic enabler of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
However, this is narrative is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as noted by revelations that India is the second-largest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia (after China). Last year, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 19 Indian entities as part of a probe into third-country sanctions evaders. This came after the EU imposed sanctions on an Indian entity for the first time in its 13th sanctions package on Russia.
The same month that Jaishankar visited to Washington, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh was in Moscow where he referred to the India-Russia friendship as “higher than the highest mountain and deeper than the deepest ocean”. Beyond this flowery rhetoric, substantive progress was made with India commissioning a Russian-made stealth frigate and both countries announcing their largest energy deal.
The limits of strategic autonomy
Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in 2024, Jaishankar remarked that India should be “admired” for maintaining “multiple options” in its foreign policy. This alludes to India’s longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy, which is a reinterpretation of its Cold War variant of non-alignment. Also framed as multi-alignment, omni-alignment and a “multi-vector” foreign policy, this essentially means that New Delhi seeks to maintain relations with major poles of influence in the international system: with both Moscow and Washington amidst the war in Ukraine, for example, or with both Tehran and Tel Aviv in the context of instabilities in the Middle East. New Delhi is even reluctant to get dragged into the US-China rivalry, with the recent border agreement between China and India indicating efforts by both countries to establish guardrails in the bilateral relationship.
The Modi government will be hoping that Trump’s return to the White House will offer some relief to India as a more conciliatory US approach towards Moscow alleviates scrutiny of the India-Russia relationship. New Delhi will also be watching for signs that instabilities in the Middle East subside as Israel winds down its military operations in Gaza and Lebanon and a weakened Iran tones down its belligerent behaviour. This will facilitate a revival of India’s connectivity initiatives in the region, including I2U2 (Israel-India-UAE-US) and IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor).
However, India’s foreign policy fortunes are too dependent on a favourable turn of events that are beyond its control. What if the wars in Ukraine or the Middle East escalate? What if Trump’s proclivity for a transactional foreign policy leads him to “make a deal” with China, leading to the revival of a G2-type accommodation between Beijing and Washington? Can India continue to maintain “multiple options” as Jaishankar referred to it under these circumstances? I think not.
source : lowyinstitute