by Mian Hameed
This article speaks to reevaluating the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent doctrine that in my view was compromised from India firing a nuclear capable missile. The article relies upon the premise of my article and Pakistan’s Foreign Office press release No. 115/2022, which suggests the missile launch was intentional, is published here.
Therefore, it is no comfort to know when DG ISPR said, Pakistan knew the “exact point of impact,” when Pakistan has no way of knowing if the missile was armed with a warhead payload – nuclear or conventional is inconsequential.
Therefore, it is no comfort to know when the DG ISPR informed the press corps, “[Pakistan Air Force] PAF initiated requisite tactical actions in according with the SOPs.” The SOPs are of no consequence even if Pakistan had shot down the incoming projectile.
A South Asia crisis leading to a nuclear catastrophe in the making is ripe. The international community should take note of the following characteristics:
For India, the math to strike against Pakistan’s land-based offensive and nuclear assets within six minutes has matured. India’s efforts to compromise Pakistan’s second-strike capability is within her right, but when a country with unstable wits exercise those rights, it becomes concerning.
The fact that India has up the stakes with her latest behavioral stratagem from Modi-ism and because of Indians self-proclaimed superior race syndrome, it may make India conclude they can paralyze Pakistan. The consequences are worrisome.
Also, Indian actions (missile launch) equates to dispossessing the region of peace and security. Peace and security have become a monolith responsibility, which now squarely lay on Pakistan to ensure.
Additionally, the Indian mentality will not place an opportunity upon the world to face the challenge of managing escalation. Pakistan has now become a prime study of a “dangerous threshold,” “to use it—or lose it.” It is concerning.
The Indian drastic acts are from an irrational ideology, making it a behavioral stratagem, which does not equate to a stable strategy of “competition in risk-taking.” Indians have rolled a loaded dice that in essence has challenged the strategy of increased “risk of uncontrollable escalation,” a.k.a., “competition in risk-taking,” a deterrence logic from strategy Pakistan had introduced with the Tactical nuclear weapons (TWNs).
Furthermore, the Indian hatched stress test of the Pakistan nuclear doctrine suggests the doctrine has failed. The tress has come from an insane act of Hindutva origin—launching the missile. The courage to launch a missile is the reason I say Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent doctrine is compromised.
Lastly, the United States has rational adversaries. Therefore, the “United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances.” –U.S. NPR 2018. However, Pakistan is facing an irrational adversary that can push Pakistan into extreme circumstances.
These circumstances may avail Pakistan an opportunity to conduct a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of her nuclear deterrent doctrine to ensure a safe and effective doctrine that assures deterring a culturally delinquent adversary like India.
A primary consideration in NPR is evaluating the essential “contributions” to deter, for the “highest priority is to deter.” -Id. Since the evidence suggests the missile launch was intentional, Pakistan has failed to place the essential “contributions,” such as, to set the pretext to “unleash” with “incalculable consequences” (copyright Luttwak), in her nuclear doctrine to make it a credible threat for India, and to deter India.
Pakistan may now choose to look at new “contributions” into NPR. Pakistan may not be ready to place a psychological “contribution” to instill the key pretax input into Pakistan’s NPR. The new psychological “contribution” is the under-utilized trait of certain Pakistani people.
Let me lay the groundwork for the fault-line or the key trait deficiency in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, which got compromised on March 09, 2022—the Indian missile launch date.
Assuming Pakistan acquires a missile defense system, aside from decoys mounted on an incoming projectile around the warhead, which can fool the defense system’s radars—X-band etc., the interceptor’s sensor (infrared) may also fail to distinguish between the type of warhead. Therefore, in a battle scenario the interceptor may hit the missile, but miss destroying the warhead that may reach its target in line of its trajectory. –Lewis and Postol.
Certainly, some peace of mind from the missile defense system. However, it is an inconsequential data point for us. The crux of my argument is, the Indian missile launch in and of itself is a significant event to say, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence doctrine is compromised.
Another fact remains, when a missile defense system is used against another nuclear armed enemy, it testifies to the fact that the human behavior, which plays into a nuclear deterrent doctrine lacks the on-paper posture, to “unleash” with the “incalculable circumstances” pretext, to make it a viable deterrent.
For instance, Putin is clear with his unleashing intent – He stated on social media: If a system identifies start of a rocket and “also shows an accurate forecast and flight trajectories […] why do we need such a world if there is no Russia?” –English translation unconfirmed.
Previously, I wrote an assessment of the India—Pakistan nuclear doctrines and risks, published here. One of the assessments was, Pakistan de-escalation strategy was far responsible than India. In relation to Indian’s recent missile fire, the de-escalation strategy which is a must, is derived from the majority of Pakistani people’s trait, in this case has undermined Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine.
By no means I am disrespecting my Pakistani friends as I ponder over this varying behavioral trait. This trait among the majority Pakistanis have undermined the nuclear doctrine’s pretext. I explain the key trait prevalent among a few that can make essential “contributions” to the NPR with the following analysis:
My grandfather was a police officer during the British Raj. Upon my grandfather’s demise, my father was sorting out his belongings. He found a British Gazetteer given to my grandfather by the custodians of the Raj. It had instruction on how to manage the people with different ethnicities. (These ethnic people now make the four provinces of Pakistan.)
The Gazetteer stated, a Sindhi must be kicked, a Punjabi must be told, a Balochi must be respected and a Pashtun must be bribed. (Later, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, they modified the British understanding of the Pashtuns’ attitude. From the Soviets, we have learned, a Pashtun will accept payment for the requested assistance if it was in his interest.) I agree with the soviet interpretation.
There is no comparison before us to outclass the key trait of the warrior class—the Pashtuns. In contrast, the British found a Sindhi and a Punjabi to be individually timid. Alternatively, we can say they are peaceful; call it a trait from docility, moderation or an outcome of an intellectual behavior. Either way, it does not cut the mustard when it comes to a country’s nuclear doctrine that relies on “competition in risk-taking.”
In this article, I will concentrate on the Pashtuns because they possess the trait to burn-in into Indian mindset what “incalculable consequences” are by doing nothing. Hindu is a mindset phenomenon. Historically, for a Hindu, a Pashtun was a “brave heart.” Hindu grandparents have passed on stories of Pashtuns, some documented in scholarly writings. A scare of a Pashtun still infringes upon Hindu minds, their insecurities from a Pushtun will linger.
More significantly, the colonial British found a Pashtun to look into the British Sahibs eye, to let the Sahib know, he was his equal. A Pashtun’s superior mindset and rambunctious attitude makes him bring war and peace as he pleases. Lord Corson addressing a meeting—a Darbar, at Shahi-Bagh in Peshawar, Pakistan noted, Pathan (Pashtun) is a man of war and peace.
This man of war and peace, especially the ethnic Yusuf Zae Pashtuns are systematically being filtered out from the Pakistan army’s higher ranks because they do not fit the contemporary army mold, is unfortunate. But they did fit before in the past within a much superior army mold – A detriment to the nuclear doctrine.
Placing Yusu Zaes in abundance can quickly make India understand the consequences of the pretext, unleashing with “incalculable circumstances” in a nuclear doctrine.
Pakistan may choose to imagine a Pakistan National Security Advisor (NSA), a Pashtun. A COAS, a Yusuf Zae. Or imagining Pakistan army’s Corp Commanders, as many as all, Pashtuns. This imagination is a drastic shift from the ongoing psyche that revives the minority feelings, “Punjab is Pakistan and Pakistan is Punjab,” is a detriment.
Unleashing through reputation and trait is the higher contributing coin. As I have written before, the “Behavioral ‘aspects’ speak to the resolve of a country in shaping a doctrine of nuclear deterrence policy. The following analogy addresses protective behavior as in a doctrine of nuclear deterrence. We have bears with a history of protecting their cub by projecting ‘incalculable consequences.’ On the other hand, the goat species watch a coyote devour their fawn.”
To make a point, to equate Pakistan’s current National Security Advisor (NSA) to goat species is logical because of his ethnicity. I see a very timid individual to a base reference—a Pashtun. His ethnicity brings incompetency into his profession—is a gospel of consequence for other key defense positions. This is how serious the business of behavioral aspect plays into a country’s nuclear doctrine.
To maintain deterrence and peace in the region, the prevailing preferences has kept away the “brave heart,” from maintaining the low threshold of nuclear deterrence. Try lobbing a missile into the U.S. or Russia, and choosing not to inform them. These countries have the built-in unleashing quality in their nuclear deterrent doctrines and has an outstanding seasoned de-escalation culture.
The U.S. and the Russia nuclear doctrine lives mainly through the term I have coined—Total-Recall. When “Total” faces the “Recall,” the “Recall—the outstanding seasoned de-escalation culture” backs off.
These two countries doctrine primarily do not seek their edge from “competition in risk-taking.” In their nuclear doctrines, “not [to] miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use” is a secondary feature because the “Total,” is not allowed to get miscalculated by either from the “contributions” into the NPR.
Go ponder, exception prevailing such as Gen. Zia; were the leaders/officials (Kashmiris, Punjabis and Sindhi) not a total catastrophe to setting the pretext of unleashing “incalculable circumstances” in a nuclear doctrine? I am not a bigot. If one makes criticism, “Israel is a delinquent State,” it does not amount to antisemitism.
Setting aside the qualities of Punjabis and Sindhis, generally they are not fit to rule at the highest order, and to rule the higher order—the Baloch and the Pashtuns. Noting, the Baloch are patriotic, and the Pashtuns patriotism, which is largely ethnic in nature, is derived from an unacceptable infringement or inflicting a wound upon their Standard (adoption, pride and interest.)
Pakistan national patriotism benefits from a Pashtun ethnic pride. The majority Pakistan would quickly learn what sweet dreams are, living in safety from the sheer adoption of pride and interest of the one that can bring war and peace upon themselves.
Do humor me, and tell me that I am not far off on my assessment of necessitating a trait. PM Imran Khan is closer to being a Pashtun. Imagine, “Absolutely not” predominantly comes from his fully adopted Pashtun trait.