Can BRICS spearhead a new multipolar world order?

TOKYO — One of the most pressing strategic challenges facing Japan, and many other Asian countries, is how to navigate a world marked by growing uncertainty while safeguarding the principles of multilateralism.

Unfortunately, this critical issue received little attention during Japan’s recent upper house election. Yet the long-standing norm of multilateral cooperation — a cornerstone of the existing international order — is under strain. Two recent international summits underscored this “clear and present danger” and its far-reaching repercussions.

One was the Group of Seven summit held in mid-June in Kananaskis, Canada; the other was the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro in early July.

At the G7 summit, host nation Canada abandoned from the outset any attempt to issue a comprehensive joint communique, reflecting rising tensions over the U.S. decision to impose steep tariffs on imports from most of its trading partners, including fellow G7 members. U.S. President Donald Trump left the summit midway and later ordered an airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities without seeking authorization from the United Nations Security Council. The G7, unable to restrain the unilateral actions of the world’s dominant power, now finds its very raison d’etre under question.

Meanwhile, BRICS, now expanded into a 20-nation alliance, reaffirmed its commitment to multilateralism, adopting a comprehensive Rio de Janeiro Declaration comprising 126 points. The bloc, originally made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has since grown to include five new full members and 10 partner countries with quasi-member status.

However, signs of internal fragility were on display. Chinese President Xi Jinping was absent, Russian President Vladimir Putin participated only virtually, and the leaders of newly admitted members Egypt and Iran did not attend.

“Many of the 180 working groups launched under Brazil’s BRICS presidency reportedly failed to meet,” said Felipe Porto, an associate researcher at the Brazilian Foreign Policy Observatory and an expert in international relations. “They signalled a bloc expanding in size but eroding in cohesion.”

U.S. President Donald Trump arrives for the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, on June 16. Trump left the summit midway and later ordered an airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities without seeking authorization from the United Nations Security Council.   © Reuters

The Rio document condemned “the military strikes against” Iran and warned that “the proliferation of trade-restrictive actions … threatens to further reduce global trade,” but deliberately avoided mentioning the U.S. by name. Nevertheless, just hours after the release of the declaration, Trump took to social media to threaten additional tariffs on countries supporting BRICS’s “anti-American” policies.

“Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions,” he declared, laying bare his hostility.

Trump’s response — lashing out at multilateral cooperation that excluded his country, even as he promoted an isolationist agenda — was a striking display of contradiction and hypocrisy.

Trump may have paid little attention to diplomatic nuance, but the tone of the BRICS declaration showed notable restraint toward anti-American sentiment — thanks largely to the diplomatic efforts of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who chaired the summit, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose country is set to assume the chairmanship next year. The two leaders’ vision for BRICS’s future was underscored by Lula’s description of the bloc as “the heir to the Non-Aligned Movement” and the first organization to unify Global South nations.

The Non-Aligned Movement and the Global South have long been historically intertwined.

The term “Global South” was reportedly coined in 1969 by Carl Oglesby, an American writer and New Left activist, in an essay critical of the Vietnam War. Oglesby argued that “the North’s dominance over the global South” had created an intolerable global order. The phrase came to denote former colonies and developing nations located in the “South,” in contrast to the industrialized powers concentrated in the “North.” In earlier decades, these countries were collectively referred to as the “Third World.”

A pivotal moment that united a diverse group of countries, spanning different regions and political systems, was the 1955 Asian-African Conference, commonly known as the Bandung Conference. Held in Indonesia, it brought together leaders from 29 newly independent nations and territories in the aftermath of World War II.

At a time when the global North was dividing into East and West with the onset of the Cold War, these developing countries sought an alternative path, embracing a policy of nonalignment and neutrality. The conference resulted in the adoption of the “Ten Principles of Peace,” also known as the Bandung Principles. These emphasized noninterference in domestic affairs, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the peaceful resolution of international disputes — clearly signaling a collective desire for unity and independence from the dominant power blocs.

Although the Asian-African Conference was held only once, its momentum endured. In 1964, nonaligned nations came together to form the Group of 77 (G77), a coalition aimed at advancing the shared economic interests of developing countries and addressing the global North-South divide. The spirit of solidarity soon extended beyond Asia and Africa, gaining traction across Latin America. While the name “G77” was retained, membership eventually grew to over 130 countries.

Then-Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, center, confers with a member of his delegation at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. Although the conference was held only once, its momentum endured.   © AP

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the influence of the Non-Aligned Movement began to wane, and the term “Global South” gradually replaced the label “Third World.” In January 2023, India, serving as that year’s G20 chair, hosted the Voice of the Global South Summit, a diplomatic initiative to provide a common platform for countries of the Global South. It was from this moment that the term began to gain widespread recognition on the global stage.

The summit, attended online by representatives from 125 countries, closely mirrored the membership of the G77. While many of today’s most pressing challenges, such as global warming and surging food and fuel prices, stem largely from the actions of advanced economies, it is the countries of the South that bear the greatest burden. Seeking new solidarity in the face of these frustrations is at the heart of today’s Global South movement.

Given this historical trajectory, how should we understand the relationship between the Global South and the expanded BRICS bloc? A closer look at the bloc’s evolving membership offers some insight.

Of the 20 countries in the expanded BRICS, four — Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus, all former Soviet states — did not participate in either the Bandung Conference or the G77. As such, they are generally not regarded as part of the Global South.

China’s position is more complex. Then-Premier Zhou Enlai was one of the key figures behind the Bandung Conference, and China has long collaborated with the G77. However, it does not formally consider itself a G77 member. In official statements and documents, the phrasing “the G77 and China” has been consistently used, underscoring the distinction. Although China identifies itself as part of the Global South, it is not widely recognized as such — and notably, it has not been invited to any of the three Voice of the Global South summits hosted by India to date.

Russia and China have long viewed BRICS as a platform to court support from developing nations and use that backing to expand their influence on the international stage. But their intentions became clearer as geopolitical tensions intensified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

As the divide between the China-Russia camp and the West deepened, fueling what many describe as a new Cold War, the Global South began to assume an increasingly prominent role in global affairs. Of the eight non-G7 countries invited to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in May 2023 by host nation Japan, six were from the Global South, including India, Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam.

Alarmed by the G7’s outreach to the Global South, China and Russia responded swiftly. At the BRICS summit held three months later, they led efforts to expand the bloc’s membership. The following year saw the sudden introduction of a new “partner country” framework, rapidly transforming BRICS into a 20-nation alliance. India, Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam are now part of the expanded BRICS.

Lula’s description of BRICS as the first organization to unite the Global South likely reflects a sentiment shared by many member states — an ambition to position themselves as the collective voice of the global majority. However, the notion that BRICS is also the “heir to the Non-Aligned Movement” may be more contentious. While countries like India and Brazil are firmly rooted in the traditional Global South, China and Russia occupy a more ambiguous position outside it. Given these differing backgrounds, it is only natural that subtle tensions in their respective agendas would emerge.

“BRICS is designed to suit autocracies, built on limited commitments and self-interest, and used by authoritarian powers like China and Russia to promote an alternative world order,” said Natalie Sabanadze, a senior research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, also known as Chatham House. “There are signs of a growing rift between Russia and China on one side and other members on the other regarding the future role and direction of BRICS.

“The Rio summit showed that not all members are interested in taking sides in a global power confrontation or turning BRICS into a tool to help reshape the global order.”

“Not all nations may accept China and Russia as integral parts of the Global South,” said Rajiv Bhatia, a veteran Indian diplomat and distinguished fellow at the Indian think tank Gateway House, adding that BRICS “is not in a strong position to garner the world’s support for it.”

Citing Brazil and India, two democratic members of BRICS and its chairs for this year and next, Bhatia suggests that they “should collaborate to devise a way to bring the U.S. and EU closer to the Rio formulations.”

“Should there be some success in this endeavor, these two nations could then work together with South Africa, the current president of the G20,” Bhatia added.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, left, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro on July 7. The two leaders’ vision for BRICS’s future was underscored by Lula’s description of the bloc as “the heir to the Non-Aligned Movement” and the first organization to unify Global South nations.   © Reuters

To assess BRICS’s potential role in upholding multilateralism, it is crucial to view it not as a battleground between the West and the China-Russia bloc, but through the lens of the Global South — caught between competing powers, yet increasingly asserting its own voice. In this context, ASEAN is well-positioned to help guide BRICS in that direction.

Through platforms such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN has built a reputation for constructive engagement across multiple fronts of global diplomacy. Notably, four of its key member states, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam, are already part of the expanded BRICS.

“As Southeast Asian countries deepen their engagement, the choices they make will help determine whether BRICS can evolve into a credible counterweight to Western dominance or whether it will falter under the weight of its own diversity,” M.A. Hossain, a Bangladesh-based political and defense analyst, wrote in The Jakarta Post.

This year marks two significant milestones: the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference and the 50th anniversary of the founding of the G7. To sustain the flame of multilateralism, Japan must also play its part. For a country that has thrived in the era of globalization, partnering with the Global South to prevent global fragmentation is not merely a diplomatic ideal — it is a strategic imperative.

The article appeared in  asia.nikkei