Author: Hassan Abbas, Yale University Press, New Haven CT, Hardcover, 304 pages, $26, USBN: 978-0-300-26788-4.
By Arnold Zeitlin 2 October 2023
Not only does Hassan Abbas, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington DC, provide an incisive peek behind the scenes of the Afghan Taliban leadership, but he also offers in his book optimistic hope for the future of the movement internationally maligned for its hard-line and suppression of females.
“The Taliban today have huge numbers of young men born after 9/11 and the US invasion — they have grown up in a different world than their seniors,” Abbas writes. “….when the senior hardliners start to die out, the question is whether the younger men of today, who adore their mobile phones and desire a relationship with the outside world — when they grow fatigued of the famine and global isolation — will slowly end the Taliban as we know it.”
But Abbas, of course, is unsure. “Perhaps the issue at heart is our naive optimism,” he writes after noting: “Only time will tell what the new fate-creators will do with their pens — one can only hope they will write in the language of peace and poetry, not the dogma, strife, and sorrow of yesterday’s hands.”
The value of Abbas’s narrative is his description of the fractious Taliban factions, the leadership, and the backstage machinations for power.
“The Taliban are a fractious bunch,” Abbas writes. “….Not to the point of provoking fractures (at least yet) but more so rivalries that in turn create conflicts….There is…a growing sense of jealousy and competition within the Taliban inner circle….reminiscent of the Italian Mafia”
Abbas breaks down the factions into five categories: first, moderates like those who negotiated with the United States at Doha; second, the Quetta Shura –“hardliners and old guard”; third, field commanders “those fighting on the ground”; fourth, “notorious organized criminal groups made up of drug dealers”; fifth, ordinary villagers who “found themselves without much choice in ‘joining ‘ the Taliban.”
Abbas claims that faction rivalry kept the leadership in doubt after the Taliban took Kabul and were ready to rule until the arrival in Kabul of Lt. Gen. Faiz Hamid, head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. “Only under the iron fist of the ISI chief could widening internal divisions be put aside and quarrels resolved, one would assume,” Abbas writes.
Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada rose to the top as supreme leader, similar to the position in Iran. “A giant among the Taliban”, Abbas labels him, “rigid” about his religion, with an interpretation of Islam that “differs greatly from that of the majority of Muslims worldwide.” His son died as a suicide bomber, a somber strategy Hibatullah encourages, writes Abbas, who also notes the supreme leader does not know how to use a mobile phone.
Abbas claims that Hibatullah is under the influence of a “hardline faction,” three clerics from the city of Kandahar, “who continue to promote bigotry.” He identifies them as chief justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, minister for religious affairs Noor Mohammed Saqib and minister for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice Mohammed Khalid Hanafi. They apparently persuaded Hibatullah to ditch an agreement at Doha with the Americans that females would be allowed to attend school and work.
“There is no sermon of the Prophet nor any verse in the Quran that claims women are to be prohibited from attending schools,” Abbas writes. “….The contrast between the truth of actual Islamic teaching and the Taliban’s actions could not be more extreme.”
The mention of the Pakistan ISI chief is only one of a number of references throughout the book illuminating Pakistan’s dealings with the Taliban, especially its efforts to get cooperation to end the hostility of the Pakistan Taliban, known as the TTP. “The Afghan Taliban so far have only helped Pakistan halfheartedly in pursuing the TTP as the two groups have enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship for a long time,”Abbas writes.
Abbas refrains from discussing the United States role during the 20-year war in Afghanistan but notes “the US-Taliban peace deal of February 2020 enabled and empowered the Taliban in a major way….The Taliban were soon to emerge as the sole arbiter of Afghanistan’s destiny.” He writes gently about Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-born ethnic Pathan who led the American negotiating team with the Taliban.
“Zal, to be fair to him,” writes Abbas, “had truly managed to make the idea of negotiating with Taliban work — he was likely the best choice to be in that role. While some place blame on him for giving in to Taliban demands, it is not likely the Taliban would have gone that far in negotiations with any other American….he looked like them”
“Despite their dysfunction and intense internal rivalries,” Abbas concludes, “the Taliban’s grip on the steering wheel is not about to loosen any times soon….
“….We are not going anywhere with current US policy toward Afghanistan…The best way to promote and protect international interests, for the sake of stability in Afghanistan, and for it not to turn into a hub of terrorism again, is to start by scrapping the moral lecture. Then to proceed with structured engagement that involves direct communication with Taliban leaders….”
Whether one agrees or not with Abbas’s conclusion, his book is an informative, invaluable asset for understanding the Taliban.