The Daily Star May 25, 2019
The two most commonly used taglines for the Bharatiya Janata Party’s campaign in the just concluded parliamentary elections were “phir ek baar Modi sarkar” and “Modi hai to mumkin hai.” Both have come tellingly true as borne out the poll outcome that gave a much bigger mandate to Prime Minister Narendra Modi than when he came to power for the first time five years ago. It was the Modi factor which made it possible despite the BJP being hobbled by farm sector crisis, job crisis and the economic reforms like demonetisation and Goods and Services Tax which temporarily hit a cross section of people.
The biggest take-away from the Indian elections is that the scale and sweep of the BJP’s victory across 22 states of the country, including West Bengal, smashed the traditional caste, class and ethnic fault lines in areas where these factors have traditionally mattered most—Uttar Pradesh and Bihar—which together account for 120 parliamentary seats. Clearly, Modi’s chemistry turned the caste arithmetic on its head which saw the BJP increasing its vote-share and tally of seats significantly from the previous national poll in 2014 to this year’s general election. The 2019 national election mandate thus signified a fundamental shift in Indian politics which has the potential to make traditional caste loyalties irrelevant before the developmental narrative. No wonder, Modi, in his victory speech at the BJP national headquarters in New Delhi, said “that there are only jaatis (castes) in India today—one is that of the poor and the other is made up of those who want to contribute to take people out of poverty. There is no other caste.”
At pan-India level, it was a contest between the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance and the United Progressive Alliance led by the Congress President Rahul Gandhi. But the fight took different shapes in different states where the BJP was confronted by a range of regional parties like Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party-Rashtriya Lok Dal alliance in Uttar Pradesh, Janata Dal (S) in Karnataka, Biju Janata Dal in Odisha, Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh and Trinamool Congress in West Bengal. Barring Karnataka, the Congress too was pitted against these regional outfits apart from facing the BJP.
In his campaign speeches, Modi sought the mandate on the basis of the report card of his government in the last five years, including economic and foreign policy agenda, social welfare schemes for rural areas like electricity, cooking gas cylinders and toilets which went down well with the people, particularly women who voted in large numbers almost matching men. But livelihood issues alone do not win elections in India. Therefore, the BJP blended these issues with national security and emotive Hindutva planks using the Indian air strikes on a terror camp in Pakistan in February and the Citizenship Amendment Bill.
Modi completely overshadowed his party in the election and in the process stream-rolled almost the entire opposition. In whichever part of India one went to, the one common and oft-repeated refrain that was heard was Modi. His supporters and critics hardly mentioned the BJP but spoke about the 68-year-old prime minister. It was not just Modi versus the opposition in the electoral battle. But Modi was projected as the panacea for all the anti-incumbency issues the BJP faced. Whenever each and every candidate of the party faced voters’ discontent in their constituencies, they took shelter behind Modi. This was a phenomenon not witnessed since Indira Gandhi at the height of her popularity immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh. The BJP succeeded in pitching the national election as a presidential-style campaign and dared the opposition to name its prime ministerial face. While Modi was the known PM face of the NDA, Rahul Gandhi was never projected so by the UPA due to reservations against his leadership among some regional parties like the Trinamool.
The opposition remained fragmented and failed to put up an overarching pan-India united face against the BJP because it was not possible and because the Congress was not interested in it as the party itself was in a turf war with many of the regional parties in states like in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha and West Bengal. The so-called anti-BJP unity efforts did not find acceptability and credibility to voters. Since the Congress and regional parties fought against each other in most states, they ended up splitting anti-BJP votes to the advantage of the BJP.
The Modi magic not only propelled the BJP to retain what it had won in the 2014 parliamentary election—like the electorally key states of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Delhi—but actually conquer new areas in Karnataka and a big state like West Bengal where it emerged as the main challenger to Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress not only in terms of seats, but also vote share. In all these states, Modi’s persona successfully trumped over the caste cleavages which were used by parties like Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party over the years. However, the BJP failed to make any impact in southern states barring Karnataka.
The SP-BSP was thought to be a formidable caste coalition in Uttar Pradesh but it crashed against the Modi factor which weighed so heavily on key regional parties like Biju Janata Dal in Odisha and Trinamool Congress. It is the Modi factor which was largely behind the SP and the BSP joining hands for survival after their decimation in the 2014 polls and 2017 assembly elections in UP on the assumption that the two parties can help overcome years of rivalry and transfer the votes of their traditional support base to each other’s kitty. But that has not happened to the extent the SP and the BSP wanted. This may force a fresh realignment of forces in the state’s politics. The Akhilesh Yadav-Mayawati alliance roped in Ajit Singh’s Rashtriya Lok Dal assessing that the Jat vote in western UP would desert the BJP which did not materialise. The BJP retained its own support base among non-Jatav (the caste of Mayawati) and non-Yadav (the caste of Akhilesh Yadav) castes but the SP-BSP coalition triggered a consolidation of other castes behind the BJP.
Another important factor in the BJP’s victory was the sustained campaign Modi successfully wove on national security after the Pulwama terror attack, India’s air strike on a terror camp in Balakot, Pakistan, and Hindutva by assuring Bengali-speaking Hindus of Assam and West Bengal that they stand to benefit from the controversial Citizenship Amendment Bill as Trinamool Congress increasingly pushed for consolidation of 30 percent Muslim voters in West Bengal. The Balakot strike projected Modi as a strong and decisive leader who declared Indian security forces would enter the home of every terrorist and defeat them. The narrative of nationalism struck a popular chord and squeezed much of the opposition, particularly those who sought to question the veracity of Balakot strike, out of political space.
The opposition, particularly the Congress and the Trinamool Congress, made the grave error in launching a no-hold barred sustained negative campaign against Modi accusing him of corruption in the Rafael fighter jet purchase deal with France. As long as Rahul Gandhi had focused on alleged irregularities in the deal, he could create a perception that there is something amiss in the deal. But the moment he brought the prime minister into his firing line by coining slogans like “chowkidar chor hai”, his offensive fell apart for none was willing to buy any graft charge against Modi given the latter’s impeccable integrity.
Mamata Banerjee’s vituperative outbursts against Modi and her refusal to take phone calls twice from the prime minister who wanted to speak to her on possible assistance to the state from the Centre to cope with cyclone “Foni” did not go down well with the people. Modi’s restrained and jocular response to Mamata’s vitriol stood out in sharp contrast—as for example, when he said in a public meeting in West Bengal that “Didi your slap (of democracy) would be a blessing for me.” In fact, the negative campaign against Modi boomeranged badly against both the Congress and the Trinamool Congress. Modi’s political success lies in that he forced the opposition into making this mistake which turned what would have a clash of ideologies into a personalised battle.
Pallab Bhattacharya is a special correspondent at The Daily Star.
The Demo Scam – which no Newspaper reported – as they were all paid off – as they are of the ilk of the Brahmins and Banias.dindooohindoo
It is the disaster of the Brain of Narendra Modi ! dindooohindoo
Part 1
Conversion Route (Elementary Level – rest to be submitted at the CIC Hearing)
• Party A has Rs 1 crore of Old Cash (which is obviously unaccounted) and the choice of paying tax and interest thereon has lapsed as there is no VDIS – and post Demo the deemed tax is 100% at the minimum
• Party B (Stage 1 Converter) has Rs 65 lacs of New Cash – which is given to Party A in lieu of the Old Cash of Rs 1 crores which is then given to Party C to X as under:
o Party C to X (Stage 2 Converter) are legal entities who trade in Nil VAT/ST products (or under Exemptions and /or Compounding) and are POS Retailers who then , make manual or backdated E-Bills for fictitious sales of items to unknown individuals and deposit the new cash into the bank
o Party C to X deposit the cash in banks whose books are open for 30-45 days before the date of announcement of the Demo or whose IT systems allow backdating of E- Bank Statements (within the period of reporting to the RBI and other Regulators)
• Party Z then taps Party A to convert the New cash Received of Rs 70 lacs into a capital entry to clean the cash at a rate of , say 15%, wiring Rs 59 Lacs to Party A, as a capital receipt etc, and taking the Rs 70 lacs of new cash from Party A
• Party Z which is basically front for Party B – hands the cash to Party B, after charing the custodial, logistics and security charges
• Party B then resumes the same chain as in Step 2 above, wherein the rate of the conversion, id.est., 30% keeps rising as the DEMO deadline appears
• Party A can convert the Rs 50 lacs into cash – new and old – at a premium, at any time that it is required
Notes
• Since converters had the new cash within a day and as per news reports , even before the announcement of Demo, they have to be part of the establishment
o If the converters had withdrawn the new notes from the bank, the banks would have tipped off the DRI/ED etc and possibly reported to the RBI – in which case they would be raided (but were not) or they would have to explain why large amounts of cash were withdrawn (for labour wages – although wages are not paid in Rs 2000 notes , agri payments etc) and on specific dates and how/why the banks were satisfied about the same
o Hence, if the converters got the new cash o/s the Banking system – that is fraud and PROOF THAT THE CONVERTERS ARE PART OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
o If the converters got the new cash from the banks – it is proof of collusion and fraud by the bankers, as past patterns of withdrawal by bank customers (for labour, wages, agri payments etc), would not support the new notes withdrawal
• Since converters had TO TRANSPORT CASH ACROSS LOCATIONS, IT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED SECURITY OR PERHAPS STATE SECURITY, they have to be part of the establishment as
o It is impossible that the state would not be aware of the logistics and security
o It is impossible that the state would not raid the cash movement
• Since Party C to X, who would have reported drastic increase in cash sales and deposit of cash into the bank , would not be able to support the same by PAST PATTERNS OF RAW MATERIAL PURCHASES AND TRADING PURCHASES AND SUCH LARGE AMOUNTS OF PURCHASES OF RAW MATERIALS IN CASH – COULD NOT HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED BY PARTY C TO X , W/O THE SUPPORT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
• Cash recovered in the "form of old notes" by the "DRI/ED and the Police" – were all recovered from the "so called originators" and "so called garbage dumps"- w/o "a single case of cash recovered" from "the converters/entry operators"
• No cash was recovered from the “converters/entry operators (Party B and Party C to X, as stated above)", who are obviously part of the establishment – which is unusual , as the operators would be having the new currency which
o Is either kept in a house/safe or
o Stocked in the bank (which would have tipped off the DRI/ED etc or
o Transferred the cash around in new stocking points and neither of the 2 above points can happen w/o the support of the establishment
• Since the GDP is still growing on the "computation mode of GDP on expenditure mode", and there is "no shortage of notes" of less than Rs 100,it would mean that the Industrial agglomerations typified by the SSI and the Cash sector,have been "able to convert the bank deposits", back into cash – "obviating the purpose" of the notebandi (Rs 100 is assumed,as the wages are paid in that denomination
• Since the GDP is still growing on the computation mode of GDP on expenditure mode, and there is no shortage of notes of Rs 500 and Rs 2000,it would mean that the Industrial agglomerations typified by the SSI and the Cash sector,have been able to "convert the bank deposits back into cash" – obviating the purpose of the notebandi (High denomination notes being used for "sales,logistics and purchases", if at all required)
• It is of interest to know how Billions of USD of New Notes "were available with Entry Operators",on Day 5 of the scheme (to build demand from Day 0), at "strategic demand and vantage points" in "key capitals and towns", across India – for converting the old notes
• It is of interest to know "how and why" the Billions of USD of INR, in the form of "new notes being delivered to the user" and the "old notes delivered to the entry/converter operator", was "logistically executed" – with "not a single case" of "interception" by the police/DRI/IB/CID/ED – as the "logistics was provided by the state" – Police (all interceptions were from the "end user of petty amounts" and could have been "fake note plants", by the GOI – as the notes were cancelled in any case)