Recent Geo-Political Developments in South Asia & their Implications for Bangladesh

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By Brig Gen Mohammad Hasan Nasir, ndc, psc (Retd)[i]

2 January 2022     

South Asia is a critical link to the rise of Asia and a region with a plenty of resources. Strategically it is vital for trade and water resources with 3.5% of the world’s land and one fourth of the global humanity. China, the largest trader and investor in the world and its connectivity with West Asia makes South Asia strategically important.

South Asia’s stability can have long lasting importance for world politics and peace. The region has issues like the lack of cooperation, boarder disputes, terrorism, poverty, weak intra-regional trade. Thanks to conflicts and tensions within the region, its only multilateral framework the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is virtually dead.

East and South Asia are increasingly tied together in political and security terms. India and China are clearly in a sustained and conscious strategic interaction. China is stronger than India, and feels less threatened by India than the other way around. China has a longer-standing and deeper-rooted position in South Asia than India has in East Asia.

In the 1990s, India worked on realigning itself to the side of the US. After 9/11, India jumped on the bandwagon to rebrand itself as America’s strategic partner. With the American sponsorship in the region, India started considering itself a counterweight to China.

The Decline of the US

The United States’ myth of a unipolar world started to crumble, as China started growing out from the shadows, and a resurgent Russia gathers strength under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Friends and foes, living under the erstwhile unipolar world, now have other international options to look towards.

China’s hardliners to the US greatly facilitated the recent US policy shift of ‘returning to East and South Asia’ as a core focus for the US security policy as its role as an external ring holder became stronger. The strong US presence blends Asian regional security dynamics between India and China across the regional and global levels for which other states in Asia have to play a tricky game of multiple hedging against:

  • An assertive China;
  • Abandonment by a weakening US; and
  • Entanglement in a new US – China Cold War, being not in anyone’s national or regional interest.

The Rise of China

China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and space capability will not just play into the China-US great power relations, but also into China’s relations with its many neighbours. China rightly wants to maintain the symbols of great power status with nuclear weapons, space capability, and a blue-water navy. The Cold War between China and the US in our region is being ‘fought’ at multiple fronts—the ‘warmest’ front however, remains the stand-off between India and China—that resulted in the loss of more than 1,000 Km/Sq of Indian land.

The rise of China is obvious and impressive. The nature of rise however, is generally assessed to be from quite benign to quite threatening. China is building infrastructure in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. This may overtly be for economic trade and development, but also has military implications for China’s naval operations in the region – particularly in the South China Sea.

India fails to hold on to its own territory and cannot as well negotiate a return of its land or reclaim its territory through conventional war. The only option for India is to choke the Malacca Straits, which forms a critical bottleneck in China’s 80% oil supply and trade routes. Considering the risks in Malacca Straits, China has already started to look for alternative routes to access the Indian Ocean for trade and oil supply lines.

The Thai Canal: China has offered Thailand up to US$30 billion to dig a canal that would cut through the narrowest point of the Malay peninsula as it would allow Chinese navy ships to quickly redeploy between its bases in South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

CPEC: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) provides an access route to the Indian Ocean, Opening the Gwadar Port to Middle Eastern oil and establish strong ties with the landlocked energy-rich Central Asian states.

CMEC. The “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)”- serves the same purpose as the CPEC; it would substantially shift China’s strategic outlook by countering India and tie Southeast Asia into its orbit addressing the Malacca Dilemma.

With the Thai Canal at Malay peninsula and CPEC flanking India to the west, CMEC could similarly isolate India from the east. These three routes, once functional, would kill the (already dying) Indo-Pacific dreams of curtailing China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region.

India’s Great Power Dream

India’s building of its armed forces, i.e., blue-water navy, a nuclear weapon state including its closer ties and nuclear deal with the US has enabled it to back up its claim to be at least a dominant local power in the region. “India did cut back Defence purchase from Russia by 53% (2016-2020) and had a Defence deal of US$3.4 billion with the US in 2020. However, India’s five sets of S-400 deal (2018) with Russia whose first set is to be delivered by December 2021 violated the US, the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” CAATSA in 2017. The US although imposed sanctions on Turkey for buying S-400 last year, yet to do the same for India.

QUAD & AUKUS

The new Cold War will be staged in the Indo-Pacific region, as the Centre-stage in world politics for a foreseeable future. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprised of Australia, India, Japan and the US, has been strengthened in response to China’s growing influence in the region.

The Biden regime kept France in the dark about its plan to give nuclear submarines to Australia under AUKUS, ignoring an already existing five-year old US$ 66 billion Franco-Australian deal for the French-made conventional submarines. China described it as a manifestation of the Cold War mentality which will only exacerbate tensions in East Asia and the Pacific.

India’s Role in Indo Pacific Theatre

With the renaming of ‘Pacific Command’ as the ‘Indo-Pacific Command’, Washington gave India a larger role to serve as a counterweight to China in the Pacific theatre. But India’s bluff was exposed as China infiltrated through the borders of Indian-held Ladakh, claiming important vantage points in Pangong Lake and the Galwan Valley. There has been no real resistance or counter from India, not even a peep. India once tried some adventurism, it lost 20 of its soldiers, without recovering an inch of land back from China.

India’s attempts to involve its coalition partners from the Quad failed as they did not seem to want to enter into a conflict with China or its growing influence across the region. Policy circles, in the US and across the globe, are asking:

  1. Will India be of benefit in the Pacific, if they cannot even retrieve their own (claimed) territory from China?
  2. If Indian forces cannot face the Chinese in Ladakh, can they be expected to send warships to the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean?
  3. Can India curtail or hinder the CPEC route, when it failed to keep the Chinese at bay in Sikkim?
  4. Is India merely a liability for the US?
  5. Instead of countering China, may it help destroy the myth of powerful Western alliances in the region?

Such reactions to the Indo-Pacific dream are a loss of face for India on the international stage. And coupled with recent developments in Afghanistan, India might find itself back where it started. 

Bangladesh in Indo- Pacific Theatre

Dhaka’s Indo-Pacific orientation must necessarily begin in the Bay of Bengal, which is re-emerging as a site for great power contestation between a rising China, India, Japan, and the United States. Sitting at the top of the Bay of Bengal littoral, Bangladesh has begun to take greater interest in maritime affairs resolving its sea-border disputes with India and Myanmar. It could now use the fast-evolving dynamic in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen its maritime capabilities.

The United States ended its traditional strategic neglect of Bangladesh beginning to see Bangladesh as its key partner in the Indo-Pacific region. India is also seeking to expand security cooperation with both Dhaka and Naypyitaw. Dhaka has a security relationship with Beijing too, and has bought Chinese submarines and frigates. India would like to lessen Bangladesh’s reliance on Chinese military equipment. Although it cannot match the scale of Chinese economic investments, India is actively raising the level of its commercial engagement with Bangladesh along with other Quad member, Japan showing their eagerness to develop infrastructure in Bangladesh.

Dhaka is increasing showing its skills in taking advantage of its external environment considering that stronger ties with the United States and Japan would reduce excessive reliance on either India or China and widen its choices. Unlike many other countries in Asia, it not only embraced China’s Belt and Road Initiative cautiously, but sought to engage multiple partners. It now has similar opportunities in the maritime rivalry between China and the Quad. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that the increasing geo-strategic stature of Bangladesh may become its burden if we fail to pay attention to our national security based on past experience as much as we should.

New Reality in Afghanistan

India’s reluctance to use its military muscle in Afghanistan at America’s behest, ruffled ties with Washington for a while. As a result, the US quit Afghanistan lock, stock and barrel, in indecent haste after failing to arrive at a fair settlement with the Taliban.

Pakistan quickly reset the fraying relations with Afghanistan being its “strategic depth,” soon after the Taliban took over. The country wants the Durand line to be recognized as the international border with Afghanistan that has so far been resisted by all Afghan regimes including the Taliban.

Quad Alliances for the Central Asia and the Middle East

The US, Israel, UAE and India in Oct 2021 created a joint working group to give a shape to a new level of economic cooperation. In central Asia, there is a talk of a loose alliance involving China, Russia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Another quad supposedly might bunch the US with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

Factors Affecting Connectivity & Progress in South Asia

The region has a number of non-traditional and traditional security challenges. The issues of food security, health security, etc. constantly challenge the South Asian nations. Historically political tensions, security concerns and cross border conflicts have slowed down the process of connectivity among South Asian countries. South Asia is one of the most vulnerable regions in terms of climate change challenges.

Despite the region having a few of the mightiest rivers, may become a severely water deficient region in the near future. The issues of “hydro politics/conflict” are extremely high with possible crisis points being identified. In Bangladesh we should have that foresight to understand the common river issues. It is not just a question of the Feni River or the Teesta River, much greater stakes are involved.

Geopolitical Implications for Bangladesh

Bangladesh is the third largest Muslim country in the world and as the second in the region. Bangladesh’s 50th birthday is being celebrated this year, but its importance and achievements have been obscured by an increasingly authoritarian system of government. The long-standing military and civilian authoritarian governments as well as bitter enmity between the two major political parties have posed as an obstacle to Bangladesh’s sustainable development.

The Bay of Bengal is fast turning into a hotbed of rivalry involving India, China and the all-powerful USA. It is seeking new maritime possibilities in the Indo-Pacific as it seeks to leverage the exposure from the great China–India connectivity rivalry. Bangladesh’s geographic proximity to Sri Lanka and the Maldives and also to Nepal and Bhutan makes it an attractive partner to all of them.

Bangladesh has emerged as India’s most important neighbour in the subcontinent with strengthening strategic, political, and economic ties. The perception of India’s strategic decision makers, that Bangladesh is well within its internal security parameters makes India shakier while dealing with Bangladesh. India would like to lessen Bangladesh’s reliance on Chinese military equipment; China remains the main supplier. India cannot match the scale of Chinese economic investments;

China’s broader programme of developing influence throughout Asia through trade, finance, military cooperation and soft power includes Bangladesh. In 2016, China offered US$24.45 billion to Dhaka in bilateral assistance for infrastructure projects as an important player in its BRI. Dhaka also bought Chinese submarines and frigates. China’s investment in Bangladesh rose to US$38 billion, the largest sum pledged to Bangladesh by any country.

The Rohingya refugee crisis has made clear that China and Bangladesh are only fair-weather friends. The perception in Dhaka is that both India and China take more than they give. China blocked the UN Security Council action to move against the genocide or ethnic cleansing by the Myanmar government, which Bangladesh considered an unfriendly act. India, ostensibly Bangladesh’s closest ally, is no better: it squarely backs Myanmar.

Bangladesh should therefore play its cards carefully, to effectively balance ties with China, USA and India in order to reap the benefits of bilateral & multilateral relationships. While this delicate balancing act has been a success, it remains to be seen if Bangladesh can continue to tread carefully between the major powerhouses.

[i] This paper was presented in the Webinar series for the commemoration of 58th Anniversary of Moulana Bhashani’s historic China visit, organised by the Moulana Bhashani Parishad, Australia.

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