A Seemingly Trivial Question?
On 16 December 2024, the Indian Prime Minister in his official X account (formerly Twitter) posted a message honouring the courage and sacrifices of the brave soldiers “who contributed to India’s historic victory in 1971.” The Vijay Diwas message the Indian Prime Minister sparked sharp reactions in Bangladeshi polity – not just for his nationalistic recollection of history and apparent distortion of the truth, but also for the strained bilateral relationship following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024 and her subsequent asylum in India.
Beyond the emotive and impressionistic responses to Modi’s Vijay Divas message, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also responded. Quoting J. N. Dixit – Indian Foreign Secretary, diplomat and National Security Adviser – the MOFA wrote: “A major political mistake at the surrender ceremony [of Pakistani forces at Dhaka on 16 December 1971] was the Indian military high command’s failure to ensure the presence of General M.A.G. Osmani, Commander from the Bangladesh side on the Joint Command.”
Thus, the seemingly trivial question ‘whose war was it anyway’ appears to be staid but ineluctable. The answer to this question lies in the geopolitical dimension of the 1971 Liberation War.
Transition from Liberation War to Internationalized Civil War
Most historians maintain that the coordinated offensive of 21st November 1971 – celebrated as Armed Forces Day – marked India’s first overt military intervention in support of Bangladesh’s ongoing Liberation War. The November offensive transformed our Liberation War into an internationalized civil war. Bangladesh intensified her fight following the coordinated offensive. But India took a strange pause till 3rd December, relegating her overt military action in the East, as an ‘insignificant prelude’ initiated by a ‘local commander.’ Much to the dismay and frustration of the Bangladeshi crews, the planned D-Day of Kilo Flight – the embryo of today’s Bangladesh Air Force – to launch their first air attack inside East Pakistan on 28 November was also postponed until 3rd December by the Indian high Command.
Downplaying the overt military offensive in the East, the Indian Defence Minister, at the Lok Sobha of 22nd November 1971, stressed that India is not in a “state of hostilities” with Pakistan, adding that Pakistan is trying to “internationalize” the War. General Osmani, Bangladesh’s Commander-in-Chief, also noted that the Indian troops were not “cleared” to join the fight in the Eastern theatre until 3rd December to avert international community’s growing demands for a ceasefire and deployment of United Nations observers. That said, the coordinated offensive rattled the Pakistani President, prompting him to declare a state of emergency and reach out to the UN Secretary-General, seeking his “personal” intervention to stave off a military defeat in the East.
But how does this insular but reflective account sit in the extant literature of our Liberation War?
Coding Bangladesh’s liberation struggle as an “interstate” war, the Harvard Dataverse – a global war dataset used by the researchers – records 20 November and 17 December as the start and end date of the war and lists India as the “initiator” of the War. The Correlates of War (COW) dataset – another widely used dataset – projects Pakistan as the “initiator”. Coding it as a “civil war over local issues” the COW intra-state war dataset records 25 March and 2 December as the start and end date while COW’s interstate war dataset lists 3 December 1971 as the start date of the ‘Indo-Pak’ war. Pakistan’s pre-emptive air strike in the West on 3 December exposed her as an ‘aggressor’ and ‘initiator’ transforming our Liberation War into an internationalized civil war, dubbed as “Indo-Pak” war.
However, for Bangladesh, the November offensive was not a ‘prelude.’ It was a continuation of the ongoing fight leading to an inevitable merger of the two Forces. It exposed the Provisional Government of Bangladesh (hereafter PGB) to the full spectrum of complexities of an internationalized civil conflict and the corresponding challenges. How did the PGB navigate those challenges to retain the political authority and ownership of the War?
Retaining the Authority and Ownership of an Internationalized Civil War
On 22nd November 1971, the PGB issued its first top-secret Operational Directive defining the “Relative Roles of Bangladesh Forces in Relation to Supporting Forces [India] in the Event of War Between the Host Country [Bangladesh] and the Enemy [Pakistan].” The Directive – issued by General Osmani following an agreement with his Indian counterpart – was sent to all Bangladeshi and Indian Command in the Eastern theatre. It included instructions on command relationships, roles of “Supporting” Forces, allotment of troops, boundaries, logistics, civil administration of liberated areas etc. Bangladesh Formations/Sectors were formally placed under the Supporting Forces’ command, requiring the Supporting Forces to “provide full logistic support”.
Such unique arrangements raise a few trivial but intuitive questions. Why did the Directive specify Bangladesh as a “host” country which was yet to be recognized by any states including India? Why were the Indian troops labelled “Supporting Forces”? What led PGB to place her military under the command of the “Supporting” forces in a somewhat unorthodox military practice? The answer to these questions is key to the understanding of the central puzzle: whose victory was it anyway?
First, geopolitics shapes the tempo and trajectory of internationalized civil war; it can fragment and share the political authority and ownership of the War leading to unintended outcomes. Quoting Henry Kissinger, Srinath Raghavan notes that a perception prevailed that if India succeeds in helping to create Bangladesh, then “East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal. And India with Soviet help would be free to turn its energies elsewhere” (1971: A global history of the creation of Bangladesh, p. 284). Amidst a complex geopolitical context, the PGB was keen to retain the ownership and authority of the War in the Eastern evidenced by the Operational Directive of 22nd November.
More than anyone, Tajuddin Ahmed – Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister, perhaps realized the complex mixture of motives and the urgency to retain the ownership of the War. In his address to the nation in September 1971, he noted that “Bengalis undoubtedly rely on their own power …but there is satisfaction to be derived from the signs of support from quarters where before there was only caution.” The predicament to retain ownership of the war was echoed in an interview by Abdur Razzaq, a key figure of the “nucleus” of our freedom struggle. Reiterating Mukti Bahini’s commitment to fighting a long-drawn war, Razzaq predicted, in future, boasting of their military support, India may claim the ownership of the war in the East as India’s overt military intervention was necessary if not essential to achieve Bangladesh’s independence. (Kino-Eye Films Archive, 2021, June 28; time 1:02:00- 1:06:03).
The Indian Prime Minister’s message on 16 December 2024 appears to be a testament to what Abdur Razzaq had predicted or feared.
Major Rafiqul Islam – a decorated freedom fighter and Sector -1 Commander also held a similar view. Recalling the Conference held at the Indian I81 Brigade Headquarters on 20 November 1971, Maj Rafique noted: “…The Indian Brigade Commander obtained permission from higher authorities, and it was decided that in extreme emergencies Indian officers could be loaned to command our [i.e. BLF] troops…However, we did not need that help and managed to continue fighting with available officers and JCOs”.
The fact that Sector Commanders were amenable to induct Indian officers “on loan” in “extreme emergencies” and yet continued fighting with available officers reflects the relationship of the Forces. These primary accounts and more suggest that, from the inception, the military and political leadership of PGB was cautious to retain the authority and ownership of the War while receiving India’s military help without the risk of “becoming Bhutan.”
Second, in hindsight, the labelling of the Indian troops as “Supporting Forces” and Bangladesh as the “host” country lends a layer of legitimacy to the Indian intervention to liberate Bangladesh. It was necessary (if not essential) for India to portray that their troops were “invited” by the “host” country in a “supporting” role. Such portrayal bolstered India’s argument that her military intervention in the East was not a violation of the non-aggression and self-determination norm to an increasingly impatient international audience.
Indeed, once the war was internationalized, much to India’s consternation, her key allies like Marshal Tito (of Yugoslavia) and President Naser (of Egypt) were critical of Indian troops moving into East Pakistan and voted in favour of an Assembly resolution demanding immediate cease-fire and troops withdrawal, along with 104 states. To India’s surprise and chagrin, the operative clause of a Polish revised draft resolution tabled at the Security Council – just two days before the Pakistani surrender at Dhaka – also demanded for troops withdrawal and omitted the original reference to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the head of the “lawfully elected representatives of the people.”
The urgency of a swift victory and the immediate withdrawal of Indian troops was palpable in the Council and Assembly discussions. Britain and France, fearing escalation, also impressed upon India to “finish the job as quickly as possible”. Their draft resolution demanded not just an “immediate and durable cease-fire” but also “disengagement leading to withdrawal” of troops. Indeed, the geopolitical consideration impelled the necessity of accelerating the pace of victory, made possible by the successive Soviet vetoes at the Security Council.
Third, as a warring party, the BLF was required to adhere to the laws of armed conflict, with increasing demands for compliance with the Geneva Conventions after hostilities began. However, the PGB, proclaimed in April 1971, was not a recognized state or signatory of the Geneva Convention, and its request to participate in Council discussions was ignored. This situation led the PG to place its military under the “Supporting” Indian forces through the Operational Directive, fulfilling both operational and legal obligations. Despite Pakistan’s concerns, this arrangement offered a layer of legitimacy and accountability for the BLF in the eyes of the global community.
Fourth, despite differing motivations, both forces were fundamentally united in liberating Bangladesh. The Directive required the Mukti Bahini to lead the “final stage of liberation,” securing key cities for political and psychological reasons. The Bangladeshi Forces were tasked with establishing civil administration in the liberated areas, affirming the authority of Bangladeshi leadership during this conflict. India’s military intervention significantly hastened Bangladesh’s emergence but framing the war’s outcome as solely “India’s historic victory” undermines the historical truth and the aspirations of the Bengali people.
End Thoughts
In summary, the establishment of Bangladesh is a notable example of state creation driven by an ethnic-linguistic movement during the Cold War. The November Offensive revealed the complexities of an internationalized civil conflict, challenging the PGB in maintaining its political authority over the Liberation War. Consequently, the utility functions of the Operational Directive issued on 22 November, to integrate the Indian Forces into Bangladesh’s Liberation War, were underpinned by the normative obligations.
The PGB crafted the Directive not only to unify both forces for coordinated action but also to provide essential legitimacy in this intricate conflict. The tone and tenor of the Directive attest to the fact that PGB retained the political authority and ownership of the War to ensure that the victory is attributed to Bangladesh and not just the Supporting Forces. The course followed by Bangladesh was guided by geopolitical considerations – exemplifying Clausewitz’s maxim that war is an instrument of (geo)politics by other means.