AMIR ZIA
Pakistanis were overwhelmingly jubilant when the Afghan Taliban reentered Kabul in August 2021. From the man on the street to those in the corridors of power, all had hoped that under Taliban rule, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations would boom.
After all, Pakistan not just hosted many of the Afghan Taliban leaders and footsoldiers for decades, but also braved Washington’s immense pressure for being soft on the militia group during the 2001-21 US-led occupation of Afghanistan.
But since the US withdrawal, Pakistan’s Afghan problem has only intensified compared to the times when Kabul was ruled by pro-West leaders and US-led NATO forces operated against the Afghan Taliban in this landlocked Central Asian state.
The deterioration of relations between Islamabad and the Taliban – once labelled as Pakistan’s proxies – has been swift and contrary to the expectations of many Pak-Afghan watchers.
Pakistan’s recent air strikes inside Afghanistan’s Paktika province, targeting alleged camps of anti-Pakistan militants, underlines the gravity of the situation. The Afghans responded within days by shelling Pakistani positions from across the border.
Who could have expected that the relations between Pakistan and its one-time ally would come to this?
From Islamabad’s point of view, its problem with Afghanistan boils down to one simple fact: Kabul’s reluctance or inability to rein in the anti-Pakistan militants, who use Afghanistan as a safe haven and jumping board to launch terrorist strikes in Pakistan.
According to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies – an Islamabad-based think-tank – terrorist attacks in Pakistan surged by 40 percent in 2024 compared to 2023. A total of 530 security personnel, 489 civilians and 950 militants were killed in 2024 in a string of terrorist attacks and ensuing operations against the terrorists.
Pakistan’s frustration with the Afghan Taliban can be seen in Army Chief Syed Asim Munir’s recent remarks that the only difference with Kabul remains the presence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan…“and the spread of terrorism… from across the border, and it will remain so until they (Afghan Taliban) remove this issue”.
The TTP mainly operates in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, especially along the borders with Afghanistan. Apart from the TTP, Pakistan alleges that Baloch nationalist insurgents also use Afghan territory to stage terrorist attacks, particularly in southwestern Balochistan province.
But for Kabul, terrorism remains Pakistan’s internal problem that needs to be addressed through negotiations with the TTP, which comprises Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen.
Although Pakistan has a history of striking peace deals with militants operating in the country’s border region, it now refuses to hold any negotiations with the TTP.
The reason? All past deals collapsed, and militants used periods of relative calm to regroup and reassert their positions.
Islamabad says that TTP’s demands are non-negotiable because it wants the imposition of an Afghan-Taliban version of hardline Islam in the tribal areas and the rollback of administrative reforms in regions which were once called the tribal belt.
However, the complexity of the problem between the two neighbours is much deeper. It is as much rooted in history as it stems from the dynamics of the current realities.
Pakistani Pashtun tribals, organised under the TTP banner, are the ideological allies of the Afghan Taliban and had fought against the US-led NATO forces.
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, their tribal region also served as the epicentre of US bloc-sponsored armed resistance against the then-Afghan Communist government and the occupation forces of the former Soviet Union.
This means that their region has a four-and-a-half decade-long history of militancy, during which it resisted two superpowers one by one.
These Pakistani tribesmen also share bonds with the Afghan Taliban, who are also overwhelmingly Pashtuns.
Many Pashtun tribes live on both sides of the Durand Line – the 2,640-km long border drawn between Afghanistan and what was then British-India in 1893. The tribes living on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan frontiers include Noorzai, Shinwari, Mohmand, Sadozai, Alizai and Yousofzai among several others.
After the departure of the British in 1947, Pakistan inherited parts of the British-India bordering Afghanistan.
However, the Afghan nationalists, including the Taliban, do not recognise the Durand Line, which is the internationally recognised border. The Afghan Taliban call it a “hypothetical line”, saying that they will never recognise it as a legitimate border.
This kind of Afghan Taliban rhetoric only intensified following the deterioration of relations between the two countries.
As terrorist attacks increased in Pakistan, Islamabad also hardened its position, taking a series of stringent steps, including the deportation of tens of thousands of unregistered Afghan refugees back to their country.
This is another matter that many of those slipped back to Pakistan, underlining the flawed approach of this venture.
Pakistan, which started fencing its frontiers with Afghanistan in March 2017 to stop the flow of militants, has recently introduced a tighter immigration system.
Earlier, Pashtun tribesmen from both sides could cross the border based on a piece of travel paper issued by the local authorities. Many made the trip without any documents at all.
Now, much to the dismay of the Afghan Taliban and locals living on both sides of the Durand Line, Pakistan introduced a visa regime. Pakistan says that this is vital to fight terrorism and establish the sanctity of the border.
Pakistan’s efforts to curb smuggling also angered the Afghan Taliban and the locals, who bank on informal transit trade.
Islamabad pushed these measures single-mindedly during the last couple of years, straining ties with the Afghan Taliban and alienating many of the locals as well.
While doing this, Islamabad has undermined the fact that during the decades-long civil war in Afghanistan and conflict in Pakistan’s northwestern border region, ties between divided Pashtun families and tribes have only deepened because of cross-border marriages and friendships.
Many senior Afghan resistance figures of the Soviet-occupation days and later the Afghan Taliban leaders who fought against US-led NATO forces lived in Pakistani cities and towns for decades, making them their second homes.
As a first step, the two sides must reengage without the media glare. This means that instead of talking to one another through harsh public statements, backdoor and silent diplomacy could be a better option.
Islamabad – which was instrumental in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table with the Americans that led to the exit of the US-led NATO forces from Afghanistan – needs to revive and reboot its contacts with the ruling administration in Kabul.
This means redefining the terms of engagement, keeping in mind that the Afghan Taliban are no longer a resistance force but rulers of a sovereign country.
Islamabad has a lot to offer Afghanistan in terms of trade, investment, and diplomatic support. Already, Pakistan serves as the main supply artery for Afghanistan under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement.
Pakistan gave diplomatic support to the Afghan Taliban after they resumed power. Now Islamabad must continue to do so in tandem with other friendly countries, including China, which are big investors in Afghanistan.
Islamabad has to take into account that India has managed to officially engage the Afghan Taliban, signalling a seismic shift in New Delhi’s position vis-a-vis the group.
After a mid-level contact last December, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Taliban acting Foreign Minister Ameer Khan Muttaqi in Dubai in early January. This marks New Delhi’s highest-level contact with the Taliban.
Former Pakistani diplomats suggest that against this backdrop, Islamabad’s aim should be to engage with Kabul constructively with the help of friendly countries like China and the UAE to ensure that it addresses Pakistan’s security concerns.
However, it must also be kept in mind that in the last 45 years or so, no government in Kabul could exercise full control of its territory – not even with the help of the once mighty Soviet Union or the combined forces of the US and its allies.
This means that the Afghan Taliban’s reluctance to act against the TTP, given their own Daesh challenge, may stem from their lack of capacity to establish their writ or fear of rocking the boat.
Since the Afghan Taliban’s return to Kabul, the terrorist group Daesh has carried out several attacks targeting the Afghan Taliban and their leadership.
Daesh is trying to expand its footprint in Afghanistan by trying to find recruits both among the Afghan and the Pakistani Pashtuns.
The Afghan Taliban are unlikely to assert pressure on the TTP as being asked by Islamabad, as there are genuine fears that Daesh could use it to create a wedge between the two forces and use the disgruntled element against the hosts.
Therefore, Pakistan needs some deft diplomacy to restore relations and goodwill among the Afghans, who need friends in the region and on the global stage.
Islamabad has to take the initiative and carry the cross to rebuild the frayed relations. This would create an enabling environment where the Afghan Taliban could reciprocate Pakistan’s gestures in the larger interest of the people of the two countries, who take pride in their shared history, cultural ethos, religion and mutual bond.
Respecting one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity will serve as the first step in rebuilding the lost trust.
source : Trt World