What Does Further Expansion Mean for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

What were the main issues on the agenda for the SCO meeting? Based on the meeting, what might we expect to see at the SCO Heads of State Summit later this summer?

Gill: According to some of the official statements and outcome documents, the SCO Foreign Ministers meeting placed a particular emphasis on two key items.

First, the ministers focused on security-related matters or, to use the SCO’s terminology, on the “three evil forces” within the borders of SCO states: terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. This emphasis appears to be driven by the terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue outside Moscow on March 22 this year, which was apparently carried out by Tajik nationals.

A second important issue for the ministers was the consideration of Belarus membership in the SCO. According to SCO Secretary General Zhang Ming, “special emphasis was placed on the expansion of the Organization.” And with the participation of Belarus Foreign Minister Sergei Aleinik, the assembled ministers “coordinated the procedure for Belarus’s admission to the SCO.”

Looking ahead, it appears the SCO State Leaders Summit, now scheduled for early July, will highlight security issues, especially internal stability challenges for the members, particularly terrorist threats. Belarus membership appears to be a done deal and will also gain headlines when the SCO state leaders meet.

Freeman: In addition to these emphases, promoting stability in Afghanistan was another important topic of discussion. This past March, a suicide bombing in northern Pakistan that killed five Chinese workers at the Dasu hydropower project (part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) may have been planned in Afghanistan, raising concerns that instability in Afghanistan could allow for violent extremist groups to grow and threaten the region at large.

Pakistan led calls for the SCO to revive its Contact Group for Afghanistan as a platform for cooperation on security and humanitarian issues in the country, implying that the Taliban government’s measures against terrorist groups are currently inadequate.

Although Afghanistan has held observer status at the SCO, the Taliban-led government has not been invited to SCO meetings, with disagreements among SCO members over whether and how to engage the Taliban, not least between Pakistan and India. During the SCO Foreign Ministers meeting, Wang Yi called for greater dialogue between SCO states with Afghanistan alongside improved coordination within the organization on regional security.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also visited Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and met independently with other officials from SCO countries. Is there a reason China is paying more attention to Central Asia at the moment?

Gill:  As a founding member of the “Shanghai 5” grouping in 1996 (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) and later the SCO in 2001, China has long had an abiding interest in Central Asia, especially following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

More recently, China’s attention to the region has expanded beyond largely economic interests under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative to emphasize its role as a more active political and security player. A major step forward in this process was the convening of the China-Central Asia leaders’ summit in May 2023 and the establishment, in March 2024, of a permanent Secretariat to coordinate the C5 + China (or China-Central Asia mechanism, as China calls it), in Xi’an, in China’s Shaanxi province.

Of course, the security of Central Asia — especially its borders on China’s restive provinces of Xinjiang — has long been a concern of Beijing’s. But over the past several years, and particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China appears to have stepped up its willingness to provide security goods in the region. This includes the provision of policing equipment and surveillance technology; support for Tajikistan’s border enforcement and counter-terrorism capabilities; military and police training; and weapons exports.

Freeman: Wang Yi’s visit to Dushanbe was notable amid mounting concerns about security in Tajikistan and its acute economic challenges. During the visit, Wang and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon agreed to strengthen their strategic partnership and expand bilateral cooperation on security, trade and other areas of economic development.

China is Tajikistan’s largest foreign investor by far, accounting for 99.8 percent of foreign direct investment to Tajikistan in 2022, according to a U.S. State Department report. Tajikistan’s formal economy depends heavily on remittances from Tajikistanis working abroad, mainly in Russia. Remittances were already adversely affected by sanctions on Russia, but fallout from the Crocus City Hall attack — where those arrested in connection were of Tajikistani identity — has resulted in a further drop in remittance flows, making economic engagement with China and other partners all the more important. Rich in critical minerals, Tajikistan is likely to become a growing source of these important resources for advanced technologies for China.

During his visit to Kazakhstan, Wang made remarks that reinforced those delivered by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2022, when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered concerns in Kazakhstan that Russia could act on long-harbored irredentism over Kazakhstan’s northern region, where the population is heavily Russian and Cossack. In 2022, Xi emphasized the importance of Beijing’s relations with Astana and stated that China would “resolutely support Kazakhstan in the defense of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Similarly, Wang stated during his visit that China would “oppose with resolve against any external forces that are trying to interfere in [Kazakhstan’s] internal affairs.”

There is the potential for the SCO to expand its membership, with Belarus almost certainly joining this summer. Are there other likely candidates, and what would that mean for the SCO going forward?

Gill: India, Iran and Pakistan all became SCO “observer states” in 2005 and went on to become full members of the organization, so that process has thus far been the pathway to formal entry for countries that were not original SCO founders.

At present, there are three SCO observer states: Afghanistan, Belarus and Mongolia. It appears highly likely that Belarus will soon be admitted as a full member of the organization, probably as early as the SCO state leaders summit in July this year. Afghanistan and Mongolia look to be next in line in the future.

In addition, there are currently 14 SCO “dialogue partners” that might also be future candidates for full membership. This group includes a large proportion of Arab states, including Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, plus others across the Eurasian landmass such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey.

However, while some expansion of SCO membership looks likely, further enlargement of the grouping is not necessarily welcomed by all.

Recent discussions with experts in Central Asia strongly suggest that the most recent expansions of the SCO to welcome India and Pakistan (in 2017) and Iran (2023) are a source of frustration. They have diluted the organization’s principal focus on Central Asia proper and introduced new complications and frictions within the grouping, especially between India and Pakistan and between China and India.

China may look to other Sino-centric institutions — such as the China-Central Asia mechanism, along with China-Arab forums, the BRICS and others — to further its specific interests, while still promoting the notion of greater Eurasian unity and “Asia for Asians.”

Freeman: Experts in the region observe that China has reduced its financial support for the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and has begun to coordinate with Central Asian governments on security through bilateral channels. The C5+China may also be a symptom of China’s own growing disenchantment with the SCO, as it also offers China a forum through which to interact with the region as a whole without Russia.