by Zohran Baig 23 March 2024
Urban warfare has remained one of the pertinent factors when it comes to military campaigns. This is because cities can provide non-state actors with a breakthrough concerning recognition and triggering the enemy regime. Since 2021, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) has been on the rise in Afghanistan. ISKP’s dramatic rise with a new organizational trajectory focused on Urban warfare instead of consolidating control over territories has emerged as a new threat to the Global War on Terrorism. The Taliban regime has launched several targeted operations on ISKP campaigns and leaders which have significantly impacted the ISKP’s attacks regarding its new trajectory. However, this remains uncertain whether there is a degradation in ISKP’s strength or it is a strategic slowdown. The Taliban regime may slow down the Urban attacks by the organization but they can lose the broader conflict in fighting the Urban Warfare against ISKP.
Urban Warfare is focused on waging different kind of destructive tactics on cities. Historically, the Battles in Mogadishu, Somalia and Grozny provide a clear context about the applicability of Urban Warfare. The difficulty that defense forces face in fighting Urban combats is the unique identity of warfare; every city in the world has its own culture, tradition, religion, and ethnic background which makes it difficult to gather the right military intelligence which is a pre-requisite in winning urban combat. The unfamiliar and different terrain in the cities is another factor that push the forces to hold back in Urban combat. Throughout history, a critical challenge of Urban warfare is that one may win the battle but can lose the broader conflict. It means that the victory in Urban warfare comes at the cost of the devastating destruction of urban infrastructure and un-countable civilian deaths. The victory in Urban warfare may minimize the threat but it will also raise other threats and problems which will disrupt the cost-benefit analysis.
In the changing dynamics of the current world system, the situation of terrorism in Afghanistan provides an elite example of Urban warfare. Since the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, the state has been strangled by a grave issue of rising terrorist organizations. Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), which was near to its demise in the late 2020s, has become one of the most wanted terrorist organizations in the state. Since 2021, the ISKP which previously focused on gaining territories shifted its focus to a new strategy of Urban Warfare. The establishment of the new leadership under Premier Shahab al-Muhajir has accounted for this shift as he has described it as Urban warfare expert by the members of the group. Since 2021, the organization has carried out different Urban attacks under his leadership; In 2021, ISKP launched a suicide attack on Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul which reportedly killed 170 Afghans and 13 U.S service officials. Another influential attack was on Nangahar prison which freed thousands of inmates. This new strategy of the terrorist organization has proved to be deadly and difficult to counter. ISKP’s new tactic is not to gain control but to disrupt the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan. ISKP’s Urban warfare tactics are highly modernized and are centered around targeting potential places that can affirm their position in the Urban areas of Afghanistan, minimizing Taliban regime control. Table 1 demonstrates the type of tactics which are used by ISKP since 2021 to legitimize their strong foothold in Afghanistan and to promote the narrative that Taliban cannot control the state.
| Operation Type | Motivation | Instances |
| Urban Warfare | -Destroy Social unity of People of Afghanistan.
-Gaining attention in the Urban areas and refocusing enemy’s attention on urban areas instead of ISKP’s rural territories. |
-2021 bombings on Shi’ a mosque, notably the Sayed Abad mosque in Kunduz’ and Bibi
Fatima mosque in Kandahar° in October. – June 2022 attack on Kabul Sikh temple -Attack on the prison in Kandahar. |
As shown in the table, the focus of ISKP’s operation has now been dominated by the strategy to utilize the urban sphere of Afghanistan to tackle the Taliban regime more influentially. The point here is that the Taliban regime stood rigid on the narrative that after the US withdrawal, ISKPs were not a threat to the state anymore but notably the group has shown the capability to target the pivotal areas in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime controls the media houses in Afghanistan and reportedly controls the proliferation of news that demonstrates the growth of ISKP in the state. Despite the Taliban’s influential strikes on ISKP’s campaigns in 2022, the group has shown a strong dis-concern in coming to the negotiating table. ISKP’s strengths depend on weakening the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan. The group holds a stronger position when it comes to weakening the Taliban regime in Urban warfare. The ethnic divides and the humanitarian issues in Afghanistan have already raised questions about the legitimacy of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which places the defense forces at a backend when it comes to fighting ISKP Urban warfare strategy. Another aspect of ISKP’s urban warfare is a significant increase in their media outreach in Afghanistan. The group’s most important media outlet Al-Azaim Foundation has constantly uploaded videos containing messages which can influentially fuel propaganda against the Taliban regime. For Instance, the group has published different pictures which can fuel rebellion in the extremists to fight against the Taliban regime. Figure (1) illustrates how the group has portrayed the Taliban regime after U.S withdrawal.
The picture was taken from the from the magazine published on “Al-Azaim Foundation” with the title “ They ( Taliban) have satisfied the international community”
The Taliban regime can limit the ISKP’s activities in the state but in the longer run the regime can lose the broader conflict. Afghanistan has a long history of critical issues including economic downfalls, civilian chaos and rebellion. Previously, it was the Taliban who fueled the conspiracies in the state and now ISKP has replaced them. The Taliban regime should focus on establishing peace and stability in the region instead of focusing on regional and international ties. The regional and international allies cannot defend Afghanistan against ISKP’s Urban warfare as the group is more familiar with the urban areas and has a strong community of Anti-Taliban Afghans supporting them.
With ISKP’s active presence in cities like Kabul and Nangahar, the most probable result of the Taliban’s counter-response to ISKP is more chaos in the state. The Taliban have closed their eyes and undermined the national and regional threat growing in Afghanistan in order to attain international recognition for their regime. The Taliban should bring the National Resistance Front (NRF) to negotiating terms to use them against ISKP. Otherwise, the mutual goals of ISKP and NRF can open a window of opportunity for both groups to pledge their allegiance to each other against the Taliban regime which will again ignite democratic instability in the state.