By Phidel Vineles 24 June 2019
SYNOPSIS
As China
seeks to improve the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in response to criticisms,
Southeast Asia could tap growth opportunities by leveraging on the strengths of
BRI-linked countries such as in finance, partnerships, negotiations and
economic development.
COMMENTARY
SOUTHEAST
ASIA is an important strategic partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). The region serves as a key link in the realisation of BRI’s Maritime
Silk Road, which aims to connect China’s coast to South Asia, the Middle East
and Europe through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.
Southeast Asia is also a critical component for the success of the BRI as it is
the mid-point which connects China with the West. However, criticism of the
BRI’s weaknesses highlight some of the risks of participation. Southeast Asian
countries could address these risks by persuading China to adopt multilateral
rules in the BRI to broaden participation so as to leverage on ASEAN’s
potential roles.
Multilateralising RisksAccording to Oxford Economics and CIMB ASEAN Research Institute’s study
(2018), total BRI projects in ASEAN has amounted to more than US$739 billion.
The highest total BRI projects is in Indonesia, which amounted to $171 billion,
followed by Vietnam ($152 billion), Cambodia ($104 billion), Malaysia ($98.5
billion), Singapore ($70.1 billion), Laos ($48 billion), Brunei ($36 billion),
Myanmar ($27.2 billion), Thailand ($24 billion), and Philippines ($9.4
billion).
In April this year, China hosted the second Belt and Road Forum (BRF) which was
attended by 37 heads of state and government, and international organisations.
During the forum, President Xi Jinping said that BRI would adopt multilateral
rules and international best practices in implementing the projects.
Xi’s willingness to multilateralise the BRI is necessary to prevent BRI projects in Southeast Asia from being exposed to operational risks, policy risks, and project cancellations. One of the criticisms of BRI is its lack of transparency and inclusivity.
In Laos, for example, locals
complain that the labour force on the 414 kilometre BRI railway project, which
will link its capital Vientiane to the China-Laos border, is mainly provided by
Chinese nationals. This echoes the criticisms of BRI in some other countries
which have similar complaints.
It is, however, laudable that there would be a BRI Debt Sustainability
Framework, which is meant to help the Initiative’s partner countries. Having
this framework could help allay the growing concerns that BRI is exposing its
stakeholders to debt trap.
Last year, Myanmar’s
Planning and Finance Minister Soe Win wanted to reduce the scale of a China-led
special economic zone project in Kyaukpyu, which was estimated at $10 billion.
The Myanmar minister argued that the special zone project should be “lean” by
cutting unnecessary expenses.
Interestingly, China is establishing a panel of international mediators from
BRI countries to resolve cross-border disputes arising from BRI projects. This
is important, especially since a wide range of contracts and deals are already
in place between China and ASEAN member states.
Financial Hub and
Third-Party Collaboration
Given that
President Xi is willing to multilateralise BRI, some ASEAN countries have the
opportunity to play important roles to improve the BRI for mutual benefit.
Singapore can play its part
in three areas, namely financial connectivity, third-party collaboration, and
mediation. According to Enterprise Singapore, the city-state has a large number
of international banks with project financing capabilities; 60% of project
finance transactions across ASEAN are led by Singapore-based banks.
Moreover, Singapore is well regarded for its transparent business dealings and
for being one of the largest offshore Renminbi centres. This puts it in an
ideal position for Renminbi trade and investment-related flows. Singapore is
also well-positioned as a financial hub for BRI projects because some of its
local banks have signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Chinese banks to
cooperate in cross-border financing.
Interestingly, Singapore has also the potential to be a third-country partnership hub within BRI. In fact, some of the Singaporean firms are proactive in BRI projects in other ASEAN countries. For example, Surbana Jurong is involved in master-planning for Kyauk Pyu Special Economic Zone and Port in Myanmar.
Singapore and BRI Connect
There is
also BRI Connect which serves as a platform to facilitate communications of BRI
projects and promote Singapore as a regional infrastructure and financial hub.
This platform builds a business community on BRI which Singaporean firms can
tap on as partners for BRI projects.
Singapore can also be a dispute resolution hub for BRI. In January this year, Singapore and China inked an agreement to establish an international panel of mediators to handle disputes that might arise from the multi-billion dollar BRI projects. This was signed between the Singapore International Mediation Centre and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
Malaysia also plays an
important role to help BRI achieve its goal of building a “community of common
destiny”. This was demonstrated when Malaysia successfully renegotiated the
controversial East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), which resulted in the reduction of the
project’s price tag by about a third.
Under the new agreement signed in April between Malaysia and China, the
640-kilometre and 20-station ECRL will cost $16.7 million per kilometre,
compared with $23.2 million previously. This success has shown that going back
to the negotiating table could help partner countries to come up with more
equitable deals.
Diversifying and Forging Sustainable Projects
ASEAN countries can also
diversify BRI projects. For example, Myanmar is increasingly becoming a vital
intersection in China’s Digital Silk Road due to its strategic geographical
location between South Asia and Southeast Asia. In 2018, China’s Huawei was
working with Myanmar’s Ministry of Transport and Communications to deploy 5G
broadband services in Myanmar within the next five years.
Going beyond infrastructure projects, Indonesia could help promote BRI projects
in Islamic finance and halal industries. China is increasingly becoming
interested in these sectors, and Indonesia could help as it has the world’s
largest Muslim population, providing a huge market for halal products.
Aligning BRI with other initiatives could help BRI projects become more sustainable. In 2017, for example, China and Vietnam signed an agreement to promote connectivity between the BRI and Vietnam through their “Two Corridors, One Belt” project.
In the second Belt and Road
Forum (BRF) in April, observers could see the possibility of “BRI
2.0” – an improved version of BRI − emerging. In sum, since China has
pledged to reform this strategic initiative, ASEAN member states can play
important supporting roles by multilateralising BRI, with some of the key areas
being in financial connectivity, third-party collaboration, mediation,
negotiations, and the sustainability of projects.
Phidel Vineles is a Senior Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.