Secretary of State Hilary Clinton recently stated in Foreign Policy that the US “is making a strategic bet on India’s future.” She explains:

“There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India’s future—that India’s greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security.”

Clinton goes on to describe the Obama administration’s “vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin.” But is this all we can expect for a proactive US policy in South Asia? Are we neglecting potentially easy wins in the smaller states of South Asia at the expense of our new relationship with India? As the US begins to transition out of Afghanistan and finds relations with Pakistan at their nadir, Washington appears to be putting all its eggs in India’s basket. The US should be careful to realize that there is more to its South Asia policy than India and Pakistan.

India: The “Linchpin” of US Policy in South Asia

In the past decade, the United States’ view of South Asia has expanded beyond its previous outlook of coupling India and Pakistan in its policy. India’s soaring economy, especially in view of China’s rise, made cultivating a strategic partnership with New Delhi a priority of the George W. Bush administration, culminating in the groundbreaking civil nuclear cooperation agreement. With the dehyphenation of India-Pakistan policy in place, US-India relations continue to grow under President Barack Obama.

During his 2010 visit to India, President Obama pledged US support of India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a long-held aspiration of the second most populous nation in the world. Likewise, India and the US meet regularly via the US-India Defense Policy Group and US-India Strategic Dialogue. The US also includes India on its strategic dialogue on Asia-Pacific regional affairs, despite the State Department’s demarcation of the South Asia and East Asia Bureaus. Defense relations admittedly soured slightly after New Delhi’s rejection of bids from US firms competing to build the Indian Air Force’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). However, India’s subsequent acquisition of Boeing’s C-17 Globemaster was the largest procurement package ever between a US defense firm and India, singlehandedly doubling the value of prior US-Indian defense trade.

Given the uncertainty surrounding the rise of China, the US is wise to regard India as a valuable strategic partner in Asia. India’s political identity is firmly rooted in a democratic system and traditions. Moreover, not only does its economic growth rate approach that of China, but Indian ties to East Asian countries are expanding. New Delhi’s “Look East” approach is finally materializing into a coherent policy that is gradually expanding both economic and security ties with East Asian countries such as Vietnam and Myanmar. The US thus has much to gain from cultivating a stronger partnership with this ascendant regional and global power.

Why Smaller South Asia?

International relations (IR) theory has traditionally paid little attention to small states, especially with regard to security relations. In his efforts to expand theory on the subject, Matthias Maass of Yonsei University assesses that “the small state has no real place in IR theory.” IR theory has largely ignored small states despite the fact that, as Maass observes, small states have constituted a majority of states in the international system since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.

During the Cold War, Kenneth Waltz’s seminal theory of structural realism tried to explain the dynamics of the international system in terms of the great power rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. Waltz analytically privileges large countries in his theory due to their greater share of capabilities. Neorealists, such as John Mearsheimer, have since modified tenets of Waltz’s theory. Mearsheimer’s “offensive realist” theory of international politics likewise privileges large states, including China.

About one-fifth of world’s population resides in South Asia, with India being home to the bulk of the region’s population at 1.1 billion people. By contrast, a total of 207 million people live in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Although this is roughly equivalent to the 196 million who inhabit both Pakistan (168 million) and Afghanistan (28 million), smaller South Asia is largely ignored in strategy formulation for the region. Perhaps one reason is because South Asia, according to the World Bank, is the least integrated region in the world. In economic terms, intraregional trade is less than 2% of GDP, compared to over 20% for East Asia. However, GDP growth rates for most of these countries were relatively high last year. Also, a new International Finance Corporation (IFC) report finds the business environment improving in these states through stronger investor protections and decreased taxes on business. Still, India’s GDP constitutes about 80% of South Asian GDP and tends to occupy most of the economic attention given to South Asia.

Despite the sizable population and long-term economic reasons to address the region, South Asia observers have started paying more attention to the role of these small states for the role they play in the strategic calculation of large states. Among defense analysts, the “String of Pearls” thesis has received much discussion due to the potential for China to “encircle” India by developing strategic relationships with the smaller countries in the Indian Ocean – a region of strategic importance due to the vast amount of energy and goods that transport these waters. Short of the implementation of formal alliances with China, the emergence of a Chinese naval base in an Indian Ocean country such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, or the Seychelles is discussed as a possible worst-case scenario in this thesis due to varying combinations of China’s increasing economic, political, and military support to these states. In addition to opening a new embassy in the Maldives on the eve of the November 2011 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit there, China is advocating for dialogue partner status in SAARC and has suggested the idea of SAARC+1 akin to China’s relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the ASEAN+1 framework. Even in land-locked Nepal, China has developed economic and defense ties with India’s neighbor, punctuated by a visit by Premier Wen Jiabao to Kathmandu in December 2011.

This discussion about the potential alignment of small states – and small South Asia specifically – underscores the importance of this group in international politics. Although IR theory has neglected study of this group, small states are indeed important analytical units to policymakers when conceived of as a block of states that larger nations – such as India, and by extension, the US – could “lose” due to China’s influence. In fact, a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report discussed this threat and stated that the US “cannot afford to ‘lose’ Sri Lanka” – presumably to China – in the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s controversial civil war victory and ensuing troubled relations with western countries.

The binary balancing and bandwagoning behaviors outlined in structural realism do not adequately account for the nuances in hedging strategies adopted by smaller states, which walk a fine line in seeking ties with and assistance from large states while pursuing national development objectives. In the context of South Asia, former US ambassador Teresita Schaffer of the Brookings Institution writes that three smaller South Asian countries—Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh—“have all had ups and downs coexisting with India, and share the ambivalence that smaller neighbors frequently have toward much larger ones.” On the other hand, Schaffer notes that Bhutan and the Maldives have different models in conducting their small state diplomacy, with Bhutan being quite close to India, while the Maldives enjoys its non-preferential stance. Incidentally, Bhutan does not have formal diplomatic relations with the US, nor does the US provide Bhutan with foreign assistance.

Putting India into Perspective for US South Asia Policy

There is much for the US to gain by expanding security ties with the smaller countries in South Asia. The US-India bilateral relationship is new and untested, and stronger relations with smaller countries would promote a more a balanced policy in the region. This is not to say that the strategic partnership between the United States and India is likely to fail. On the contrary, bilateral relations appear to be on route to strengthen incrementally over the long-term. Still, the US could expand security ties with smaller South Asia without detracting from its bilateral relationship with India. A broader regional policy in South Asia represents a cautious approach to managing relations with a country that the United States did not enjoy positive relations with during the Cold War, and whose interests and values it does not entirely comprehend today.

India, for its part, is justifiably cautious about accelerating the rate of warming relations with the US. In addition to a relentless electoral and media cycle, policymakers in India are under pressure not to appear too US-friendly and are beholden to interests that still look to Russia as India’s preferred strategic partner, particularly given their significant amount of defense trade. Cold War memories also remain of the US cutting off military supply parts to India during its wars with Pakistan.

Furthermore, some in Washington reflexively impose a transactional view on the burgeoning relationship with New Delhi, who is not always as keen to advance bilateral relations at all costs. After setbacks such as India’s rejection of American MMRCA bids in early 2011, some US officials expressed their disappointment and did not immediately adopt the long-view in bilateral relations. But many seem to have recovered from this bump in the relationship, especially after India’s subsequent purchase of C-17s, which was seen by many as an attempt to atone for the fallout over the MMRCA decision.

As seen with the MMRCA episode, another potential seam ahead is that Washington appears more exuberant than New Delhi for better relations with its new strategic partner. One way in which this is evinced is in the discourse about the common values of the two countries. Secretary Clinton has written that “President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests.” In April 2011, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Robert O. Blake continued with this theme in testifying before Congress that all South Asian countries are governed by democratically elected leaders. He attributed this phenomenon to “an indication that India’s thriving democracy has served as a useful model in the region.”

Much discussion about intensifying US-India relations naturally emphasizes their “shared values” as the largest democracies in the world, thus implying the logic of their strengthened ties. However, Assistant Secretary Blake makes a mistake by viewing the smaller South Asian countries through the prism of India. They all have democratically elected leaders, which are not necessarily the result of their association with India, which incidentally has had its own share of high-profile, undemocratic episodes and controversies over civil liberties, as all developing countries do. Certainly, India is a great civilization with cultural linkages to all the smaller South Asian states. Yet in their exuberance for expanding ties with New Delhi, US officials should be wary of attributing the successes of individual South Asian countries to India. This action makes the US appear too eager for closer ties with a cautious (and arguably wise) India.

Consequently, US security strategy in South Asia should not make India its “linchpin.” There is already a sense that Washington will rely on New Delhi to manage the major security dealings of the smaller countries in South Asia, due to cultural and historical ties and geographical proximity. Former US ambassador Teresita Schaffer describes this “concern that “the United States might outsource its South Asia policy to India.” If the US were to “outsource” its South Asia policy to India – especially now when the bilateral relationship is still inchoate – this policy would be premature at best and disastrous at worst if expectations do not materialize. More importantly, however, building stronger relationships with small South Asia is not mutually exclusive to relationship building with India. In fact, the former may enhance the latter.

Current US Activities and Interests in Smaller South Asia

Besides deterring Chinese influence in smaller South Asia and cushioning the US in its new strategic relationship with India, what are the reasons for the US to develop its security policy in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal? Small states in South Asia would clearly benefit from US security assistance, but how would the US benefit from cultivating stronger relations with these countries?

It is worth noting that current US policy does not completely ignore the smaller South Asian states. Speaking about the Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka before the Senate Armed Service Committee in April 2011, Admiral Robert F. Willard of US Pacific Command (USPACOM) has testified that “The US has extensive interests throughout the rest of South Asia.” In Bangladesh, 2011 was the first year for the bilateral Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise between the Bangladeshi Navy (BN) and the US Navy. This is the first time in 17 years that a South Asian country participated in this annual series of bilateral exercises held by the US Navy and Southeast Asian countries. Last year, the US donated 16 Defender-class boats to the BN for counterterrorism and maritime interdiction purposes. In Nepal, US marines participate in expeditionary and tactical exchanges with the Nepal Army. In the Maldives, the US provides assistance on maritime security and International Military Education and Training (IMET), in addition to training selected personnel from the Maldives National Defence Forces (MNDF). In Sri Lanka, the US defense community engages Sri Lanka as much as it can while walking a fine line with regard to the 2007 cutoff in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid and ongoing US human rights concerns. An example of engagement is the attendance of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia Robert M. Scher at Sri Lanka’s Galle Dialogue in November 2011.

Still, the US could be doing more with the smaller states of South Asia while still supporting their own national interest. Secretary Blake observes that the US needs Bangladesh’s cooperation on counterterrorism. Similarly, he notes that the “Maldives is situated on the front lines of common threats including Somali piracy, narco-trafficking and the recruitment and training grounds of Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba.” Admiral Willard has testified about this threat as well. The MNDF does not have the ability to patrol all of their sprawling 1200 islands. Therefore, it is in the US interest to ensure that the Maldives does not unknowingly harbor terrorists in any of its atolls.

As policymakers seek ways to reduce defense spending, smaller South Asian states are also important for mitigating the American share of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Admiral Willard testified that USPACOM is trying to build capacity in South Asian militaries so they can address natural disasters. For instance, the US provided relief assistance to Bangladesh through Joint Task Force Sea Angel in response to Cyclone Marian in 1991 and Operation Sea Angel II following Cyclone Sidr in 2007. Of course, the US also responded to the 2004 tsunami and aided Indian Ocean littoral nations such as Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia through Operation Unified Assistance. In Nepal, the greatest natural threat involves earthquakes because Nepal lies in a high seismic risk zone. The UN Development Programme estimates that a major earthquake in the Kathmandu Valley could result in the death of at least 40,000 people. The III Marine Expeditionary Force and the Nepal Army participate in an annual HADR exercise that focuses on coordination in the event of an earthquake.

Despite the US’s troubled relations with Sri Lanka, Ambassador Blake has asserted that “Sri Lanka remains of strategic interest to the US” and points to the country as a “capable and willing partner to effectively combat violent extremism, trafficking and piracy, and thereby help to ensure the maritime security of the region.” In fact, the US Navy could benefit from learning techniques employed by the Sri Lankan Navy including the creation of small boat units and counter-swarm tactics to defeat the swarm attacks by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTTE) Sea Tigers during the civil war. These methods could be useful given the threat the US may face in the Strait of Hormuz against Iran. Furthermore, Secretary Scher participated in Sri Lanka’s November 2011 Galle Dialogue and spoke about the countries’ common interests on maritime security.

Finally, as Bangladesh and the Maldives are predominantly Muslim countries, the US could use as many international partners with this religious identity given its troubles with the Islamic world and perceptions of its intent there. The Pew Global Attitudes Project consistently finds unfavorable public opinion of the United States in majority Muslim countries, except for Indonesia.

Easy Wins for the US, India, and Smaller South Asia

Smaller South Asia would welcome greater ties with the US. Sri Lanka, in particular, has been on the outs of the Western international community and would welcome a benign US visage after years of a cold shoulder. The Maldives would appreciate maritime security and counterterrorism assistance combating the threats posed by Somali pirates and al Qaeda terrorists. In the long run, however, the Maldives’ greatest threat is existential due to rising sea levels that may render its entire population environmental refugees. Bangladesh likewise faces serious environmental threats and would welcome assistance such as early warning systems and satellite data-sharing to mitigate the damage of cyclones on its shoreline. Nepal, for its part, could benefit from US support during the process of integrating Maoist rebels into the Nepal Army. Furthermore, all these countries seek Excess Defense Articles (EDA) from the US, which are usually given via grant or FMF.

Deepening such traditional and nontraditional security ties would provide the US with an opportunity to show leadership in South Asia at relatively little cost. There is of course the possibility that India might take offense to a greater US role in the region. Some Indian defense analysts may even fear that growing maritime security relations with smaller South Asia could lead the US to set up a naval base. Given budget cuts in the US, however, this is unlikely. Furthermore, the US is content with its Indian Ocean presence in Diego Garcia, and India is accustomed to this. While US officials such as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta assert that the US will not quit Asia despite incipient Pentagon budget cuts and the weariness of two land-wars in the Middle East, economic realities could give sway and ultimately dictate a gradual US retrenchment during the course of this century, although not completely.

In the meantime, a greater US role now in South Asia would provide a helpful transition for India to develop its leadership in the region—something it has been reluctant to do. India is still learning how to manage its economic and strategic rise and is not yet comfortable exerting an active leadership role, likely due to its roots in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma’s statement that India will not take a “headmaster” role in the Indian Ocean region typifies the country’s reluctance to assert its presence. Despite its formidable economic growth, India still lacks a coordinated strategic response and management of reaction to China’s increased presence in South Asia. Until India embraces the convergence of its increasing resources, capabilities, and interests, the US should not neglect the opportunity to cultivate deeper economic, political, and military ties directly with the region’s smaller countries, which are typically overlooked until a natural disaster occurs or a human rights concern emerges.

US-India Security Coordination in Smaller South Asia

Rather than being an irritant to US-India bilateral relations, expanded US security ties with smaller South Asia presents a chance for the two countries to coordinate on ensuring stability in the region. Given its increasing defense budget, India should embrace the opportunity to exercise a leadership role and shed some of its NAM baggage. Meanwhile, the US would welcome an opportunity to promote burden-sharing in the context of declining resources. A November 2011 Pentagon report to Congress stipulates that “the Department of Defense is continually looking for ways to expand defense cooperation with India.”

A wide range of motives and means for collaboration exist. Given growing Chinese relations with the smaller countries of South Asia, neither the US nor India want to concede potential strategic gains through China’s association with them. Smaller South Asia is politically stable with democratically elected leaders, and it is in both powers’ interests to preserve this state of affairs. Writing about increasing counterterrorism capacities in South Asia, former Pentagon official S. Amer Latif stresses that the US should be sensitive to how it conducts its efforts with India for fear of raising the specter of colonialism. Treating the dominant power with respect is wise in any subregion. Still, the potential benefits to India and the US outweigh the costs of coordinating on counterterrorism, as well as on other issues. On HADR, US-India coordination before the next environmental cataclysm will alleviate the blow experienced by residents in this region’s turbulent climate.

It is not surprising that the US has failed to take full advantage of its bilateral relationships with smaller South Asia. US policymakers are understandably preoccupied by challenges presented by larger countries in the region: namely, drawdown from Afghanistan, tenuous relations with Pakistan, and a new strategic partnership with India. However, in an era when US relations with India are still developing, but New Delhi is only beginning to grasp its potential for exercising leadership in this region, and as China’s ties with the smaller states of South Asia strengthen, the US should advance security relations with smaller South Asia. Not only are Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal situated in a strategic location, but they constitute an important arena of competition between India and China. Enhanced ties with these states could provide the US with a cushion in South Asia, especially if relations with the larger countries disappoint and Washington is ultimately left without strong security partners in the region. In addition, the US could benefit from military exchanges with these countries and has long-term interests in building capacity in counterterrorism and HADR.

A new discourse is emerging in Washington policy circles about the “Indo-Pacific,” which is gradually displacing the more commonly used term “Asia-Pacific.” India should not be the only factor in this new conceptualization; smaller South Asia also has a role to play in the region. With proper attention to this block of states and careful management of its nascent relationship with India, the US has much to gain from intensifying security ties with the smaller countries of South Asia. ■

* Nilanthi Samaranayake is an analyst in the Strategic Studies division at CNA in Alexandria, VA. She can be contacted at  nilanthi@cna.org. This article was adapted and  expanded from an essay published by the East-West Center in September  2011. The views expressed are solely those of the author and not of any organization with which she is affiliated.