The real reason China wants peace in Afghanistan

• Like many superpowers before it, Beijing is discovering just how difficult it is to establish a presence in a region famed for self-destruction 
• It has a vested interest in Afghanistan’s security – it is vital for the success of Gwadar Port, a key hub in Xi Jinping’s ambitious belt and road plan

Tom Hussain 4 January 2020

The US$60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – unveiled five years ago by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Islamabad – was envisioned as a game-changer for Beijing’s insolvent ally. In due course, it was hoped that the CPEC would provide a springboard for the extension of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative into Afghanistan and Iran, and onwards into the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf.With the onset of 2020, however, China finds itself mired in the region’s political quagmire, unsure of the outcomes of its economic connectivity endeavour. Like the invading superpowers that have previously tried, and failed, to establish a strategic corridor between the Gulf and Central Asia, Beijing has discovered that the countries on its western flank have a frustrating proclivity for self-destructive politics.

This means China will have to work extraordinarily hard in 2020 to avert the mess brewing on the borders of Xinjiang province, and give the belt and road plan a fighting chance of success in South Asia.

As ever, Afghanistan represents both the biggest opportunity and the most formidable challenge. With presidential elections forthcoming in the United States, President Donald Trump’s administration is moving quickly to end America’s 18-year war with the Taliban. US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has said talks with the insurgent group have reached an “important stage”, suggesting a peace deal is imminent.But a bitter dispute over the dubious outcome of Afghanistan’s presidential election threatens to upset that apple cart. After three months of arguing over which votes to count or not, President Ashraf Ghani has been declared the winner by a margin just about big enough to prevent a run-off vote against his rival, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah.

Ominously, the results showed a geographical north-south split, along the ethnic lines that sparked civil war after Soviet forces pulled out in ignominy in 1989, turning Afghanistan into a breeding ground for global terrorism. This internal division will become more pronounced amid the intensifying electoral dispute between Ghani, who is ethnically Pashtun, and his non-Pashtun rivals. In turn, that will invite competing regional powers to leverage the situation to their rivals’ disadvantage.Subscribe SCMP Today:  This Week in AsiaGet updates direct to your inboxBy registering, you agree to our T&C and Privacy Policy

Infuriated by the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, Iran has declared its opposition to the ongoing negotiations between the US and the Taliban, saying any deal must be negotiated by Kabul. Poignantly, Tehran justified the move by citing former president George W. Bush’s decision to include it in the so-called Axis of Evil in 2002, soon after it played a central role in piecing together the post-Taliban political dispensation in Afghanistan.

In doing so, Iran has positioned itself as a dangerous spoiler which, acting in concert with Ghani, could delay an Afghanistan peace deal long enough to provoke the temperamental Trump into ordering a unilateral pull-out of American forces – as he did from northern Syria earlier this year.

A hasty US withdrawal without a negotiated political settlement unanimously agreed to by all interested parties, Afghan and foreign, would invariably create chaos and yet more ungoverned spaces for the likes of Islamic State (Isis) and Uygur separatists to exploit. For China and its close ally Pakistan, as well as Russia, Iran and the Central Asian republics, that would be an unmitigated disaster.Of all the foreign powers involved in Afghanistan, however, China is widely viewed as the least controversial and most pragmatic. It has developed an economic and security partnership with the Afghan government, earning its symbolic backing on the South China Sea dispute, while also developing a relationship with the Taliban’s Doha-based diplomatic mission.

China steps in to revive Afghanistan peace talks23 Oct 2019

Over the past couple of years, China’s State Councillor Wang Yi has also played a key role in mitigating disputes between Kabul and Islamabad. Without his efforts, it is unlikely that the Afghan peace process would have progressed to the tantalising point of resolution.

Wang will have to ramp up his efforts as a good-faith go-between to ensure that the negotiations between the US and the Taliban, and the Taliban and their Afghan rivals, do not break down.

At the same time, he will have to keep a close eye on the overspill of Middle Eastern rivalries. While Iran explained its recently voiced opposition to the Afghan peace process in the context of US sanctions, its changed position is an outright rejection of intense lobbying by Pakistan’s powerful army chief of staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa.

He has struggled to maintain cordial ties with Tehran since last year, when Pakistan invited Saudi Arabia to invest in an oil refinery complex near the CPEC port of Gwadar, close to Iran’s border. Islamabad extended the offer in return for a multibillion-dollar financial bailout by Riyadh, and in the hope that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would prevail upon the White House to resume financial and military assistance to Pakistan.

Like Wang, the Saudi crown prince’s facilitation contributed to the establishment of the Afghan peace process. In Tehran, however, this raised fears about renewed cross-border attacks by militants allegedly working as proxies for Riyadh.

Did pressure from Saudi Arabia see Pakistan’s Khan skip Malaysian summit?17 Dec 2019

Pakistan’s last-minute pull-out from a summit of Muslim nations in Kuala Lumpur last month, reportedly at Saudi Arabia’s behest, was the last straw, apparently, because Iran changed its stance on the Afghan peace talks immediately afterwards.

Clearly, China does not want the area around Gwadar, the maritime hub of its long-desired overland route to the Arabian Sea, to become destabilised by Middle Eastern machinations.

Again, it will fall upon Wang to persuade Beijing’s partners in the Gulf to restrain their actions for the greater, common good of peace in Afghanistan.

The outcome of his efforts, successful or not, will reverberate around the region for decades. ■