Dr. Manoj Kumar Mishra 18 September 2018
As the Chinese footprint in the South Asian and the Indian Ocean region expanded under the rubric of ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), India’s threat perceptions from muscular China surged due to reasons like lack of trust between them historically, Chinese long-term assistance to Pakistan in order to bolster it militarily and Indian suspicions of Beijing’s motives underlying BRI. India’s concerns are genuine and legitimate given that roads, railways, bridges, and ports constructed under BRI can be used for dual purposes – civil and military. Indian concerns primarily stem from ulterior military objectives underlying Chinese mega connectivity project and not with the official declarations from Beijing which stress only for commercial and development purposes. Some developments in the Indian Ocean and South Asian region have not gone unnoticed in New Delhi – for instance, Chinese acquisition of a naval base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, Chinese warships and nuclear submarines making port calls in Colombo, Beijing muscling its way into dwarfing Indian influence in the Maldives- an archipelago state and alleged Chinese plan to deploy nuclear submarines at Gwadar port in Pakistan.
To roll back Chinese influence in South Asia, India came up with its proposals to foster regional trade and connectivity. However, because of the inefficacy of the regional platform provided by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in promoting New Delhi’s objectives, India led efforts at invigorating sub-regional initiatives. The sub-regional initiatives included Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) comprising members such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, BCIM initiative to establish an economic corridor between Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar and BBIN initiative between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal to pursue the primary objectives of forging connectivity in the areas of power, transport and infrastructure and provide a bulwark against Chinese sway into the South Asian region.
However, BBIN initiative which was activated following India’s failure under Modi’s leadership to push through the Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) in the SAARC Summit held in Kathmandu proved a temporary failure with Bhutan’s withdrawal from the agreement. Since 2007, with the revision of 1949 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, Bhutan has substantially extended its diplomatic relations with many countries with a slackening of Indian control over its foreign policy. Even though China does not have a diplomatic presence in Bhutan, Indo-Bhutanese relations began to wobble when Thimpu started to cozy up to Beijing during the earlier Prime Minister Jigme Y Thinley.
The Chinese overture to Bhutan not only involved its push for formal diplomatic presence, but a land-swapping deal was also allegedly discussed involving the strategically located areas in the tri-junction of India-Bhutan and China. India withdrew subsidies on kerosene and cooking gas as a measure to pile up pressure on Bhutan to force it to change its stance which was subsequently withdrawn and the succeeding Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay maintained close relations with the Indian leadership by putting a pause on diplomatic overtures and made Bhutan the only country in South Asia apart from India who did not join Chinese-sponsored BRI. As Bhutan is going to witness a change in leadership soon, India would reach out to the new leader with its historical ties with the country and concerns, but the more important task would be to create enough trust and mutual stakes so that it would not be bought into Chinese overtures.
Nepal, another Himalayan neighbor with which India shared close ties since independence, has shown signs of working towards building a partnership with China. Of late, Nepal while declined to participate in the New Delhi-proposed first-ever joint military exercise within the framework of BIMSTEC, it expressed its readiness to participate in a 12-day long joint military exercise with China termed as Sagarmatha Friendship-2 in Chengdu.
Nepal although officially clarified that this should not be construed as an anti-Indian gesture, there are reports that Beijing has facilitated Nepal to acquire ports and roads in China which would significantly reduce Indian economic influence in Kathmandu. These developments would put challenges on Modi’s leadership as to how to create enough soft power in Nepal as any measure of coercion would push Kathmandu further towards Beijing as has been witnessed in the past. Similarly, the Sirisena government of Sri Lanka which was perceived pro-India has leased out Hambantota port to Beijing for 99 years under Chinese debt pressure raising Indian threat perceptions in the Indian Ocean. Although India has responded to the threat by starting negotiations to operate Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport near the port to keep a check on Chinese moves, Colombo remains as a swinging pendulum which New Delhi must work towards changing to its side.
The 2+2 diplomacy between the US and India reaped mixed results as it assuaged Indian threat perceptions from China and Pakistan, it was poised to push India into the American strategic orbit. The defence pact is known as Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) which was signed during the 2+2 dialogue on June 6, 2018 would not only facilitate Indian military platforms’ access to encrypted, cutting edge and high-end secured communication equipment from the US, it would also enable India to put Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean and Himalayas under close surveillance. New Delhi considered the agreement important despite the legitimate concerns that it might compromise India’s strategic autonomy by facilitating American intrusion into the Indian defence communication systems not only by allowing visits by US officials to Indian bases to inspect equipment safeguarded under COMCASA, it could technologically enable the US closely monitor India’s defence preparedness and moves. There are also arguments that India’s indigenous military platforms and already existing Russian military platforms may not be compatible with COMCASA.
India’s move towards enhanced military preparedness seems to imply proactive strategic aspirations rather than mere defensive requirements which fell squarely with the enhanced Chinese threat perception across the Himalayan border which was witnessed during the Doklam standoff and continuing incursions across LAC (Line of Actual Control) and in the Indian Ocean in the shape of String of Pearls strategy (encirclement strategy) adopted euphemistically under the Maritime Silk Road project. However, New Delhi has seemingly failed to derive much anticipated American concessions on S-400 missile deal with Moscow under the weight of strategic partnership with Washington. While China and Pakistan are coordinating their efforts in developing strategically important Gwadar port, India has failed to take forward its partnership with Iran and develop Chabahar port as the Trump Administration rolled back the nuclear deal with Tehran and put up new sanctions.
India’s strategic partnership with the US has tacitly forced New Delhi to drag its feet from forging an independent policy towards Iran which led to sluggish efforts at carving out an alternative route to Afghanistan even while India has been denied overland route to Afghanistan through Pakistan for long. India’s challenge seems to lie in carving out a path by which it could keep its strategic relations with the US intact without undermining its strategic autonomy and policy of multi-alignment which would ensure Indian interests in the long-run.
While Pakistani-prompted incursions into the Indian side of Line of Control (LOC) and proxy wars continued unabated, it was following the terrorist attacks on the Uri military camp in India that Pakistan was not only isolated internationally, India was compelled to take measures in the diplomatic and military realms in order to alter Pakistani indulgence in its alleged role in sponsoring terrorism. Previously, such actions were difficult to contemplate because of lack of unanimity among powerful states as regards the role of Pakistan in supporting and strengthening cross-border terrorism. International political environment whether conducive or obstructive has had its impacts on India’s policy response to threats in the neighborhood. Pakistan allegedly played a role in deluding the international community by projecting terrorism either as an expression of the angst of the supporters of the freedom movement in Kashmir or labeled the terrorists as non-state actors over whom the Pakistani state does not have any control.
In the diplomatic realm, India considered strategies such as revisiting the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status granted to it, regulating cultural interactions in the fields of sports and films and refusing to engage Pakistan at the regional level by turning down invitation to join the 19th SAARC summit which was supposed to be held in Islamabad in November 2016. India achieved a diplomatic success when a few other members of SAARC such as Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan canceled their participation in the scheduled summit quickly following India’s rejection.
However, when the diplomatic pressures palpably failed to change Pakistani behavior, and Indian admonishments went unheeded, New Delhi resorted to surgical strikes along the LOC which were a step in the military realm and undertaken with extreme caution and accurate intelligence feedback. By conducting a successful surgical strike, India wanted to send a strong message to the opponent that unless the existing behavioral pattern changed, the costs would be higher in the future. While Pakistan flamboyantly denied such operations, India corroborated its reality with photographic evidence. However, dealing with proxy wars raised by Pakistan has had turned out to be an enigma for India strategic policymakers.
The surgical strikes in no ways served Indian intentions, and the incidents of cross-border firings in violation of ceasefire agreement of 2003 kept swelling until and unless Pakistan agreed to it. Pakistan, following its acquisition of nuclear weapon, made use of a ‘tactical nuclear weapon’ threat to continue the proxy war to undermine India’s superior conventional military capacity.
While India did not endorse coercive strategies towards its neighbours, yet its policies were cautious and pragmatic about the change of circumstances in its neighborhood. However, there remained a confusing aspect to Indian strategies which mostly emanated continuous threat perceptions from rising Chinese sway in the South Asian and Indian Ocean region and Pakistani-supported proxy wars along the border which evoked various responses from India ranging from soft to hard approaches. India as a nuclear power with geographical contiguity with the Indian Ocean region and assured conventional military capability and naval presence must not deal with its neighbors panicked by Chinese threat perception instead it should work towards building positive and healthy ties with them as neighbors cannot be wished away even as a country can choose friends and foes.