By Rear Admiral Monty Khanna, Indian Navy (Retired)
On 26 April 2024, Admiral Naveed Ashraf, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Pakistan Navy, was present at the Shuangliu facility of the Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Group (WSIG) in Wuhan, China, to witness the launch of the first Hangor-class submarine, an export variant of the Chinese Type 039B Yuan-class. The program is the largest defense contract signed by the Pakistani Navy in its history. It has, however, been beset with issues since its inception in 2015. Of the eight submarines under procurement, four were to be built by WSIG and the remaining four at Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW) in Karachi, Pakistan, under a transfer-of-technology agreement.
The Pakistan Navy and the Hango r-Class
The program got off to a good start, with the Shuangliu facility augmenting its infrastructure to take on the enhanced construction load. However, problems soon began to appear. The largest was related to the installation of the MTU 396 diesel engines, which drive the submarine’s generators and keep its batteries charged. These engines were being built under license in China and have been extensively used in their Song- and Yuan-class boats. The Chinese assumption that getting requisite end-use certification approval from Germany to install the engine on the exported submarines would merely be a formality turned out to be ill-founded. Germany first denied fitment of the engines on the Yuan-class submarine being built for the Royal Thai Navy (RTN), the order that preceded Pakistan’s program. The RTN ultimately decided to foreclose the contract and instead use the funding for the purchase of a surface vessel from China. However, recent reports indicate the contract could be revived.
Cancellation of the Pakistani program would have been highly disruptive for both parties. Consequently, it was decided that the MTU 396 engines would be replaced with Chinese-designed-and-manufactured CHD 620 diesel engines in all eight submarines. China has apparently given sufficient performance guarantees to assuage Pakistani concerns about reliability and maintainability of these engines. As a result, the program has once again gathered pace, with the first of the class launched on 1 May 2024. Earlier, at a well-attended ceremony at KS&EW on 24 December 2022, the previous Pakistani naval chief, Admiral Muhammad Amjad Khan Niazi, presided over the keel laying of the fifth boat and steel cutting of the sixth boat, both part of the four submarines undergoing indigenous construction in Pakistan.
The delivery of the Hangor will likely take place by the end of 2024. The boat will subsequently be commissioned in Pakistan as the PNS Hangor, possibly in early 2025. The commissioning of follow-on submarines should happen at six-month intervals. Induction of these submarines, albeit much later than planned, will give a substantial boost to the Pakistani Navy submarine force. For the first time, Pakistan will be operating boats with a proven air independent propulsion (AIP) system. Though the Augusta 90B submarines procured by Pakistan from France in the 2000s were fitted with MESMA AIP systems, these plants were unreliable, difficult to maintain, and vexed with contractual issues. Therefore, their use has been severely curtailed.
The other positive outcome of the Hangor program, insofar as the Pakistan Navy is concerned, is the infrastructure augmentation at KS&EW. The yard has been fitted with a 125-meter-long Synchrolift ship-lift-and-transfer system that can hoist most of the vessels the Pakistan Navy operates. In addition, the facility has several dry berths to accommodate vessels under maintenance. There is also a 135-meter-long covered building bay for constructing two vessels simultaneously. The yard will undoubtedly acquire increasing proficiency in the construction of submarines built to Chinese specifications, which will assist them in building follow-on boats of newer classes as well as in the maintenance of the Hangor submarines currently under construction.
It is also likely that some or all these submarines will be based at the Jinnah Naval Base in Ormara, Pakistan, once commissioned. This will require building the infrastructure to support unfettered operations and maintenance from this location. Pakistan has already invested in a Chinese-supplied very low frequency (VLF) communication station in Sindh which has been commissioned as PNS Hamid. This will facilitate secure submarine communications, an essential building block for effective submarine operations.
Bangladesh Navy’s Mings and Base at Pekua
Pakistan will not be the first Indian Ocean region country to acquire Chinese-built conventional submarines. Bangladesh signed a contract in 2012 for the refurbishment and delivery of two Ming-class submarines. These boats underwent refit at China’s Dalian Liaoning South Shipyard. Post-refit, they were handed over to then–Bangladesh Navy Chief Admiral Nizamuddin Ahmed at a ceremony on 14 November 2016 and transported to Chittagong using a semisubmersible heavy lift vessel. The boats were subsequently commissioned as the BNS Nabajatra and BNS Joyjatra on 12 March 2017 by then–Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
Along with this contract, the BN concluded another agreement with Poly Technologies, Inc (PTI) of China for the design and construction of a full-fledged submarine base at Pekua, Cox’s Bazar, about 32 miles south of Chittagong at a reported cost of $1.21. Work on the project commenced in 2016 and the base was commissioned on 20 March 2023, though some construction activity continues. The base was named BNS Sheikh Hasina, after the recently deposed prime minister.
A rudimentary examination of commercially available imagery of the base shows the facilities are far more robust than what would be required by a modest fleet of two diesel submarines. Central to the base is a large 400 x 300-meter basin that has been dredged to adequate depth to cater for the draught of the Ming submarines. In addition to masonry piers, the base also has two 100-meter-long floating jetties, each capable of berthing two submarines. There is also a 130 x 30 meter dry-dock under construction on the southern wall, which will be able to dock the existing Mings as well as other ships and submarines. In addition to well-conceived command-and-control facilities, the base houses extensive maintenance infrastructure. BNS Sheikh Hasina could easily support six to eight submarines, along with several warships.
Myanmar Navy’s Ming and Base at Made Island, Kyaukphu
About 200 miles southeast of Pekua, another submarine base is being built at Made Island, Kyaukphyu, in Myanmar, with assistance from China. This facility is designed to support Chinese-built Ming-class submarines, one of which Myanmar has acquired. As in the case of Bangladesh, this submarine was refitted at the Dalian Liaoning South Shipyard in Liaoning Province. She subsequently sailed to Thilawa, Yangon, flying a Chinese flag and was commissioned on 24 December 2021 as UMS Minye Kyaw Htin. She will be shifted to her new home at Kyaukphyu once the base is ready. The facilities under construction at this location are far more modest than those at Pekua, essentially comprising a jetty perpendicular to the lay of the coast that supports two piers; one floating pier 50 meters long and one concrete pier 100 meters long. Facilities under creation ashore include adequate technical and maintenance infrastructure to support submarine operations.
China’s Quest for Submarine Bases in the Indian Ocean Region
Within roughly a decade, Chinese-built submarines and the infrastructure to support them have come to stay in Indian Ocean region. These will undoubtedly become more robust with time. Further, the creation of such facilities is complex, expensive, and customized for equipment from specific original equipment manufacturers. Given that the building of a new class of submarine by the same OEM essentially follows a path of spiral development with iterative improvements superimposed over large segments of commonality, existing maintenance and training facilities can transition from one class to the next with relative ease. This incentivizes countries, particularly those with limited capacities, to persist with future acquisitions from the same source. This could ensure the perpetuation and strengthening of Chinese-built submarines and associated support infrastructure in the region for the foreseeable future. It could also lead to a growing degree of dependence by nations so invested, which China could leverage for geopolitical gain.
It would not be inconceivable for Chinese submarines to use these facilities when deployed and possibly even be based there for extended periods. Such an outcome is more likely in Pakistan where, given its contested relationship with India, long-term basing of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) assets could be seen as beneficial by both parties.
Why is China making such a concerted effort to increase its submarines basing options in the Indian Ocean region? Most of the above projects have been underwritten by substantial Chinese financial assistance either in the form of grants or soft loans. Given that submarines will likely play a major role in China’s future security contingencies in the region, the task of getting them into the region is not an easy one. Though China is relatively close to the Indian Ocean territorially, the distances from its Navy bases are greater than 3,000 nautical miles by sea. Further, submarines would have to break through the first island chain, transit through constrained straits associated with the Indonesian archipelago—each with associated depth restrictions and possibly embedded with acoustic sensors—and only then be able to take up their assigned stations. In doing so, these submarines would burn through a sizeable part of their endurance, particularly in the case of conventional submarines. Faced with a defect at sea, the decision on what to do next could pose to be a big dilemma—even more so during hostilities, when options to use harbors in neutral countries would diminish. The solution thus lies with establishing long-term assured basing arrangements at suitable locations in the Indian Ocean region.
While one such base in Djibouti already exists, it is not ideal. Its location in the Horn of Africa is not central to the region and would require long transits for boats operating in the southern Indian Ocean or in the Bay of Bengal. Further, Djibouti already houses the bases of several other countries, including the United States, Japan, France, and other European nations. This makes its assured use doubtful, particularly during hostilities.
China’s desire to increase its submarine presence in the Indian Ocean region is also evident from its growing deployment of survey and research ships in the region. Data these ships garner assists the PLA Navy in developing a clearer understanding of the environment for subsurface operations. The stage is therefore set for China’s undersea presence to grow in the Indian Ocean region. This will add a new dimension of competition in waters that have been comparatively placid for decades.
source : usni