by Apurbaa Sengupta and Tanistha Bhagawati 3 June 2020
Introduction
The strategic significance of the Indian Ocean has undoubtedly transformed the region into a theatre of intense global conflicts over the years. The IOR (Indian Ocean Region) roughly covers an area of 68.56 million sq. km and is the third largest ocean in the world. Spanning over nearly 20% of the Earth’s surface, the IOR has emerged as not only an imperative communication link between the West and the East but also attracted significant global attention for its geopolitical and economic significance. The Indian Ocean is home to seven chokepoints- the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Cape of Good Hope, the straits of Malacca, Sunda Strait and Lambok Strait. Emerging as an important territory in the Asia Pacific littoral, the Indian Ocean basin houses about one third of the world’s population. Albeit nations bounding the Indian Ocean may have little interactions, it has become a critical trade route accounting for almost 40% of global oil exports.
Geo-political criticality of the Indian Ocean Region
The IOR is an arena of massive geopolitical and geo-economic importance. It is the largest maritime space that houses a third of the world’s population, natural resources, energy supplies, developing nations et al, thereby making it a contested territory. Geographically, the Indian Ocean is bound by the Asian continent to the north, Africa to the west, and Australia to the east encompassing large regional seas like the Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, Somali Sea, and the Arabian Sea. The Indian Ocean Region covers 28 million sq. miles acting as maritime link between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, major sea routes connecting East, South-East Asia, Middle East, and Africa with Europe and America. The region which lies at the crossroads of global trade holds a mammoth 16.8% of oil reserves worldwide and 27.9% of the world’s natural gas reserves. A rich resource basin, this region accounts for a 35.5% of world’s iron production and 17.8% of global gold production. The geopolitical criticality of the Indian Ocean hails from the trade and transit of energy resources. Linking the Atlantic to the Pacific, it accounts for roughly 40 per cent of global oil supply which makes its way through the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb[1]. With the emergence of globalisation as a tool for connecting global markets, the region has assumed paramount significance. Apart from serving as a conduit for trade and commerce, the IOR also has abundant reserves of natural resources. Global fishing (approximately 15 per cent), coupled with vast quantities of mineral resources like nickel, iron, cobalt, manganese, zinc, gold has contributed to its geo-economic importance.
Economic significance of the Indian Ocean Region
The geopolitical relevance of the Indian Ocean Region resonates with its economic significance with fishery, minerals and petroleum making it a hotspot for trade and commerce. A rough speculation of it would indicate the region to be approximately a trillion-dollar hub, if all its resources are optimally procured and traded, let alone fully. Acting as a link between the East (Asia-Pacific) and the West (North Atlantic), the region provides an impetus for economic growth. Most bordering countries including India is dependent on trade and contributes a fairly large share to their fiscal inputs, with exports of 11,34,948 metric tonnes of seafood worth $5.78 billion (2016-17).
The Indian Ocean Region is made up of coastal states’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and high-seas pockets that are not only conducive but also support fisheries in the region. Fisheries are a significant renewable resource that the Indian Ocean offers forming an integral part of the Blue Economy sustaining a large number of livelihoods. Its depletion could even result in major security issues in terms of scarcity of resources pushing countries to meet demands through aggressive fishing methods (could also result in encroachment to EEZs of other countries). Most countries identify the ‘blue economy’ and the significance to sustainably use ocean resources to avoid depletion, integrating economic interests with the ecosystem. This region’s fisheries produce around a third of the world’s tuna including the valuable southern blue fin tuna fisheries, extending into the Pacific Ocean. Organisations such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission, Bay of Bengal Program Intergovernmental Organisation[2] that work to sustainably procure and sell Tuna while also keeping in mind the criteria of population density and area for fishing.
Australia ratified the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) in 2012. The SIOFA was established to address the unregulated fishing of shared and straddling stocks on the high sea[3]. The Indian side remains confined to mostly coastal fishing unable to exploit the EEZ due to its lacking security apparatus. Defence Secretary Ajay Kumar states India’s need to augment its security for it to be able to support fishing, mineral and energy exploration in the region[4].
The region is rich in mineral deposits where polymetallic nodules found on the deep seafloor (>4000 m water depth) are being recognised as alternative sources of metal. Deposits, spreading over millions of square kilometres, contain nearly 40% of combined metals (Manganese, Iron, Nickel, and Cobalt) beyond the exclusive economic zones of most countries. India happens to be one of the eight pioneer investors with exclusive rights over an area of 75,000 sq. km in Central Indian Ocean for the exploration and future exploitation of these mineral deposits (the other countries include France, Russia, Japan, Korea, China, Inter-ocean metal, Poland, and Germany in the Pacific Ocean)[5].
The mineral rich deposits are exploited by bordering countries of India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. India’s ambitious ‘Deep Ocean Mission’ was launched in 2019 by Dr. Madhavan Rajeevan, Secretary of Union Ministry of Earth Sciences announcing an INR 8,000 crore to explore deep sea minerals. The sea lanes in the Indian Ocean command strategic importance with more than 80% of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through the Indian Ocean. Energy security and resources being extremely critical, developing societies are heavily dependent on resources for primary and exportation purposes[6].
The linking sea routes carry a heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia. Large reserves of the coveted Hydrocarbons are being tapped in offshore Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, and Western Australia. Since Hydrocarbons are being heralded as the next big thing in renewable fuel, its exploration has initiated competition among countries to be able to create a viable market for its sale.
China is seeking to exercise its hegemony in the region where it has actively made investments in the Indian Ocean ports. China has been able to acquire the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka for a period of 99 years and 15,000 acres of land around it[7] giving it a strategic foothold both commercially and militarily. China has also invested $60 billion[8] in Africa in the furtherance of consolidating its position. The Chinese acquisition of ports on the fringes of the Asian continent and Africa is a strategic move by China to be able to singularly capitalise on the trade much to the concern of both India and the United States.
The importance of the Indian Ocean: What role does India play in the IOR
Notwithstanding its global importance, the Indian Ocean serves as a viable region for India in terms of strengthening its economic and security base. A roadway for petroleum and vast expanses of marine life are elements India is looking to optimally gather and use for commercial purposes. India is the largest littoral state in the Indian Ocean Region with a coastline expanding over 7,500.[9] India has been able to establish 12 major ports and 200 minor ports along the coast. India has initiated a plan called Sagarmala to maximise its maritime capability[10]. The program aims to double the existing major ports in the country. Besides its own coastline, the importance of the Indian Ocean has pushed India to foster better relations with surrounding regions for its economic and strategic benefits while keeping an eye out for its regional rival China. It is pivotal in India’s effort to maintain contact with the rest of the world. India has focused on its relations with Iran, East Asia, and Africa to impose its importance in the region[11]. Iran’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz makes it a strategic location where almost 30% of the world oil passes the strait. Iran has not been able to substantially optimise on its natural gifts owing partly to lacking facilities and the rest to sanctions. India, which has been for years one of the top buyers of Iranian oil, has entered into strategic relations with Iran and has developed the first phase of the Iran Chabahar port, close to Farzad oil fields giving it a strategic advantage with access into central Asia (dependent on stability in Afghanistan)[12]. India, being one of the 8 countries to have received a waiver from the US sanction not only monetarily benefits from the transaction but also can monitor China’s movements via its presence in Iran. India has improved relations with east Asian countries like Indonesia. Indonesia, very much like Iran, provides an important strategic point, the Malacca Strait. India has signed an agreement with Indonesia to acquire the strategically viable Sabang Port. Both India and Indonesia are awry of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), refusing to let Chinese initiative dictate their positions[13]. India has started working with Japan and its African counterparts to have announced, in 2017, an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)[14], as an alternative to the BRI, to be able to secure its entry and exit point. Valued at $40 billion, this plan is not only supposed to aid African development but would inversely undermine Chinese investment.
Challenges for India’s Maritime Security threats in the Indian Ocean Region
In 1890, Alfred Mahan said, “whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia; the destiny of the world will be decided on waters[15]. Due to its ever proliferating economic and geo-strategic importance, the IOR has been subjected to tri-polar competition with the United States, India and China emerging as the important stakeholders of the region. Counting the historical hostilities and sour relations between two of Asia’s most powerful countries- India and China, situations seem ideal for a Sino-Indian confrontation at sea. Both countries are involved in a constant tussle over who can adequately use the region to its own advantage. Although Chinese strategic focus continues to lie in the Pacific, it would be wrong to assume that the PRC has looked away from strengthening its control on the Indian Ocean. Beijing’s priority in the Indian Ocean lies in securing the significant Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) from the Gulf to South China Sea, which is vital for China’s energy imports. China’s economy is heavily dependent on seaborne trade and energy sources which transits through this route. Being one of the largest importers and consumers of energy sources, it is to the advantage of Chinese economy to have maritime engagements in the region. Driven by their maritime ambitions, both countries have plunged into a race to expand their navy for protection of their economic and strategic interests. India is anxious about Chinese maritime intentions in the IOR. China’s flourishing economy emanating from vital resources in Africa and oil and gas exports from the Gulf region transits through the Indian Ocean. This dependence is long-standing and is likely to continue for another forty years, thereby escalating Indian anxieties[16].The Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ theory to expand its influence in the IOR and surround India by ‘pearls’ in the form of increased military infrastructure is testimony to the country’s increasing maritime ambitions. The only distrust for India emanates from the growing presence of the People’s Liberation Navy (PLAN) in the Indian Ocean. India, who sits at the middle of the IOR, has been assertive about growth in the region. During his visit to Seychelles and Mauritius in 2015, Narendra Modi had put across the idea of SAGAR- Security and Growth for All in the Region to consolidate India’s maritime security interests in the region. Moreover, with China’s massive global investment in the form of the $1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) it is prepared to establish a connection between China and Eurasia through various infrastructures. Therefore, China looks at the IOR as an integral part of a broader Chinese geo-political expansion. China’s desire to emerge as a pan Asian superpower and its maritime outlook is reflected to the world through its engagements in the South China Sea. Therefore, in the run up to facing direct confrontations from its Chinese counterpart, the Indian Navy has grown significantly in size to make its presence felt in the region. While China continues to make investments in building ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh and so on, India has tried to include nations like Seychelles, Mauritius and Thailand in the latest Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) to which, China remains a dialogue partner[17]. However, what is very evident in spite of the clashes between the two is the heavy dependence on energy sources to fuel their individual economies which makes its way into the country through the Indian Ocean sea route. Thus, keeping aside the security threats posed by either country, it seems unlikely for either New Delhi or Beijing to engage in direct maritime confrontations. What serves as a challenge to the competing interests of India and China is the entry of the US in this maritime game. The geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean is not lost to the United States which is making considerable efforts in order to make its presence felt in the region, one of them being sharing cordial relations with India to contain the Chinese maritime presence. India as an independent-minded actor would, however, never cave in to decisions that are in opposition to its autonomous status. Thus, it becomes important for the US to revaluate its propositions with greater care. The US is rebalancing its global engagements by promoting an Indo-Pacific framework that would integrate the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean into a single region. China’s fear includes US encroachment into the Indian Ocean littoral, detrimental to its maritime security interests. As the US is shifting its attention to Asia-Pacific, it is increasingly looking at India as a security provider and to preserve the maritime route that integrates economies worldwide[18].
Conclusion
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has done little to erase existing tensions in the region. The increased animosity towards China has further disturbed its relations with India and US. The Indian Ocean Region still remains at the heart of geo-politics with the three powers- India, China and the US, constantly engrossed in changing the contours of the contested arena. Different actors with different interests have time and again tried to exert dominance in the region. The challenge is colossal. What will define the rapidly changing dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region is still unknown. However, considering the intertwined relationship between the three powers, the future of this maritime hegemony seems likely to be determined by cooperation and coalition and not conflicts.
Authors:
Apurbaa Sengupta and Tanistha Bhagawati
Apurbaa Sengupta is currently in her final year of pursuing a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University. She holds a keen interest in research, primarily in the fields of Foreign Policy, International Relations, Neighbourhood Studies and Diplomacy.
Tanistha Bhagawati is currently in her final year of pursuing a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from the Department of International Relation, Jadavpur University. Her area of interest includes International Relations with an emphasis on international market and diplomacy.
[1] “World Oil Transport Chokepoints,” US Energy Information Administration
[2] Modified from Palma Robles 2014
[3]Haward, Marcus Bergin, Anthony from the report ‘Net Worth: Australia’s regional fisheries engagement’ -Australian Strategic Policy Institute copyright: March 1, 2016
[4]https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-ocean-becoming-new-focus-of-activity-after-south-china-sea-need-to-augment-security-defence-secretary/articleshow/75871269.cms
[5] Sharma, Rahul ‘First Nodule to first mine-site: development of deep-sea mineral resources from the Indian Ocean’ Current Science Association (Vol 99 No 6) 25th September 2010
[6]https://thediplomat.com/2011/03/why-the-indian-ocean-matters/
[7]https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html
[8] Jadesimi, Amy ‘How China’s $60 billion for Africa will drive Global prosperity’ Forbes March 14, 2017
[9] ‘Length of Indian Coastline’ Statista Statista http://www.statista.com/statista734258/lenght-of-coastline-by-state-India
[10] Sagarmala: Concepts and Objectives, Ministry of Shipping, Govt. of India http://sagarmala.gov.in/about-sagarmal/visions-objectives
[11] Hassan, Muhammad Abbas, ‘Growing India-China competition in the Indian Ocean: Implications for Pakistan’ Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2019
[12] MA Hassan ‘Modi’s Maritime Ambitions- Implications for Pakistan’ Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, June 14, 2018
[13]Mehmud, Majid ‘Growing Indonesia India Strategic Ties’ Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, June 7, 2018
[14] Panda, Jagannath ‘The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: An India-Japan arch in the making’ Focus Asia, no 21, August 2017
[15] United States presence in the Indian Ocean: Counter Strategy for China- Huma Amin, Modern Diplomacy
[16] D.S. Rajan, “China in the Indian Ocean: Competing Priorities”’ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Article- 4302, February 10, 2014.
[17]Vijay Sakhuja, China in the Indian Ocean: Deep Sea Forays, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
[18] Geraghty, Colin ‘India in the Indian Ocean Region: Re-calibrating U. S. Expectations’ American Security Project Oct 1, 2012