By Sher Bano
Amid persistent high tensions among major nuclear-armed nations, the states-parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are preparing for a challenging second preparatory committee meeting ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Akan Rakhmetullin, has been designated as the chair for this crucial gathering, scheduled to take place from July 22 to August 2 in Geneva. This meeting will review the implementation of the landmark 1968 NPT treaty and aim to develop a forward-looking action plan on its key components of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The NPT, with 191 states-parties, is a cornerstone of global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The preparatory meetings focus on making recommendations and advancing substantive debate on key subjects ahead of the review conferences, which serve as the main forum for assessing treaty performance and encouraging states-parties to fulfill their NPT-related obligations. After two consecutive failures to adopt substantive outcome documents by consensus at the last review conferences in 2015 and 2022, there is significant political pressure to ensure a successful outcome at the 2026 conference.
However, divisions among NPT states-parties have intensified, manifesting in various multilateral nuclear-related meetings. One major issue anticipated to dominate discussions at the preparatory committee meeting is the lack of dialogue between Russia and the United States, as well as China and the United States, on nuclear risk reduction and arms control. Both nations are accelerating efforts to strengthen their respective nuclear arsenals.
The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, emphasized the need for collaboration among all NPT parties to ensure consensus at the 2026 review conference. He highlighted that nuclear-weapon states must lead the way in accelerating the implementation of disarmament commitments made under the NPT. The Biden administration has prioritized preserving the authority and integrity of the NPT at the preparatory committee meeting, as stated by Adam Scheinman, the special U.S. representative for nonproliferation. The U.S. aims to advocate for a constructive agenda on nuclear disarmament, including support for bilateral dialogues with Russia and China, the long-overdue fissile material cutoff treaty, and greater transparency among parties.
Experts express concern about the ability of states-parties to fulfill their NPT obligations. The increasing mistrust and misperceptions among nuclear-weapon states fuel harmful action-reaction dynamics. If states-parties, who have been the custodians of the treaty, are unable to engage in direct dialogue, the prospect of a substantive outcome in 2026 remains uncertain. This highlights the potential role of bridge-building states and coalitions in facilitating progress.
Another significant issue expected to be discussed at the preparatory committee meeting is nuclear safety, particularly the security risks posed by Russia’s continued occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. Russia’s objection to language in the draft 10th NPT Review Conference document relating to Ukraine’s sovereign control of that facility led Moscow to block consensus on a final conference document in 2022. Nuclear sharing arrangements between the United States and its NATO allies, coupled with Russia’s forward deployment of some of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Belarus and recent exercises involving its battlefield nuclear weapons, are also likely to be contentious topics.
To address these and other divisions, Akan Rakhmetullin, the chair-designate for the 2024 NPT PrepCom, has held consultations with states-parties, experts, and civil society organizations. He noted that while all parties understand their differences on key issues, they diverge on how to overcome those differences. The outcome of the preparatory committee meeting will depend on the political will of participants and their readiness for compromise.
As the 2024 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting convenes in Geneva, states-parties face mounting pressure to advance the treaty’s implementation. Following the failure to reach consensus on outcome documents at the last two review conferences, a successful outcome has become a pressing necessity. Achieving this will require the NPT community to reimagine the review process, embracing more constructive approaches and exploring novel pathways to progress.
The challenges confronting the NPT regime have intensified, with Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, continued nuclear modernization across all nuclear-weapon states, and growing defense budgets. There is an escalating reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national security, particularly among nuclear-weapon states and their allies. With the impending expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia in February 2026, the next NPT Review Conference in the summer of 2026 may take place in a landscape devoid of arms control agreements.
Urgent action is required by NPT states-parties to address several areas where continued deterioration poses the most severe threats to the treaty regime. These include the intensifying mistrust and misperceptions among nuclear-weapon states, the failure to compartmentalize arms control and risk reduction from geopolitical tensions, the weakening commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the norm against nuclear testing, and the absence of effective crisis communication channels.
As cooperative approaches appear increasingly elusive, NPT states-parties must broaden their toolkit to meet the urgency of the moment. Demonstrating meaningful progress in the implementation of Article VI, which obligates nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament, can take various forms. This may involve shifting the mindset to recognize that success at the next Review Conference need not be defined solely by a consensus final document, although that should remain the ultimate goal. States should discuss and consider multiple options at the Preparatory Committee meeting, including a high-level political declaration reaffirming a shared commitment to the NPT’s core principles and a reinvigorated pursuit of all its objectives.
Diplomacy through joint voluntary commitments by individual states or groups could also contribute to progress. Specific joint voluntary commitments that could mitigate risks and manage crises include nuclear-weapon states reaffirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” committing to exercise restraint, and strengthening dialogue on crisis avoidance and management.
Given the serious consequences of a resumption of nuclear testing by an NPT member state, states-parties should enhance their commitment to upholding the norm against explosive testing. This may involve reaffirming the goal of prohibiting all nuclear tests as enshrined in the NPT, bilateral outreach encouraging states to uphold the norm, and introducing confidence-building measures such as increased transparency around test sites.
These risk reduction measures cannot substitute for concrete progress on Article VI and nuclear disarmament. Continuing “business as usual” threatens to render the review cycle, and consequently the NPT, dysfunctional. The problem is not a lack of ideas but a lack of political will. Nevertheless, this should not detract from the pursuit of unilateral options or actions by groups of like-minded states. The next two weeks in Geneva will be crucial in starting to untangle the deadlock that has plagued the review cycle for too long.