by Sibghatullah Ghaznawi
The Taliban’s successful overthrow of Ashraf Ghani’s government on August 15, 2021, marked a major shift in regional geopolitical dynamics. For Islamabad, the Taliban’s return was initially perceived as a strategic victory. Religious leaders, politicians, and media anchors in Pakistan openly celebrated, while then-Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) Faiz Hameed made a historic trip to Kabul, claiming that with the Afghan Taliban in power, “everything will be okay.” This reinforced the impression that Pakistan had regained its strategic depth in Afghanistan. On the other hand, for India, the Taliban’s return to power was considered the loss of a strategic foothold and the emergence of new security concerns, particularly given India’s USD $3 billion investment over two decades in Afghanistan’s development and military training programs. However, the last three and a half years have negated these early assessments, leading to much speculation about the Taliban’s strategic priorities and their regional objectives vis a vis India and Pakistan.
Taliban’s Surprising Break from Pakistan
Over the past three years, Pakistan has encountered a new reality in its relationship with the Taliban. The current state of their ties demonstrates that the Taliban have not moved past their grievances and grudges against Pakistan, nor have they forgotten the role of its military in the U.S.-led war on terror. The imprisonment of Taliban leaders in Pakistan and the killing of their Supreme leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, remain fresh in their minds, resurfacing in their annual victory speeches on August 15 every year. The autobiography My Life with the Taliban, written by former Taliban ambassador to Islamabad Abdul Salam Zaeef, is widely read among Taliban members, many of whom have memorized its graphic details of his arrest by the Pakistani military and subsequent handover to the United States.
In the last three and a half years, Pakistan has experienced a rise in security threats, with military targets being the primary focus. Reports indicate that attacks in Pakistan doubled in the first year of the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. More recently, the Global Terrorism Index 2025 ranked Pakistan second among 163 countries, highlighting a 45 percent rise in deaths from terrorist attacks over the past year, totaling 1,081 fatalities.
According to the index, the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is among the world’s four deadliest terrorist organizations. While the TTP carried out the highest number of attacks in 2024, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is responsible for 2025’s deadliest terrorist attack yet, hijacking a passenger train and claiming to have executed 50 Pakistani security personnel taken as hostages. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of harboring BLA militants, alleging that these fighters operate from Afghan territory in coordination with the (TTP) and under Kabul’s patronage.
Islamabad has repeatedly blamed Kabul for its growing insecurity, criticizing the Taliban’s failure to curb the activities of more than a dozen terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. The Taliban, in turn, have pointed fingers at “external agents” for orchestrating attacks such as the February 11 bombing in Kunduz. The phrase “external agents” has historically been used in Afghanistan as a euphemism for Pakistan’s ISI. Border clashes between the two countries have become routine, with both sides frequently exchanging fire and targeting each other’s security posts. Last year, tensions escalated further when Pakistan carried out an airstrike in Afghanistan, targeting TTP hideouts. The Taliban perceived this as a violation of Afghanistan’s territorial sovereignty and vowed to respond, maintaining that innocent women and children were killed in the attack, which they condemned as a “clear act of aggression.” India, however, sided with Kabul and condemned Pakistan’s actions, with the Indian foreign ministry spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, stating, “It is an old practice of Pakistan to blame its neighbors for its own internal failures.”
Islamabad has repeatedly blamed Kabul for its growing insecurity, criticizing the Taliban’s failure to curb the activities of more than a dozen terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. The Taliban, in turn, have pointed fingers at “external agents” for orchestrating attacks such as the February 11 bombing in Kunduz.
Amid the growing rift between Pakistan and Afghanistan, India has been reassessing and adjusting its diplomatic approach toward Kabul. In October 2023, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s embassy in Delhi shut down, in a move that, according to statements by former Afghan diplomats, was influenced by Taliban pressure. Following a January 2025 meeting between India’s foreign secretary and the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, the Taliban publicly referred to India as a “significant regional and economic power.”
Indian Regional Pragmatism and the Taliban
Maintaining open diplomatic channels serves both India and the Taliban. For India, a presence in Kabul ensures first-hand observation of any potential expansion of Chinese influence in Afghanistan. Additionally, New Delhi is wary of any potential security risk originating from Afghan soil. Another likely strategic consideration is the Chabahar Port, which India seems to have developed to bypass Pakistan’s Karachi port for trade with Central Asia. The shortest route from Chabahar to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan runs through Afghanistan, making sustained engagement with the Taliban a rational choice for India.
For the Taliban, relations with India carry both diplomatic and economic benefits. Engaging with New Delhi gives an impression of regional acceptability on the international stage while projecting stability and normalcy domestically. Economically, the Taliban seek to operationalize Chabahar to diversify Afghanistan’s trade routes, reducing dependency on Pakistan and mitigating the impact of Islamabad’s repeated closures of the Torkham and Chaman border crossings.
The Taliban’s growing interest in regional trade, particularly through Chabahar, aligns with India’s long-term economic ambitions. Additionally, the Taliban may look to India for diplomatic maneuvering to maintain the exempted status of Afghan trade through Chabahar from U.S. sanctions.
In addition, the Taliban likely view strengthening ties with India as a potential opportunity to improve their air defenses in the future. The regime’s acting Minister of Defense, Mullah Yaqoob, has repeatedly described Afghanistan’s airspace as “occupied”, citing the persistent presence of drones. In July 2023, senior Taliban leader Abas Stanikzai accused neighboring countries of violating Afghan airspace by sending drones. Meanwhile, the head of the logistics department at the Taliban’s Ministry of Defense has expressed interest in purchasing air defense systems from Russia. However, given the Taliban’s financial and technical constraints, acquiring and operating Russian systems seems unfeasible. In contrast, India’s recently developed Very Short Range Air Defense System (VSHORAD) could be a more viable option against the drone threats the Taliban face.
Taliban’s Nationalist Stance and the Pakistan Dilemma
Beyond recent history, there are other dynamics that shape the Taliban’s policies toward Pakistan. A key internal dynamic is their need to satisfy a vast base of foot soldiers and young madrassa graduates by maintaining a strong pro-jihadist stance. Simultaneously, key officials in the Taliban’s interim administration, like acting Minister of Defense Mujahid, son of the founder and late leader of the Taliban Mullah Omar, seek common ground with urban Afghan nationalists by adopting the language of “national interests” and “territorial integrity”—rhetoric historically associated with previous Afghan governments.
Another bone of contention between the two countries is the Durand Line. One of the core tenets of urban Afghan nationalism has been the rejection of the Durand Line as an international border with Pakistan. In December 2023, the Taliban’s acting Minister for Border and Tribal Affairs, Noorullah Noori, reiterated this stance during a televised visit to the Torkham crossing, stating, “We do not have a zero point with Pakistan; the Durand Line is a hypothetical line.”
Historically, Pakistan has leveraged border closures and the threat of forced repatriation of Afghan refugees to pressure previous Afghan governments. However, the past three years have shown that these tactics have little effect on the Taliban. Despite forcibly repatriating nearly one million Afghan refugees since 2023, Pakistan has failed to extract significant concessions from the Taliban. Plans to deport the remaining Afghan refugees in 2025 will likely further diminish Pakistan’s leverage while exacerbating tensions. Even if Pakistan abandons its pressure tactics, it is unlikely to deter the Taliban from deepening their engagement with India.
A Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
In the coming years, the Taliban will likely continue to deny any formal ties with the TTP while refraining from taking decisive action against the group on Pakistan’s behalf. Recent clashes at the Torkham crossing with Pakistan and its closure to trade have further strained relations, prompting the Taliban to adopt a more defiant stance. Further, the Taliban’s track record in the 1990s and their rigid position during the Doha negotiations with the United States suggest that they are unlikely to make concessions to Pakistan.
This further underscores for the Taliban the importance of maintaining diplomatic ties with India. Last December’s Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan likely intensified the Taliban’s urgency to acquire air defense systems as soon as possible. Strengthening ties for enhancing defense capabilities provides a religious justification to the Taliban leaders to engage with India without jeopardizing the trust of their lower ranks. Thus, any signal by India to discuss the sale of an air defense system would strategically bring the Taliban and India closer. However, this would be a leap for New Delhi, considering the Taliban’s attacks against Indian diplomats and civilians in Afghanistan before 2021, and there is currently no indication that something of this nature is being considered.
Any signal by India to discuss the sale of an air defense system would strategically bring the Taliban and India closer. However, this would be a leap for New Delhi, considering the Taliban’s attacks against Indian diplomats and civilians in Afghanistan before 2021, and there is currently no indication that something of this nature is being considered.
On the other hand, India’s status as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other major human rights conventions, along with its bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, discourages it from fully recognizing the Taliban regime. However, it is already taking some steps to strengthen diplomatic ties with the Taliban.
In this emerging reality, Pakistan faces a critical decision—whether to reassess its approach and engage with the Taliban on more equal terms or risk further alienation as Afghanistan’s new rulers forge alternative regional alliances and continue to support proxies in Pakistan.
Beyond India and Pakistan, the Taliban also seek stronger ties with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations, offering security assurances for their trade routes. These evolving dynamics underscore a significant shift: Pakistan’s once-dominant influence over the Taliban is waning, while India and other regional actors are strategically positioning themselves to fill the vacuum.
The article appeared in the southasianvoices