by Mian Hameed 4 June 2020
To summarize part I: The crux of the conflict has risen from India abrogating article 370 by claiming J&K and Ladakh as Indian Union territories. Furthermore, in The Hindu newspaper, as of May 14, 2020, India’s Foreign Ministry reminded China of India’s claim over Gilgit-Baltistan—a vital CPEC interest and Pakistan controlled area.
There are opinions that China’s current incursion into ‘India’ is a tactical play of President Xi to divert attention from internal problems and is tied to “COVID-19 induced surge in economic distress,” which are all childish. The Chinese incursion into Ladakh is certainly timely to forestall the Indian option of accessing Gilgit.
Part II deals with the scrutiny of the legal aspect of China’s action in the disputed area and the historic interpretations of China from the ideological psyche of Prime Minister P. J. Nehru, which I claim have contributed to the handling of the crisis. Nehru’s psyche is a kin to the Hindutva psyche, and carries the same old defect which will plague the future Sino-Indo agreements.
Before I submit my arguments in support of part II and discuss the implications of Nehru’s psyche to peace, I find it timely to share the nuances of the U.S. –India strategic relationship and because of high stakes, world peace, I must submit a candid discussion. Before Modi came into power, the “Politicians and the media in both India and the United States began to speak of the two countries as “natural partners.” Source: Ainslie T. Embree, “Why It’s Important to Know About India.”
The two countries sharing certain similar foreign policy objectives is an aspect of natural partners, but otherwise, there is no comparison between America and India in terms of American values of business, the American way of life, and the American way of standing up for justice. The protest in the United States over George Floyd’s death is a remarkable show of character towards attempting to fix the justice system for all Vs. India’s unfortunate street beating and killing of humans under the watch of Modi and the Indian security forces speak to the streak of the “Hindu nation” philosophy. Therefore, the implications to world peace from the U.S. alignment with India in foreign policy are enormous.
Understanding India is very important for world peace. India is the same country of the past, where Aisnslie Ambree, some fifty years ago, taught India to his students “apologetically,” when “The U.S. government, military, business world, media, and even academia”lacked interest in learning about India. Against that lack of interest, Ambree wrote, he “would have argued that because of the greatness of its contributions to civilization in art, literature, history, and religion, India was worthy of sustained attention. That is still true, but changed relations between India and the United States have added a different dimension to the need for knowledge about the nature of Indian society.”
In such polite, gratuitous interpretations of India, there is an embedded message here from the wise, Ambree. It is surely in our own interest to unfold the Indian society for evaluating the prospects of peace, taking into consideration a U.S. promise.
The promise of President Bush was to “Help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century.”–Embree. This once hard to think of promise between the two nations has a startling feature. The feature is a “promise to supply India with nuclear technology, defying not only the NPT, which India has not signed, but also [the] U.S. law, which forbids the exportation of such technology.” This relationship has happened because according to Ambree, Washington and India would not admit, but are for making superior weapons. Source: “Voices: A conversation with Aisnslie Embree.” University of CA in Santa Barbara.
From the virtues of electing Modi, India has topped the dangerous charts. Thomas Reuters’ research found India has leaped into topping the chart for being the most dangerous place to be a woman. Additionally, the Indian society has become dangerous for the Christians and Muslims of the region.
Dangers in India do not come only from xenophobia or the horrors of a caste system. Dangers lie ahead for those that criticize the State. In the June 01, 2020 issue of the Washington Post, a piece written by Jason Rezaian addressed the dangers from “Modi’s war on journalists.” Rezaian describes India as “the most dangerous place to be a journalist.”
Modi’s fascism, aided by India’s hyper-nationalism, has dangerously contaminated the political environment. The former army chief and parliamentarian, Shankar Roychowdhury, in an OP ED “The perils of hyper-nationalism” from 2017 in the Deccan Chronicle, noted risks to India’s security. The Indian hyper-nationalism in fact carries threatening challenges to world peace. The year 2017 made it a nostalgic OP ED.
The lid on violence in India after the partition in 1947 was capped by the Indian Congress Party because RSS as a terrorist group was banned twice “(in 1948-1949 and in 1975-1977)” from participating in politics. Eventually, Modi’s party with RSS affiliation was able to rejoin the mainstream politics. Their political strength in India has magnified crisis in India’s democracy and has endangered world peace.
With the aforementioned preamble to understanding the risks from India, I unfold the thesis statement. Among the Sino-Indo agreements, the “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas” signed on September 07, 1993; Section 1 states,
“The two sides are of the view that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations.”
By abrogating Article 370, Modi’s government made J&K and the Ladakh area an Indian Union territory, which is a violation of the Peace and Tranquility agreement and has violated the spirits of “peaceful and friendly consultations” guidance.
Section 2 of the agreement has guidance for reducing military forces in areas along LAC, which also helps with confidence building, and states,
“Each side will keep its military forces in the areas along the line of actual control to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relation between the two countries.”
However, India has created an opposite situation in Ladakh—military buildup in DBO town supported by a strategic DBO road to provide logistics support to the military base. This threatens China and Pakistan.
In the agreement of November 29, 1996, between the two nations, which speaks to the “Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along The Line of Actual Control…,” both countries can terminate this agreement, and if they have, I presume the spirits of this agreement would remain a guiding principle to keep peace and tranquility in the region. Among the articles of this agreement, Article I and Article II stipulate,
“Neither side shall use its military against the other side… or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquility and stability in the India-China border areas. ” [And in Article II,] The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question.”
Both the countries have shown maturity in respecting the peace and tranquility aspect of these agreements from the perspective of not resorting to firing shots at each other, but to the global audience, the language of the border dispute, “mutually acceptable settlement,” brings into question Modi’s decision of abrogating article 370. Since India finds border disputes as her internal matter, violations in agreements may see military posturing to accommodate diplomacy in support of securing one’s rights.
Understanding Nehru means developing an understanding of the Indian psyche, the challenges this psyche may bring to the Sino-Indo diplomacy dialog, and assuming turbulence among the many more agreements that may follow is plausible.
Nehru’s judgments suffered from the shortfalls of his psyche. The Nehru psyche, or the Indian psyche, has been a problem in resolving the border disputes between India and Pakistan and Sino-Indo. The main reason is the Hindu ambition, the “Hindu kern is to conquer.”
It was Nehru’s misinterpretation of the Chinese psyche that overshadowed a bond between China and India that dates back thousands of years. Nehru misinterpreted China’s psyche in 1950 from his contradictions that manifested in his psyche from the “Hindu kern is to conquer,” which brought China’s aspirations to Nehru’s focus. Nehru’s thinking and emotions spoke to the Chinese issue, and he isolated India’s border problem to the Chinese reasons and Chinese national character. –Hoffmann. Nehru did not look into his own backyard to understand the Chinese issue.
In Steven Hoffmann’s book, India and the China Crisis, quotes Nehru, which I use to show that Nehru drew a silhouette of China from protruding his-self, which is the cause of misinterpreting China.
Nehru once wrote, after China took over Tibet,
“Chinese psychology, with its background of prolonged suffering, struggle against Japan, and successful communist revolution, is an understandable mixture of bitterness, elation, and vaunting confidence to which the traditional xenophobia and present day isolation from outside contacts have added fear and suspicions of motives of other powers. For inducing a more balanced and cooperative mentality in Peking, it is essential to understand those psychological factors.”
The aforementioned explanation of China can be framed for Nehru and the Indian national character by replacing Japan with the Muslim and the British rule. The Indian psyche is influenced by the same background of mental ‘suffering’ from the Muslims and the British occupation—the bitterness, elation, and vaunting confidence. Hindus in 1947 rose from the ashes of a centuries old devastation of ego.
Hindu hyper-ambition from devastation lends to an uncooperative mentality. The hyper-ambition has created “The Hindu kern is to conquer,” ambition, and it is not the bitterness that has added fear of other powers. The land grab and contradictions come from the kern, while the fear comes from not fulfilling the ambition.
Nehru “Keenly knew” the future of South Asia depended on friendship and peace. It was Nehru’s psyche that overshadowed the long ties of friendship by contradicting his own beliefs about Tibet. Nehru’s “bedrock belief about Tibet was that it was part of China,” but failing to nurture friendship was assisted by Nehru’s fears, “magnified by an aggressive political philosophy” of a leader in China who waged a successful war.
Although Nehru had his “bedrock belief,”perhaps from his fear and his contradictions he desired Tibet to “be allowed as much autonomy as possible. [Even though] India had formally recognized China’s rights in Tibet…”
If Nehru had a bedrock belief that Tibet was a part of China, when news of Tibetan revolt was received on March 15, 1959 by the Nehru government, India would have fared better to improve on her policy statement on Tibet. Hoffmann claims India was undecided on Tibetan policy and based her broader policy on three factors. Grouping these three factors was illogical. India stated she had “deep sympathy for Tibet…nothing will be said or done that endangers the friendly relations […] for the peace of Asia and the world.” The illogic and confrontation nature in India came from the remaining two factors, “the preservation of the security and integrity of India,” and “Our desire to maintain friendly relationship with China.” –Hoffmann. Meeting these two objectives is questionable if India had deep sympathies for Tibet.
The Indian State’s security and concern for friendship was undermined even if India did not intend to interfere in Tibet. The latter part of the first statement, “nothing will be said,” had contradicted the former “deep sympathy for Tibet.” By saying “deep sympathy,” India actually said something offensive, which she claimed will not do. Regarding not doing anything, Nehru traveled to meet the Dalai Lama and this meeting was not appreciated by China.
Nehru with his convictions and China’s conviction that émigré allowed by India played a major role in the Tibetan revolt strained the prospects of peace. Their convictions also allowed China to explain Tibet “without fault or failure” of China.
China suspected India encouraged the Tibetan rebels. It infuriated China and in the May 16, 1959 meeting, China’s Ambassador Pan Tzu-Li delivered his note to Foreign Secretary Dutt. It was an abrasive note and reminded India of the future friendship of “ten thousand years” to come. Pan had penciled language, “Our India friends! What is your mind? The note mentioned the possibility of India facing hostilities on two fronts, “It seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts.”
Nonetheless, the roots of fear prompted Nehru to support the Dalai Lama. “Chinese claim that Tibetan revolt was caused by upper-class reactionaries assisted from across the border and supervised from the Indian border town Kalimpong.” –Hoffmann.
Nehru further goes into a psychological evaluation of China after a serious border incident, and per Hoffmann, Nehru reluctantly adopted cumulative beliefs concerning “Chinese motives for having initiated border conflict,” and Nehru wrote,
a) An arrogant China with feelings of superiority.
b) “China was a revolutionary and unsatisfied power, in an aggressive mood.”
c) China is an expansionist state when strong internally.
d) Sino-centrism and nationalism influenced policy from a version of Communist ideology towards India.
e) Chinese were paranoid and were not interested in border settlement that India could accept.
Nehru’s aforementioned image of China came from the strength of his “deep-seated emotion” that China would harm India. –Hoffmann. In my view, the manifestation of motives that Nehru underlined for China was a mirror representation of Nehru’s own psyche. China’s expansionism conflicted with Nehru’s expansionism and is evident in conniving with Lord Mountbatten and influenced the 1947 Radcliffe Boundary Commission award.
Nehru’s emotion and psyche damaged the long bond of friendship with China and started bad blood between the two newly created countries, India and Pakistan, by breaking numerous promises made in telegrams, letters and statements given on the radio in which Nehru said the accession of Kashmir will be per the wishes of Kashmiri people, and the Pakistani sentiments—to correct a wrong committed in the first place from Hindu ambitions.
Whether one views India’s border disputes from the vestiges of Nehru’s contradictions in personality in an overarching view point influenced by the “Hindu kern is to conquer,” or we address this kern in a contemporary limelight through the vestiges of Hindutva, the RSS or Modi’s ideological beliefs, the matter of future agreements between India with China over the border disputes will not have good intent or good will because there is a track of history in place that will tell us China has no choice, but to use force in the current border dispute.
The litmus test to the use of force remains a fact due to the inhibitions of the Indians in the way of settling territorial disputes. I will explain it through China settling territorial disputes: Professor John J. Mearsheimer references Taylor Fravel, in which he says, since 1949, “China has settled seventeen out of twenty-three—in good part because it has been willing to make some significant concessions to the other side.” An example of concessions or willingness to work with settling disputes is between China and Pakistan in 1963, but the Chinese concession formula has failed to work in Aksai Chin, Ladakh, and Arunachal Pradesh in the Sino-Indo dispute.