Image credit: Youtubeby Adnan Qaiser 28 March 2023
Communist theorist and Bolshevik revolutionary Leon Trotsky had once noted: “You may not be interested in war, but war [remains] interested in you.”
In a surprising diplomatic coup on March 10, 2023, China stunned the world by brokering a peace deal between Islam’s two patriarchs: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.[1] While the bonhomie has driven the world ecstatic, the Muslim world, in particular, has taken a sigh of relief. Carrying a long history of acrimonious relations, it has been the hapless Muslims bearing the brunt of sectarianism and proxy wars at the hands of these two giants of Islamic faith. It is time to see a peaceful Middle East; or is the celebration too early?
The question is, whether the leaders of these two opposing sects – carrying diverse geopolitical outlook, rigid and distinct faith rituals and hegemonic ambitions to lead the Muslim world – can ever live amicably together.
My initial impression of the Saudi-Iranian deal is that Iran has tried to: (i) gain a diplomatic life-line against regional and global isolation; (ii) woo the goodwill of Gulf countries to ease the burden of economic sanctions; (iii) safeguard itself from any attack at its nuclear installations crossing over Saudi airspace; and (iv) buy time to reach nuclear weapon building threshold.[2]
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has played a diplomatic masterstroke, achieving two major objectives: First, the Saudis snubbed President Biden’s administration, which had been pressurizing the Kingdom to recognize the state of Israel, without offering in return: (i) a Saudi desired civilian nuclear program; (ii) security guarantees similar to those extended to NATO countries, Japan and South Korea; and (iii) hassle free provision of advance weaponry and technology. Secondly, having been bitten by the Iranian proxies twice – once by a swarm drone attack at Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in September 2019 and second at Aramco refinery in Riyadh in March 2022 – the Saudis ensured the Kingdom’s safety from any ugly fallout from an expected aerial strike at Iranian nuclear sites, for which the U.S. and Israel seem almost prepared with joint military exercises already conducted.
In my August 2022’s paper titled The Iranian Nuclear Bomb, I had quoted former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s sombre remark when he retorted at the suggestion of an Israeli air attack at Iran’s nuclear installations by saying, “Who would clean the mess, the next day?”[3]
Thus, in all likelihood, the Saudi-Iran detente remains a marriage of convenience and geopolitical exigencies, rather than a Catholic, “till death do us part.”
The Islamic Faith’s Feuds Within
Seeing the past disposition of these two heavyweight champions of the Islamic faith, it is sometimes hard to decide, whether the world of Islam should fear its enemies – or itself, more.
First of all, the fourteen hundred year old “political conflict” – for the succession and leadership of the Muslims after the death of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) – has fissured and haunted the Islamic faith perpetually in the shape of Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict.[4]
Secondly, as I had postulated in my paper in spring 2017, Radical Islamism: Understanding Extremist Narrative and Mindset, all Middle East’s ills lie in its oppressive monarchies and autocratic regimes.[5] Saudi Arabia has long enjoyed U.S. patronage, which helped it in establishing its monopoly over the Islamic faith and hegemony over the Muslim countries. Awash with petro-dollars, and being the custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia has always imposed its supremacy over the Islamic world. However, its propagation of hardline Wahhabi-sect doctrine has not only created intra-faith feuds, but also gave birth to Salafist terror-groups like al-Qaeda (and its several offshoots) and Daesh (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria).
In his talk at the Council on Foreign Relations in January 2016, U.S. Senator Chris Murphy shared “some very uncomfortable truths about the imperfections” about America’s “most important ally in the Middle East.” Without mincing words, the Senator blamed Saudi Arabia for having “funnelled over US$100 billion into funding mosques and madrassas … from Pakistan to Kosovo [and] from Nigeria to Indonesia teaching an intolerant version of Islam that leads very nicely into an anti-Shia, anti-Western militancy to hundreds of millions of young people with the mission of spreading puritanical Wahhabism … the only sect of Islam that can be perverted into violence.” Murphy also castigated “Iranian Shia clerics for also using religion in order to export violence into Syria, and Iraq, and Lebanon.”[6]
A Nuclear Middle East
Saudi Arabia not only remains jittery about its regional dominance but also stays preoccupied with its pre-eminence in the Muslim world for which the Kingdom has now chosen to go nuclear. As feared by me in my above-quoted paper, an Iranian nuclear bomb has already unleashed a nuclear race in the Persian Gulf region.
Citing the example of India and Pakistan – the two archrivals becoming nuclear powers simultaneously in May 1998 – Saudis have often hinted achieving nuclear weapon capability to match an Iranian nuclear threat. In an on-stage interview at the World Policy Conference in Abu Dhabi, Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud had categorically stated: “If Iran gets an operational nuclear weapon, all bets are off.”
In its report in June 2014, the UN Commission on Syria had feared, “A regional war in the Middle East draws ever closer.”[7] Participating in the 20-nation military manoeuvres named Thunder of the North, Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ally, Pakistan, has repeatedly declared that any threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia will “evoke its strong response.” Said to have financed Pakistan’s nuclear program, BBC has already reported availability of “off-the-shelf” Pakistani nuclear weapons to the Saudi Kingdom.[8]
President Obama’s controversial legacy of signing a nuclear deal with Iran – though under UN auspices – had further brought much consternation to the House of Saud. Riyadh’s plan to invest nearly US$20 billion in a nuclear-armed – but failing[9] – Pakistan most probably comes from transfer of nuclear know-how for Saudi Arabia’s two (out of a total of 16 planned) nuclear reactors at King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology.
Since Iran can never even think of bombing the holy land of Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia does not face any existential threat to its security. However, a nuclear power status not only brings the Kingdom at par with the Shiite Iran but also adds “prestige” to the House of Saud – further exalting its pre-eminence globally.
Saudi Trepidations
The shifting geopolitical sands have meanwhile made the House of Saud run out of American favour. Partly due to the reckless approach of the new heirs to the throne and partly owing to the U.S. fatigue in Iraq and Afghanistan wars. However, since nature abhors vacuum, Saudi rulers swiftly aligned with the new centers of global power and began offering their goods and services to their new benefactors.
The Kingdom’s heightened anxieties can be attributed to many a factor:
1) First of all, the U.S.’ discovery of its own shale gas reserves and alternate fuel and energy resources reduced its geopolitical dependence on Saudi Arabia significantly;
2) With a younger and more precipitous leadership – said to having some dark sides and having little or no experience in statecraft – taking reins of the Kingdom, Saudi allies as well as its adversaries find it hard to deal with the new heirs to the throne;
3) The acute repression and brute force employed by the monarchy to crush the Arab Spring uprising in 2011 further caused revulsion in the civilized world on severe human rights violations;[10]
4) The Kingdom’s imprudent military intervention in Yemen in 2014 to salvage President Mansour Hadi’s government from Houthi Shias further caused humanitarian crisis at a massive scale. As saner voices from the UN and Western world calling to end the carnage fell on deaf ears, loathsome feelings aroused around the globe;
5) Saudi support to the Syrian rebels against President Bashar al-Assad – to the extent of offering to send its ground forces in Syria ostensibly to fight against Daesh – not only widened the scope and stretch of the conflict but also turned it more violent;
6) The Saudi-Qatar diplomatic spat of 2017 (discussed below) led to ugly optics causing fissures and ill will among the Gulf countries. Doha’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy, which included having close ties with Ankara and Tehran, was viewed as Saudi insubordination;
7) The formation of a 41-nation Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) in December 2015 was not only taken as a “Sunni alliance” against the threat of a Shiite Iran but also amounted to sanctioning sectarianism and bloodshed among Islam’s fellow believers;
8) President Obama’s pull back further caused extreme disquiet to the Saudi rulers. However, besides half-heartedly supporting the “Arab Spring” uprising and its preoccupation with a nuclear deal with Iran, the U.S. administration remained worried about Saudi support to the Syrian rebels going awry. It was the same time-period (2013-14) when Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh took deeper roots;
9) Lastly, the release of 28 classified pages of 9/11 commission report certifying official Saudi links with the terror incident further unnerved the House of Saud. The mysterious deaths of three Saudi princes in just one week in July 2002 could have some connection with the 9/11.
In the backdrop of America’s misadventurous Iraq War in 2003, highlighting the “snatch of ‘true’ Islam [in Iraq] and delivered to ‘heretical’ Shias,” Vali Nasr recounts in his book The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future that in September 2005 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal chided the Americans: “[W]e fought a war together to keep Iran out of Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason.”[11]
The Iranian Survival Guide
After the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979,[12] Saudi Arabia not only brought the Gulf countries under its tutelage but also supported the Ba’thist regime of Saddam Hussein in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War – thereby diminishing both military powers. Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini might have had ambitions to export his theocratic Velayet-e-Faqih (Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists) to the Middle East. However, as emerged after the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi Shias under the leadership of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani preferred to choose parliamentary democracy in 2005.[13] Likewise, Shiite communities in the region continued to follow their own practices rather than adopt Iran’s “Twelver Imam” belief.
Despite having been outcast by the Western world as a pariah regime for its human rights violations and nuclear program, the shrewd Iranian theocracy emerged as a winner.
1) First, Iran successfully managed to extract a nuclear deal from the U.S. led P5 + EU in July 2015, duly reserving its technological right to uranium enrichment, which could one day be used for building a nuclear device. A weathered President Obama finding himself knee-deep in the Afghan War quagmire besides having had enough of Iraq War’s hangovers found no other way but to bind Iran in some kind of an agreement to delay its nuclear breakout point. Unsurprisingly, while President Trump rubbished the Iran nuclear deal as “horrible,” President Biden too could never muster up courage to revive the “dead deal;”
2) Secondly, since Iran’s Weltanschauung takes the conflicts away from its geographic borders, Tehran has always adopted a strategy of employing proxies – or non-state actors – to advance its defence and foreign policy objectives.[14] Since after the drubbing in Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the Western powers dared not send their boots on ground again in Iraq to fight out al-Qaeda and Daesh, a Shiite Iran’s proxy militia forces played a critical role in exterminating the Sunni terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria. This is another matter how these unruly groups such as Badr Brigade, Kataib Hezbollah, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and several others later started interfering into the Iraqi politics and became a source of continued regional destabilization. However, Iran’s successes against Daesh in Iraq not only won Tehran global accolades but also helped the Iranian regime to consolidate its hold over Gulf countries and the larger Middle East;
3) While Lebanese militant Hezbollah’s proxy links with Tehran are no secret, the Syrian civil war further allowed Iran to establish its strong military presence in Damascus by sending its Revolutionary Guards advisors. Supporting the battered government of President Bashar al-Assad, Iran defeated the Saudi-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) through its Fatemiyoun Brigade (comprising of Afghan mercenaries) and Zainabiyoun Brigade (made of Pakistani enlists);
4) Iran further contained Saudi Arabia through a “Shiite crescent” that starts from Turkic Shias of Azerbaijan, Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Saudi Arabia’s Shaykhis Shias, Iraqi Twelver Shias, Bahrain’s Akhbari Shias and Yemen’s Zaidi Shias;
5) Lastly, Tehran chinked the Saudi-Pakistan armour. The puppet parliament of an obligated (nuclear-armed) Pakistan – a country of some 220 million Muslims long survived on Saudi handouts and financial bailouts – for the first time in history refused to join the Saudi war in Yemen. Islamabad further stunned Riyadh when it declined to send Pakistani troops to join the 41-nation Saudi alliance against terrorism, fearing Shia-Sunni fallout. Finally, annoying the House of Saud, neither Pakistan took any sides in the Saudi-Iran hostilities after the execution of Shia scholar Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in 2016 followed by revenge burning down of Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad; nor at the time of Qatar’s blockade in 2017.
Under backbreaking U.S. economic sanctions, Tehran not only fraternized with Europe offering lucrative economic incentives, oil and gas, but also firmly sided with Russia and China in a new cold war, a new great game or a great power competition.[15] Signing a strategic military cooperation pact with Russia, a trade deal with Italy worth €7 billion, a US$600 billion commercial contract and a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China, Iran successfully survived to fight another day.
Saudi Export of Wahhabism and Sectarianism
Being the custodian of Muslims’ holy sites in Mecca and Medina, the House of Saud shoulders the heavy responsibility of holding the world’s 1.9 billion Muslims together. However, since the Kingdom’s leadership came into the hands of a younger, impulsive and headstrong crown prince, untrained in statecraft, the House of Saud’s popularity and reverence has been sliding down in the Muslim world.[16]
In this age of political awareness and social media exposure Muslims have begun to feel antagonistic towards Saudi Arabia due to the lavish lifestyle of Saudi princes; the shabby treatment of pilgrims and frequent stampedes due to poor Hajj arrangements; discrimination and denial of rights to women; oppression of Shiites in its eastern province; failing to forcefully raise the Palestinian issue on world-stage: cornering Muslim Brotherhood; interfering in regional countries (especially Iraq and Lebanon); and rendering the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Arab League toothless enterprises.
The two biggest disservices to the religion that escaped the world radar for long had been Saudi incitement of Shia-Sunni sectarianism and its aggressive propagation of Imam Hanbal’s rigid interpretation of Islam as Wahhabism. As noted by Senator Chris Murphy above, the generous Saudi funding of religious political parties, mosques, madrassas (religious seminaries) and Islamic universities throughout the Islamic world not only inflamed a Shiite hatred but also produced Salafist radicals.
According to a 2012’s PEW survey in some 39 Muslim countries, “at least 40% of Sunnis do not recognize Shias as fellow Muslims.”[17]
In his scholarship Sectarian War: Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East, Khaled Ahmed highlights the role of Saudi charity Rabita al-Alam al-Islami and Medina University in promoting Wahhabism worldwide.[18] Wahhabism not only distorted the largely followed Sunni practices but also led to a wider chasm between its Deobandi and Barelvi sub-sects.
As documented by Muhammad Amir Rana in his comprehensive study on Pakistan’s jihadist and sectarian landscape in his book A To Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, the country remains a sectarian battleground with no less than 148 Shia-Sunni outfits carrying out the bidding of their Middle Eastern patrons and financers.[19] A Saudi beholden Pakistan, meanwhile, has gone a notch further in sectarian killings when the hardline Deobandis started targeting the mystic and docile Brelvis, bombing their spiritual Sufi (saints) shrines.
The Kingdom had found an opening in the shape of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union during the 1980s to cover-up its insecurities from the Iranian revolution. The Saudis used Pakistan as a proxy battleground for instigating Shia-Sunni feud.[20] Khalid Ahmed further documents in his abovementioned book that after having a “bad meeting with Khomeini” in 1984, Pakistan’s military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq – carrying the infamy of ruthlessly crushing a Palestinian uprising during 1970’s Black September in Jordan[21] – created several anti-Shia militant outfits in 1985 under state policy.
Mushrooming into a total of eighty-two violent militant groups with thirty-eight actively engaged in sectarian war, Shias in Pakistan have since been regularly targeted and killed under the 1986’s Fatwas (religious edicts) of Deoband seminaries – sanctioning Shias’ Takfir (apostatization/killing) for being Rafidah (rejecters of Islamic faith). Frontrunner militant organizations, in this regard, are Sipah-e-Sahaba (name changed to Ahle-Sunnat Wal Jamaat after being banned under international pressure), Lashkar-e-Jhangavi, and Jundullah.[22]
According to 2015’s report by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan saw a total of 220 sectarian attacks in the country killing 687 innocent people and injuring 1,319 others.[23]
Having gone bigger than its boots, while Lashkar-e-Jhangavi’s 14-member leadership had been eliminated in a police shootout on July 29, 2015, Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment continue to be viewed as protecting, propagating and metamorphosing these anti-Shia groups as state policy.[24]
In their book Spy Stories: Inside the Secret World of the R.A.W. and the I.S.I, authors Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark quote the “recollections” of a general from Pakistan’s premier Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), directing anti-Shia Sunni rebels belonging to Jundullah towards “heating up” the Iranian border. The authors document, “… the I.S.I. general’s recollections were backed by two other senior executive officers, one of whom, a D.D.G., maintained: “We had been active on the Iran border for four years, as had the C.I.A., so it was a case of reheating relationships between us and cells of minority Sunni rebels fighting the Iranian Shia security forces.” The rebels belonged to Iranian Jundullah, the Soldiers of God, an outfit that had strong links to the outfit of the same name in Pakistan, that I.S.I. enabled to pressurize Shias in Karachi.”[25]
While the US State Department’s Country Report on Terrorism 2013 had noted, “Terrorist violence in 2013 was fuelled by sectarian motivations, marking a worrisome trend;”[26] two reports by European Parliament’s Directorate General for External Policies titled Salafist/Wahhabite Financial Support to Educational, Social and Religious Institutions[27] and The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World documented Middle Eastern Wahhabi and Salafi financers “supporting and supplying arms all over the globe.” The reports frighteningly claimed that “no country in the Muslim world is safe from their operations … as they always aim to terrorise their opponents and arouse the admiration of their supporters.”[28]
Radical Islamic Terrorism
As I had noted in my 14-part YouTube presentation on “Islamic Radicalism”,[29] – as well as in my two papers on Islamic terrorism titled Radical Islamism: Understanding Extremist Narrative and Mindset and Islamic Radicalism: The Curse of Boko Haram’s Religious Terrorism[30] – the biggest beneficiary of the Middle East’s power rivalries and sectarianism have been the radical Islamist terror groups.
Despite repeated claims of decapitating the top leadership of al-Qaeda and Daesh (Islamic State), no less than thirty-four allied terror groups keep threatening world peace and security, such as: (1) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen; (2) al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Mali and Mauritania; (3) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in Pakistan and Afghanistan; (4) Jabhat-al-Nusra Li Ahl al-Sham (al-Nusra Front) in Syria; (5) Harkat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia; (6) Boko Haram in Nigeria; and at least 23 smaller groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan including (7) Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K); (8) Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); (9) Jamaat-ul-Ahraar; (10) Lashkar-e-Khorasan; (11) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); and (12) East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
Indoctrinated into the extreme philosophy of Abu Bakr Naji’s Edarat ul Wahash (Governance in Wilderness through Management of Savagery) these modern-day Salafists follow seventh century’s Khwaraji ideological practices of: (i) Khuruj (revolt against deviant Muslim rulers); (ii) Takfir (apostatization/killing of heretics); and (iii) turning Ibn-ul-Balad, the sons of soil into blood brothers (recruitment).
These radical terrorists target their “near enemy” (Muslim societies) under the commandment of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and “far enemy” (Imperial/Western powers) under Dr. Aimal al-Zawahiri’s proselytization. By making selective use of Quar’anic injunctions, these extremists aim to: (i) institute puritanical Islam; (ii) establish a global Muslim caliphate; (iii) obtain political power through terror; and (iv) amass money through organized crime under the name of Islamic ideology.
It is hard to forget that not only Osama bin Laden but 15 out of 19 hijackers who had perpetrated the heart-wrenching 9/11 attacks under the banner of al-Qaeda were Saudi nationals.
Intra-Wahhab Squabble – Saudi-Qatar Conflict
Being devout adherents and proponents of Wahhabism the House of Saud and Qatari monarchy claim to be the sole heirs of Muhammad ibn-Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92). Such wrangling on their lineage led Saudi Arabia to protest against naming of Doha’s state mosque on their patriarch.
The befuddling Saudi-Qatar dispute from June 2017 to January 2021 had been another personality driven animus of the Saudi Crown Prince – demanding unquestioned obedience from his satellite state in the Gulf. Besides being guilty of standing up tall in the Middle East, Doha’s greater offense was the prediction by former Qatari prime minister Hamad-bin-Jassim about Saudi Arabia “disintegrating into smaller states and getting wiped-out from the face of the world in 12 years” in a leaked 2003’s recording that came to light in 2014.
The accusations levelled by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) cohorts against Qatar were no less than preposterous – compelling the U.S. to interject and counsel reason. Disregarding a moderate and forward looking Qatar’s positive regional and global contributions, the GCC broke all diplomatic relations with Doha in a knee-jerk reaction, terror-sanctioning 12 Qatari organizations and 59 other people. Left with no choice, Doha had to reject GCC’s 13 demands.
Besides housing U.S. CENTCOM, Qatar – in 2017 – was eying to host FIFA-2022 – an event whose successful culmination brought great laurels and acclaim to the small Gulf state. It had been Doha negotiations, which had facilitated a UN brokered ceasefire in Israel-Hezbollah 34-day war in 2006. Moreover, a “Doha agreement” had ended an 18-month long political crisis in Lebanon in May 2008. Finally, Qatar, which had opened a Taliban’s political office in Doha since 2013 helped in ending the longest war in American history by facilitating a U.S.-Taliban peace-deal in February 2020.
While Türkiye, Kuwait, Oman, Morocco and Tunisia had wisely stayed out of the affray, Egypt, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates toed the Saudi line; first, to suppress the remnants of Arab Spring popular uprising and second, to counter the growing Shiite and Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in their countries. Libya, Maldives and Mauritania, siding with Saudi Arabia, added numbers but carried no weight in the dispute.
The real problem for Riyadh had been Doha’s observance of an independent – and balanced – foreign policy, especially its growing ties with Ankara and Tehran – both viewed as challenging Saudi supremacy. A further source of irritation was Qatar’s support to Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood – both Saudi bête noire. Saudi denunciation of Hamas comes from: (i) Hamas’s militancy as an Iranian proxy; (ii) House of Saud’s condemnation for providing lip service to the Palestinian cause of statehood; and (iii) Saudi placation of Israel to avoid hostility. Notwithstanding its past practices of violence, a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, generally stands up for a “democratic political Islam” – though in turn inviting Saudi disapprobation for condemning oppressive monarchies and autocracies in the Middle East.
Learning to live with “al-Walad” – The new Saudi Crown Prince
It is ironic that when reporting 1,310 deaths due to cholera epidemic, the UN was warning of a famine in Yemen, the Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammad-bin-Salman – popularly known as MbS – had been elevating himself in the House of Saud’s succession ladder in June 2017.
MbS’s sudden and unexpected entry into power is said to be through a “palace coup.” However, the unceremonious dethroning of former crown prince, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, doesn’t come without invoking the perils of internal resentment. A seasoned Prince Nayef who has been respected worldwide had deservedly won international acclaim for his successful counterterrorism operations, eliminating al-Qaeda from the country. Palace intrigues and conspiracies must never be lost sight of when it comes to House of Saud; the iconic King Faisal had been assassinated by none other than his own nephew on March 25, 1975. Security concerns have already led MbS to take refuge and go into hiding in September 2018, as reported.
Saudi condemnation of moderate media channels like Al-Jazeera, Arabi21, Rassd, Al-Araby, Al-Jadeed and Middle East Eye comes from its fears of fanning the Arab Spring type uprising sentiments, seeking democracy in the Middle East. Pressing some raw nerves in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, these media houses have been “objectively” presenting Saudi and Emirati military action in Yemen as a bungled undertaking causing unprecedented humanitarian losses.
While “Vision 2030” (of reducing economic dependency on oil) of this young and energetic crown prince is appreciable,[31] MbS’s belligerence and arrogant hostility towards Iran has remained problematic. His naked threat of “taking the battle to Iran” in a public interview in May 2017 immediately drew strong rebuke from the Iranian defence minister, General Hossein Dehghan, warning against carrying-out “such a stupidity” because in that case, nothing would be “left in Saudi Arabia except Makah and Medina,” the two holy Muslim cities.
Riyadh is further accused by Tehran for funding, what it calls a “terrorist organization” named Iran International, a UK-based Persian-speaking television channel providing coverage of street protests in Iran and telecasting anti-regime interviews.
Little wonder, MbS’s egocentric and impulsive nature[32] has made other Saudi princes taunt him as al-Walad – a boy.
The good news, however, is that since wisdom comes through suffering – or perhaps the absence of a superpower guardian-angel tones down one’s aggressive stance – the Saudi crown prince has adopted a conciliatory regional approach. Under a strategic rethink, Saudi Arabia stopped interfering in the Lebanese politics – after being accused of holding former Lebanese prime minister hostage in 2017. Riyadh also reached out with humanitarian assistance to Bashar al Assad’s government in Syria after the devastating earthquake on February 6, 2023. The House of Saud further agreed to move past the sordid Khashoggi-episode with President Erdogan of Türkiye. Finally, with its strongest partner in Operation Decisive Storm withdrawing the Emirati troops from Yemen in October 2019, Riyadh conceded its military limits and agreed to a UN sponsored ceasefire.
Sanctioning Sectarianism – A Sunni Islamic Military Alliance
Without having a single noteworthy success, the formation of a 41-nation Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) further sowed the seeds of mistrust and fissures among the Muslim faith-followers owing to its sectarian undertone.
Touted to be a Muslim NATO, first of all, none of the forces from Muslim countries except Türkiye, Egypt and Pakistan carries any worthwhile fighting capability or wherewithal to combat terrorism. Out of them, only Pakistan armed forces have the battle-hardened experience of combating a jihadist insurgency in the so-called “war on terror” – and Pakistan had refused to join.
Secondly, it is no secret that the Islamic military alliance against terrorism had in fact been cobbled together against the threat of a Shiite Iran. While Iran too remains blameworthy for destabilizing the Middle East, it is wrongful to isolate and stigmatize a Muslim sect and its military power as the sole source of terror in the region. While the Islamic Military Alliance against Terrorism remains a “ghost force,” it has hardly any capacity to challenge the Iranian military prowess. Despite boasting, Saudis never had the audacity to send their ground forces into Syria or Yemen. Notwithstanding Iran’s strategic restraint, any Saudi military adventure could have resulted into some serious broken crockery in the region under Iranian retaliation.[33]
Third, outcasting the Shiite Iran not only legitimizes Shiite Takfir (apostatization/killing) as heretics, but also incentivizes the terror groups like Daesh, Jundullah, Lashkar-e-Jhangavi-al-Almi, Jaish-ul-Adal, Tehrik-e-Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) to target Shiite community, at will. The world is already witnessing Islamic sectarianism on full display in the shape of targeted attacks against Hazara community in Afghanistan by IS-K and against Shiites in Iran at the hands of Daesh and Jundullah al-Almi.
Conclusion
The Middle East remains an unending “game of thrones,” rife with regional rivalries, power brinkmanship, ideological divisions, sectarian strife and personal animus of headstrong and egocentric rulers. While the powerful Islamic patriarchs have benefited from their superpower benefactors, the satellite Gulf and Arab states pledged their allegiance to these masters to ensure their survival in power and perpetuation of their dynastic rule.
Moreover, Saudi-Iran competition to become “sole-proprietors” of Islam has not only kept the region destabilized by proxy harlot-soldiers but also gifted terror-groups to the world. Ironically, failing to iron-out intra-Muslim conflicts, the Islamic heavyweights like Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council remain toothless elite debating clubs.
Thus, the China’s brokered detente is unlikely to be treated like a holy scripture and will be prone to geopolitical tug-of-war, great power competition, and hegemonic rapacity. Since nature abhors vacuum, U.S. – and EU/NATO’s – loss of world influence after the two failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been duly filled by an emerging “Sino-Russian axis.” While Russia has been strategically exhausting the NATO in a slow and steady “war of attrition” in Ukraine,[34] China has unnerved the U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific – forcing them to spend fortunes on their defence budgets.
Middle East’s problems reside in the Sykes-Picot Accord between Great Britain and France a century ago.[35] With little or no regard for ancestral roots, tribal bonds, sectarian beliefs, cultural ties, and linguistic moors, these powers arbitrarily and unnaturally demarcated borders and installed oppressive monarchies and autocrats over people. In order to perpetuate their hereditary rule and distract the masses from their democratic aspirations, the tyrants have kept their people backward, and entangled in sectarian dissensions and Arab/non-Arab discords. Resultantly, the faith of Islam that has remained fragmented since its birth continues to stay at war with itself.
The international community must counsel Saudi Arabia and Iran to step-back from becoming the paterfamilias of the religion and stop pitting innocent Muslims against each other – a bloodshed ongoing for the past fourteen hundred years. Left to their own devices these autocratic rulers are otherwise hell-bent on destroying the Muslim civilization.
Adnan Qaiser is an international affairs commentator having had a distinguished career in the armed forces as well as international diplomacy. He can be reached at: adnanqaiser1@yahoo.com and Tweets @adnanqaiser01. Views are personal and do not represent any institutional thought. Complete list of Endnotes can be accessed at author’s LinkedIn account: https://www.linkedin.com/in/adnanqaiser1/
Notes
[1] The agreement negotiated in Beijing to restore relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran signalled at least a temporary reordering of the usual alliances and rivalries, with Washington left on the sidelines.
Chinese-Brokered Deal Upends Mideast Diplomacy and Challenges U.S., Peter Baker, The New York Times, Mar 11, 2023
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/us/politics/saudi-arabia-iran-china-biden.html
[2] Adnan Qaiser (Author) Iran’s Out of Bottle Nuclear Genie, South Asia Journal (USA), March 2, 2023
https://southasiajournal.net/irans-out-of-bottle-nuclear-genie/
[3] Adnan Qaiser (Author) The Iranian Nuclear Bomb, South Asia Journal (USA), Aug 6, 2022
https://southasiajournal.net/the-iranian-nuclear-bomb/
[4] Sectarian conflict is becoming entrenched in a growing number of Muslim countries and is threatening to fracture Iraq and Syria. Tensions between Sunnis and Shias, exploited by regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran, could reshape the future Middle East.
The Sunni-Shia Divide: A CFR InfoGuide Presentation, Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/sunni-shia-divide/#!/
[5] Adnan Qaiser (Author) Radical Islamism: Understanding Extremist Narrative and Mindset, Conference of Defence Associations Institute’s On Track magazine, Spring Edition 2017, Page 24, May 2017 http://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ONTRACKSpring2017.pdf
[6] Chris Murphy on the Roots of Radical Extremism, Council on Foreign Relations, Jan 29, 2016
https://www.cfr.org/event/chris-murphy-roots-radical-extremism
[7] Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention: Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Human Rights Council’s Twenty Sixth session Agenda item 4, A/HRC/26/CRP.2, United Nations, Jun 16, 2014
[8] Saudi Arabia has invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects, and believes it could obtain atomic bombs at will, a variety of sources have told BBC Newsnight
Mark Urban, Saudi nuclear weapons ‘on order’ from Pakistan, BBC, Nov 6, 2013
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24823846
[9] Madiha Afzal, Pakistan: Five major issues to watch in 2023, Brookings Institute, Jan 13, 2023
[10] Dilip Hiro, Chapter-12: The Arab Spring—Reversed by a Saudi-Backed Counterrevolution, Cold War in the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy, March 2019, pp. 241–274
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190944650.003.0012
https://academic.oup.com/book/32421/chapter-abstract/268736897?redirectedFrom=fulltext
[11] Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, W.W. Norton & Company, 2007, p. 242
Book Review: The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, The Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, April 11, 2007
https://cmes.fas.harvard.edu/news/shia-revival-how-conflicts-within-islam-will-shape-future
[12] Suzanne Maloney, The Iranian Revolution at Forty, Brookings Institute, February 25, 2020
[13] Officials and insiders say it was only Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah’s stance behind the scenes that halted a meltdown
How 92-year-old Al-Sistani silently halted Iraq’s slide back into war, Arab News, Sept 3, 2022
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2155736/middle-east
[14] Seth G. Jones, War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 11, 2019
https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east
PDF Report:
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190312_IranProxyWar_FINAL.pdf
[15] Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Competition: Great Power Rivalry in a Changing International Order — Concepts and Theories, RAND Corporation, 2022
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1404-1.html
[16] Touted by some as Saudi Arabia’s progressive reformer, Mohammed bin Salman has an ominous human rights record.
Mohammed bin Salman: The dark side of Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Al-Jazeera, Mar 9, 2020
[17] The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, Survey Report, Pew Research Center, Aug 9, 2012
[18] Khaled Ahmed Sectarian War: Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 3, 82-83, 88, 92, 105, 128,136,138
https://www.amazon.com/Sectarian-War-Pakistans-Sunni-Shia-Violence/dp/0199065934
[19] Muhammad Amir Rana, A To Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, Mashal Publication, January 1, 2004, 595pp
https://www.amazon.com/Z-JEHADI-ORGANIZATIONS-PAKISTAN/dp/B003R3QEMK
Also see:
Muhammad Amir Rana, Radicalization in Pakistan: A Comprehensive Study-I, Volume: 3, No. 2, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Apr-Jun 2010
https://pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/205.pdf
[20] A New Era of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan, Report: 327/Asia, International Crisis Group, Sept 5, 2022
https://www.crisisgroup.org/327/asia/south-asia/pakistan/new-era-sectarian-violence-pakistan
PDF Report:
[21] Bruce Riedel, Fifty years after “Black September” in Jordan, Studies in Intelligence, Brookings Institute, Sept 25, 2020
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/fifty-years-after-black-september-in-jordan/
PDF Report:
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/riedel-black-september.pdf
[22] Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University
https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/147?highlight=April+19
[23] Sectarian Violence, Pakistan Security Report 2015 by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), p. 27
https://www.pakpips.com/article/book/pakistan-security-report-2015
[24] Arif Rafiq, Pakistan’s Resurgent Sectarian War, United States Institute for Peace, Nov 2014
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB180-Pakistan-Resurgent-Sectarian-War.pdf
[25] Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, Spy Stories: Inside the Secret World of the R.A.W. and the I.S.I, Juggernaut, Juggernaut Publication (August 17, 2021), p. 171
https://www.amazon.com/Spy-Stories-Inside-R-W/dp/9391165141
[26] Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/index.htm
[27] Salafist/Wahhabite Financial Support To Educational, Social And Religious Institutions, Directorate-General For External Policies of the Union Directorate B Policy Department Study, EXPO/B/AFET /FWC/2009-01/LOT4/22 June, 2013
[28] The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World, Directorate-General For External Policies of the Union Directorate B Policy Department Study
EXPO/B/AFET /FWC/2009-01/Lot4/23 June, 2013
[29] Adnan Qaiser (Author) Islamic Radicalism – A Discussion Series’ Introduction, 14-Part YouTube Discussion, Feb 9, 2020
https://youtu.be/EUJFWOJxXo0
[30] Adnan Qaiser (Author) Islamic Radicalism: The Curse of Boko Haram’s Religious Terrorism, The Geopolitics, Mar 11, 2020
https://thegeopolitics.com/islamic-radicalism-the-curse-of-boko-harams-religious-terrorism/
[31] Shmuel Even and Yoel Guzansky, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030: Reducing the Dependency on Oil, INSS Insight No. 819, The Institute for national Security Studies, May 6, 2016
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/saudi-arabias-vision-2030-reducing-the-dependency-on-oil/
PDF Report:
[32] Graeme Wood, Absolute Power, Global, The Atlantic, Mar 3, 2022
[33] Anthony H. Cordesman, The Strategic Threat from Iranian Hybrid Warfare in the Gulf, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 13, 2019
https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-threat-iranian-hybrid-warfare-gulf
PDF Report:
[34] Adnan Qaiser (Author), Pushing Russia to Nuke Ukraine LinkedIn, July 2, 2022
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cornering-russia-nuke-ukraine-adnan-qaiser-adnan-qaiser/?published=t
[35] The borders of the Middle East were drawn during World War I by a Briton, Mark Sykes, and a Frenchman, Francois Picot.
Marina Ottaway, Learning from Sykes-Picot, Wilson Center
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/learning-sykes-picot
PDF Report: